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CHAIRMAN 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FROM THE ASSEMBLY LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE HEARING 
ON THE STATE/LOCAL FISCAL CRISIS 
JUNE 11, 1990 
ROOM 4202 - STATE CAPITOL 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 
The special hearing of the Assembly Local Government 
Committee was called to order by Chairman Sam Farr upon 
PHONE 1916)445·6034 
adjournment of the Assembly Ways and Means Committee. That body 
had just adopted its subcommittee reports for the state's 1990-91 
budget. There was an air of gloom surrounding those proceedings, 
since committee members realized that there was yet much work to 
be done on the budget in order to meet a projected $3.6 billion 
shortfall. 
Chairman Farr pointed out that one reason for the meeting was 
to discuss the impacts of the Governor's proposed budget on 
counties. The Administration's suggestions for managing the 
budget crisis included further reductions in local appropriations. 
The objectives of the hearing were to help assess the counties' 
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fiscal condition, to discuss the impact of changes in state appro-
priations to the counties, and to evaluate potential solutions to 
the fiscal crisis. 
Farr indicated that he hoped the testimony would help to 
answer three questions: 
1) What kind of services should counties 
provide? 
2) Do counties have sufficient discretion to 
raise revenues to meet desired service 
levels? 
3) Should the Legislature consider realigning 
counties' fiscal responsibilities? 
The Chairman acknowledged several parties who helped with 
hearing preparations, including county representatives, CalTax, 
the staff of the Senate and Assembly Revenue Taxation Committees, 
and Judi Smith of the Ways and Means Committee. 
OVERVIEW 
The first segment of testimony at the hearing provided an 
overview of both the state and counties' fiscal condition. Mr. 
Pete Schaafsma of the Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO), outlined 
the state's financial situation. He indicated that the state 
would fall about $3.5 billion short of funding the 1990-91 budget, 
depending on priorities and assuming a $1 billion reserve. The 
passage of Proposition 111 on June 5 resulted in about $2.1 
billion of "room" in the state's Gann limit. However, even if the 
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state could raise revenues to fill the limit, about $900 million 
of that revenue must be directed to schools under the provisions 
of Proposition 98. That only leaves $1.1 billion to address the 
shortfall. 
Mr. Dick Simpson, Director of the California Counties 
Foundation Research Division of the County Supervisors Association 
of California (CSAC), shared with the committee some preliminary 
results of a study currently in progress. The study includes 
information gathered during site visits to 18 counties and surveys 
completed by all the counties. 
Simpson's testimony indicated that in the past it was 
primarily the small, rural counties that were subject to financial 
problems. However, fiscal stress has now hit the large counties 
as well. The crisis has been developing for some time but was 
masked by the AB 8 bailout, stabilization legislation, and 
property tax growth. The problem, according to Simpson and other 
witnesses, is "structural." Counties' ability to generate revenue 
does not match its required expenditures. (See Appendix D) 
Simpson cited the financial status of the counties visited 
during the study. Almost all 18 were in financial distress, 
anticipating shortfalls in meeting their 1990-91 budgets. While 
there was some diversity in the reasons for this duress, common 
themes were costs associated with construction and operation of 
new jails, programs required by the state but operated and at 
least partially funded by counties, and inability to raise 
adequate revenues. 
Ms. Juliet Musso of the Legislative Analyst's Office 
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indicated that while there is no direct link between the results 
of the CSAC study and the Analyst's report on "Variations in 
County Fiscal Capacity, The 1990-91 Budget: Perspectives and 
Issues, pp. 323-344," the LAO study outlines a similar problem 
(See Appendix E). 
The LAO report defines county fiscal capacity as "the ability 
of a county to meet whatever public service needs may arise in its 
community with the resources it has available to it. Low fiscal 
capacity leads to fiscal distress when the imbalance between 
resources and responsibilities leads the county to have severe 
difficulty addressing service needs." Musso indicated that there 
were several items in the Governor's budget that would further 
reduce counties' fiscal capacity: a reduction in AB 8 
appropriations, deferment of mandate reimbursement; and a 
reduction in MIA (Medically Indigent Adult Program) funds. She 
suggested that the Legislature provide adequate funding for the 
county stabilization program and a "slush fund" to help counties 
balance their budgets on a very targeted basis. 
Musso also discussed the problem of county costs associated 
with state-required programs. Under provisions of the State 
Constitution, the state must reimburse local governments only for 
programs enacted after 1974 and not disclaimed under specific 
conditions. As a result, the majority of costs associated with 
required programs are not reimbursed. The LAO estimates that, for 
the latest year in which data are available, the counties spent 
$3.7 billion of local revenue for state-required programs. Of 
these costs, only $46 million were reimbursed by the state. 
- 4 -
Mr. Fred Klass of the Department of Finance responded to 
Chairman Parr's questions regarding the administration's current 
proposals to balance the budget. Klass indicated that the 
Governor is meeting with leaders of the Senate and Assembly to 
determine a course of action. With regard to Butte County, there 
will be no bailout proposal from the Department of Finance until 
the county's budget situation is clear. 
IMPACTS OF THE GOVERNOR'S 1990-91 BUDGET PROPOSALS 
As proposed in January, the Governor's budget would have made 
cuts in county appropriations in several areas. Mr. Cliff 
Allenby, Secretary of the Health and Welfare Agency, indicated 
that he had "no good news" for the committee. Although the 
Legislature has modified the Governor's budget, further reductions 
must be made to accommodate the state's revenue shortfall. 
Allenby indicated that the Legislature and the Governor will have 
to look at the resources available and fund the priority programs. 
The state may have to reduce requirements it has placed on 
counties. He agreed with Chairman Farr that program decisions 
should be made -- to the extent possible --- by the agency which 
has the resources. 
Santa Cruz County Chief Administrative Officer, Ms. Susan 
Mauriello, cited examples of the effects of reduced state 
appropriations. Proposed cuts in the In-Home Supportive Services 
Program (IHSS) would cause a reduction or elimination of services 
for at least 750 people in her county. It would also cause a loss 
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of wages for their caregivers who may then need other county 
services themselves. Another major cause for uneasiness is 
threatened cuts in services for children and families. Reductions 
in licensing requirements for day care homes is particularly 
frightening. 
Mauriello related to the committee that she had just returned 
from New York where she had met with a rating agency in 
conjunction with pursuing debt financing for the county. She 
discussed an indirect effect of California's state/local fiscal 
crisis: rating agencies are watching the California situation 
very closely and the inability of its public agencies to raise 
sufficient revenue to match its obligations could have an adverse 
impact on bond ratings. 
The October 17, 1989, earthquake also produced a crisis. In 
the aftermath, state and local agencies pulled together to manage 
the disaster and work toward normalcy. Mauriello suggested that 
this same type of cooperative effort should be employed to respond 
to the current fiscal dilemma. 
Ms. Karen Coker, CSAC Legislative Representative, outlined 
the consequences of the budget crisis in the health and welfare 
area, particularly in the following programs: AB 8/County Health 
Services, Medically Indigent Services, Mental Health, Child 
Welfare, In-Home Supportive Services, and Medi-Cal Optional 
Benefits (See Appendix F). 
According to Coker, a common consequence of these program 
reductions is that they are noneconomic. Reductions in one 
program would result in increased demands on another, either 
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immediately or in the future. For example, if counties do not 
maintain a prescribod love] of servico in certain programs, they 
will not be eligible to receive tobacco tax funds under AB 75. 
Also, treatment or preventive care not administered now will 
result in additional health and welfare impacts now and in the 
future. This was graphically illustrated by a list of referrals 
not assigned for treatment by the public health nurse in Yolo 
County due to lack of staff. The cases included premature babies 
with respiratory problems, a low birthweight baby with signs of 
abuse, numerous pregnant women with problems including physical 
abuse, retardation, and drug abuse. 
Supervisor Don Perata of Alameda County told the Committee 
that his county's biggest problems are crack cocaine, homeless-
ness, and AIDS. The county faces a $50 million gap in its 1990-91 
budget. Further reductions in state funds will compound the 
problem, both financially and pragmatically. More cuts will 
result in more crime and greater health problems, partially 
because the county will have to close a jail and its hospital. 
Poor persons in need of medical care will have difficulty finding 
it since other providers are reluctant to treat MediCal patients 
because of inadequate compensation and excessive paperwork. 
OPTIONS FOR COUNTIES 
The last panel of witnesses at the hearing had been asked to 
address possible solutions to the current fiscal situation. Their 
suggestions included both short- and long-term responses. 
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Supervisor Perata stated that the counties' partnership with 
the state is no longer working. They are expected to administer 
programs for the state but lack the revenues to do so. Alameda 
County is looking at several internal so ions in an attempt to 
manage its own shortfall. These include asking employees to 
forego raises, closing county offices one day a month, and selling 
off county assets such as the Coliseum and fairgrounds. Perata 
noted, however, that disposing of these assets would not even 
raise enough money to keep the hospital in operating condition. 
Mr. Perata suggested several courses the Legislature might 
pursue, given the current financial situation: 
1) Suspend the provisions of Proposition 98 
for a year to free up more money for the 
general fund. 
2) Expand the alcohol tax increase proposed in 
ACA 38 (Cortese). 
3) Extend the sunset date on the 1/4 cent 
sales tax currently imposed for earthquake 
relief. 
4) Eliminate the MediCal program since "it 
can't be reformed." 
5) Buy out the General Assistance program 
currently operated by counties. 
Perata told the committee that counties can't take further 
reductions in state appropriations: "There ain't no more to cut. 
Too many people here are no longer living in a Golden State." (See 
Appendix G) 
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Supervisor Jane Dolan of Butte County told the committee that 
her county will probably file bankruptcy later this summer. 
County officials see no other rvvay of handling their financial 
deficit. She had four suggestions for legislative action that 
could help the county on a long term basis: 
1) Revisit AB 8: the program does not 
recognize population growth which has a 
substantial impact on case loads and the 
cost of the program. 
2) Put counties on the same footing as cities 
with regard to their ability to raise 
revenues. 
3) Recognize that programs for the needy (e.g. 
AFDC, General Assistance, Public Defender, 
etc.) are state programs and have the state 
take responsibility for them. 
4) Change the redevelopment laws to prevent 
the drain on county treasuries. 
Mr. Clark Channing, Chief Administrative Officer of Merced 
County and President of the County Administrative Officers 
Association, suggested that the first priority should be to 
determine an appropriate level of service for state programs 
carried out by counties. This step will help to determine the 
revenue options which should be made available to counties. He 
referred to the options outlined in the committee's background 
report as a starting place. Channing pledged that his colleagues 
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would be available to assist the Legislature in establishing 
priorities and evaluating revenue options (See Appendix H). 
Ms. Rebecca Taylor, Vice-President of the California 
Taxpayers Association (CalTax), recounted to the committee the 
results of a CalTax study which showed that counties are "most 
under the gun of all local agencies." To compound this, counties 
are not equal players in annexations and redevelopment. 
Taylor said that there is no fiscal accountability in 
California. The state establishes programs and then requires that 
counties administer and finance them. CalTax believes that the 
state must fund its mandates. Taylor suggested three options for 
the committee's consideration: 
1) Require a two-thirds vote of the 
Legislature for approval of any mandate. 
2) Make the state responsible for state 
programs. 
3) Redesign the disability retirement program 
because it creates an unreasonable burden 
for public agencies. 
In addition, witnesses from previous segments of the hearing 
suggested several options in their testimony. Ms. Musso 
discussed, without endorsing four short-term options as follows: 
1) A waiver of county match requirements, as 
provided in AB 2800 (Farr) could give 
"hundreds of millions of dollars" of 
relief. 
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2) If the Legislature provided "targeted 
relief" to counties it could use as an 
index of fiscal stress the growth rate in 
local purposes revenue. 
3) Fully funding the Revenue Stabilization 
program with a 1990-91 appropriation of $40 
million to $50 million. 
4) Provide a "slush fund" in 1990-91 to help 
counties balance their budgets. 
Cliff Allenby argued that the state and the counties need to 
work together to solve state/local fiscal problems. Mr. Allenby 
said that although he would prefer to increase appropriations for 
counties, revenues are insufficient to cover all funding needs. 
Allenby suggested consideration of the following options: 
1) Decategorization, even though previous 
proposals for block grants have failed 
passage. 
2) Reduction in program requirements. 
3) Increased flexibility to counties in 
administering programs. 
In general, he believes that local government, rather than the 
state, should have authority to make program and funding decisions 
because local government is the best source for decision making. 
CSAC's Coker suggested that if cutbacks could not be avoided, 





Printed on Recycled Paner 
1) Decategorize mental health funds so they 
could be allocated according to local 
needs. 
2) Exempt counties from the costly Beilenson 
Act hearings required to be held prior to 
reducing services or closing facilities. 
3) Modify the maintenance of effort 
requirements of AB 75 which are required to 
receive Proposition 99 funds. 
Channing compared the current state/local fiscal crisis to 
the casualties resulting from the Lorna Prieta earthquake in 
October of 1989. He also suggested that the state take action now 
similar to the level of response it exhibited following the 
earthquake. 
Larry Naake, Executive Director of CSAC, told the committee 
that the state needs to have a serious discussion regarding the 
role of counties. The "dual role" where counties act both as the 
arm of the state and as municipal service providers has been 
eroded. He suggested establishing a goal for a ratio of 
discretionary vs. nondiscretionary funds for counties. 
Naake urged the Legislature to pursue structural reform of 
the state/county relationship. Such a reform could include: 
1) Revision of the current mandate system. 
2) Reallocation of revenues and programs 
(realignment). 
3) Provision of a local source of revenues. 
- 12 -
Pnnted on Recycled Paper 
• 
4) Transferal of the court system to the 
state. 
For realignment, the state could assume all costs associated with 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and trial court 
funding. The counties could assume the costs for mental health, 
health, and social services, provided an adequate revenue source 
was made available (See Appendix I). 
Chairman Farr thanked the participants for their contribu-
tions and their patience. He said that he would like to work 
toward a "local government vision" of how to provide and pay for 
services and asked the witnesses for their cooperation in crafting 
a legislative proposal to restructure our current system. He also 
indicated that discussions would continue regarding solutions to 
the current state/county budget situation. 
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STATE/LOCAL FISCAL CRISIS 
June 11, 1990 
Room 4202, State Capitol 
3:00 - 5:00 p.m. 
Introduction 
STATE CAPITOL 
P.O BOX 942849 
SACRAMENTO, CA 94249-0001 
PHONE !916J445..fi034 
Through each budget bill, the state annually appropriates 
billions of dollars to local governments. For 1990-91, the 
Governor originally proposed to appropriate $2.5 billion in 
General fund money directly to counties, cities and special 
districts. Of this amount, all but $200 million would.fund either 
specific programs of statewide interest or reimburse local 
governments for costs associated with legislative mandates. In 
addition, the governor proposed an additional $11 billion in local 
assistance for individuals and service providers for health and 




Printed on Recycled Paper 
As the Legislature considers how to accommodate its 
multi-billion dollar deficit, it may wish to reduce some local 
assistance appropriations. Counties would be particularly 
vulnerable to any such reductions in appropriations. They 
administer more programs of statewide interest than do cities and 
special districts. Yet, they generally have less discretion to 
raise revenue. Consequently, if the state wishes to reduce state 
appropriations to counties and maintain service levels, it must 
provide additional revenue raising authority to the counties. 
This informational hearing has been called so that interested 
parties may assist the Legislature in its deliberations on how to 
adjust the state-county fiscal relationship. This paper contains 
a brief description of the existing county fiscal structures and 
an outline of county-based expenditure and income options. 
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Overview of the County Fiscal Structure 
The state's 58 counties provide a variety of services. As 
political subdivisions of the state, counties serve as 
administrative arms for the state by administering programs in the 
areas of public health and welfare, courts, jails and criminal 
justice, and elections. Even though they also address parochial 
needs, these programs substantially serve a statewide interest. 
Counties also function as independent governmental entities 
which provide or coordinate many services which are primarily 
local in nature. Service levels and programmatic decisions are 
made primarily at the local level. In this capacity, counties 
levy, assess, collect and allocate the property tax. They also 
provide sheriff's patrols, libraries, parks and transportation 
programs. In unincorporated areas they also provide essential 
municipal services. 
The counties' 1989-90 budgeted appropriations, as detailed in 
the counties' adopted budgets, are listed in Table 1. The table 
divides county appropriations into nine traditional categories and 
lists both dollars appropriated and the share of appropriations 
made in each category. 
TABLE 1 
BUDGET REQUIREMENTS BY FUNCTION 1989-90 
(Dollars ) 
Function Amount Percent of 
















Total, Public Protection 
Public Ways and Facilities 
Health and Sanitation 
Public Assistance 
Welfare Administration 
Social Service & Aid 
Medical Services 
General Relief 
Care of Court Wards 
Veteran's Services 
Other Assistance 
Total, Public Assistance 
Education 
Recreation and Cultural 
Services 
Debt Service 
Reserves & Contingencies 































Totals do not include City and County of San Francisco. 










Source: State Controller's Office, County Budget Requirements and 
Means of Financing (1989-90). 
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As seen from this display, public assistance and public protection 
services account for more than half of a county's appropriations. 
The cost for these programs, together with costs for public health 
programs, are difficult to control because service levels are 
often prescribed in state law and because expenditures are often 
caseload driven. 
County services are financed through a combination of local 
revenues, federal and state transfers and debt. Table 2 displays 
the amount of budgeted revenue from these sources, together with 
each source's share of the total. As displayed, state transfers 






MEANS OF FINANCING, BY SOURCE 
(Dollars in Millions) 





Licenses and Permits 
Fines, Forfeitures & Penalties 





Charges for Current Services 
Other Revenues 





Fund Balance 1,048.2 
Cancellations of 
Prior-Year Reserves 129.8 
Total, Other Available Funds 
















Totals do not include the City and County of San Francisco. 
Data do not include "enterprise activities." 
Source: State Controller's Office, County Budget Requirements 












County reliance on state transfers increased 1980s 
and is likely to continue. This is primarily due to tax 
limitations imposed throughout the last 12 
the passage of Proposition 13. As 
in 1988: 
Prior to the voters' 1 
governments had direct control over 
revenue source, the property tax. 
independently raise the level of taxes 
both the programs desired by their c zens 
required by state law. Now, revenue 
significance remaining under county control 
current services, which accounted for 8 percent 
county revenues in 1984-85. (Legislative fice, 
The 1987-88 Budget: Perspectives and Issues, p. 247.) 
As described in the revenue section of this tax 
limitations imposed by Proposition 13 
Proposition 62, while a series of court 
define the impact of these initiatives. 
As counties increase their reliance on state trans I 
budgets run the risk of reflecting statewide, 
priorities. When the state transfers revenue, o 
that the counties provide some assurance that the trans 
funds are spent with some accountabil Moreover 
make transfers while attempting to achieve 
objectives by funding specific, statutorily-defined programs. 
Thus, while state transfers may increase revenues, may 
not increase the amount of revenues avail of 
parochial or discretionary interest. 
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Local Assistance Programs Recently Adopted by the Legislature 
In the past several years, the Legislature has provided 
additional funding to help the counties manage within their 
limited budgets. Most notable are the Trial Court Funding and 
Revenue Stabilization programs. 
The Trial Court Funding program was established by SB 612 
(Presley)--Chapter 945, Statutes of 1988. The program provides 
local assistance by (1) supplementing salaries for municipal and 
justice court judges, and (2) providing block grants for funding 
trial court operating expenses and supplements for new judgeships, 
In 1989-90, the program provided $400 million in additional money 
to counties. Because most of the additional money offset costs 
which would have been financed through local discretionary 
revenues, the program serves to "free-up" discretionary money for 
most counties. The Governor proposes expenditures of $455 
million. 
The Revenue Stabilization program was enacted by adoption of 
AB 650 (Costa)--Chapter 1286, Statutes of 1987. This program 
helps protect counties from spending an increasing share of their 
discretionary funds to meet their match requirements on four 
welfare programs: Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(excluding Foster Care), In-Home Supportive Services, Community 
Mental Health, and Food Stamps. Under the program, whenever a 
county spends a greater share of its general purpose 
("discretionary") revenues than it did in 1981-82, the county 
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receives a subsidy through an appropriation of stabilization 
program funds. The subsidy can be up to the full amount of those 
county costs in excess of the county's 1981-82 ratio. The program 
has never been fully funded, so counties receive subsidies on a 
pro rata basis. 
Mandates 
In addition to these assistance programs, counties receive 
subventions for funding certain reimburseable mandates. As 
specified in Section 6 of Article XIII B of the State Constitu-
tion, the state must reimburse local agencies for costs incurred 
whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new 
program or higher level of service for local agencies. Under the 
Constitution, subventions are not required if the mandate results 
from the request of the agency affected, legislation defining a 
new crime, or legislation changing the definition of a crime. 
Importantly, the Constitution does not require reimbursement 
for programs or services resulting from legislation enacted prior 
to adoption of Section 6 in 1974. As a result, cost increases 
associated with programs pre-dating the constitutional protections 
may only be partially funded by the state. 
Procedurally, local agencies may obtain reimbursement of 
state mandated costs in two ways. First, the legislation creating 
the mandate may appropriate funds for reimbursement of increased 




the State Controller for its share of these funds. Second, if the 
original legislation does not appropriate sufficient funds for the 
mandate, a local agency may file a "test claim" with the 
Commission on State Mandates. After a noticed public hearing 
process, the Commission makes a determination on the merits of the 
test claim, and if it finds that a reimburseable mandate exists, 
the commission requests funding for the mandate from the 
Legislature in the form of a local government "claims bill". Once 
these funds have been appropriated for the costs of a mandate, any 
local agency which believes it is entitled to a reimbursement may 
file a claim with the Controller. 
In addition, an appellate court decision, Carmel Valley Fire 
Protection District v. State of California, provides a mechanism 
for enforcing the state's constitutional obligation to reimburse 
mandate costs. Under the terms of the decision, under most 
circumstances, if the Legislature fails to appropriate funds for 
reimburseable mandates, the courts can order the payments made 
from the operating budgets of state agencies. In addition, the 
courts may authorize local governments to satisfy unpaid claims by 
offsetting the claim amount against other money the local 
government owes the state. 
Recently, the Legislative Analyst estimated that counties 
spent $3.7 billion in local revenue on unreimbursed and 
state-required programs in 1987-88 (the latest year for which data 
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were available). Some believe that the vast majority of these 
unfunded requirements were imposed prior to adoption of the 
constitutional reimbursement procedures, and therefore, part of 
the state's historical programmatic partnership within counties. 
Table 3 details these estimates by program area. 
TABLE 3 
COUNTY EXPENDITURES 
OF LOCAL REVENUES FOR STATE-REQUIRED PROGRAMS 1987-88 
(Dollars in Millions) 
Program Areas Amount Percent 
Judicial $1,495 40.8% 
Corrections 1,140 31.1 
County Health Services 284 7.8 
Mental Health 91 2.5 
AFDC 321 8.8 
IHSS 18 . 5 
Food Stamps 111 3.0 
General Assistance 200 5.5 
TOTAL $3,660 100% 
Source: Legislative Analyst's Office 
Importantly, the Analyst's estimates does not reflect changes in 
state-funded local assistance developed since 1987-88. The Trial 
Court Funding program has provided significant amounts of new 
revenue for corrections programs. Even with this new money, 
however, it appears that counties will continue to use billions 




Structural Adjustments Advocated 
County expenditures and revenues are out of balance. 
According to the Legislative Analyst, the counties' "fiscal 
difficulties . are long-term and structural in nature." When 
considering how to make structural changes, the Legislature may 
want to consider the components of the structure: 
(1) Service Levels. What kinds of services should counties 
provide? 
(2) Revenues. Do counties and their voters have sufficient 
discretion to raise revenues to meet desired levels of 
service? 
(3) Alignment of Program and Funding Responsibilities. Are a 
county's programmatic responsibilities funded from 
appropriate sources? 
The state can help restructure county finances by adjusting either 
the expenditure or income side of the county's fiscal equation, as 




One way to improve the local balance sheet is to reduce county 
costs financed with local funds. The state can help reduce county 
costs in three ways: 
1. Waive Local Match or Cost-Share Requirements. 
The Legislative Analyst estimates that local governments will 
spend $1.3 billion in 1990-91 to meet state cost-share or match 
requirements. A waiver of these requirements would provide 
local governments with savings. 
If it authorizes the waiver, the Legislature may or may not 
require the state to backfill for the local cost share/match. 
If the state backfills, its costs increase. If the state does 
not backfill, program expenditures (and potentially service 
levels) will fall. 
Those favoring local match/share requirements argue that they 
improve the delivery of locally-administered programs. When a 
county has a financial stake in the cost of a program, it may 




2. Suspend Unfunded Local Mandates. 
The state could suspend some of the mandates which are not an 
essential governmental function until sufficient revenues are 
available. In a more extreme action, the state could repeal 
these mandates outright. 
3. Reguire the State to Pay for More Local Programs. 
Assuming that local service levels are appropriate (or should 
be raised), cost relief may be structured to shift costs from 
the county to the state. The state could increase its revenue 
sharing with the counties (increase its share of jail 
construction costs), or it could take over programs (such as 
General Assistance). Given the state's revenue shortfall, 







Since Proposition 13, initiatives, statutes, court decisions and 
legal opinions have combined to limit local government's ability 
to raise or impose new taxes. The following is a history of these 
limitations: 
1. Proposition 13 
This initiative established the basic tax limitations. It 
introduced, but did not define, the distinction between 
"general" tax levies imposed with a majority vote and 
"special" tax levies approved with a 2/3rds majority vote. A 
definition was supplied in the Farrell decision. 
2. City and County of San Francisco v Farrell 
When the San Francisco voters approved a gross receipts tax by 
55 percent margin, the city controller refused to certify that 
the funds were available for appropriation. The controller, 
John Farrell, argued that the tax levy was a special tax, 
imposed without the 2/3rds vote requirement required by 
Proposition 13. In this case, the Appellate Court defined 
"special" tax as a tax levied for a specific purpose. Under 
this definition, the San Francisco tax was not a special tax. 




3. Los Angeles Transportation Commission v Richmond 
The court considered whether a transit district could levy a 
transactions and use tax ("local sales tax") without meeting 
the stricter special tax super-majority vote requirements. 
The court ruled that the higher vote requirements did not 
apply because: (a) the transit district had taxing authority 
existing prior to the enactment of Proposition 13, and (b) 
even if it did not have this existing authority, Proposition 
13 was a property tax measure and did not apply to a district 
which had no property taxing authority. 
The court left open whether the lack of property tax authority 
was in itself sufficient to exempt a district or agency from 
the special tax provisions. Questions about the vote 
requirements for general tax levies made by special districts. 
4. Proposition 62 
With this statutory initiative, the voters attempted to codify 
the distinctions between special and general taxes, as defined 
in Farrell. 
The initiative also required the Legislature to authorize 
districts to levy special taxes. In the wake of this 
initiative, the Legislature has authorized the use of special 




In addition, Proposition 62 did not provide sufficient 
guidance on the levy of general taxes by special districts. 
Given the terms of the Richmond decision, important questions 
remain about the conditions under which the Legislature may 
authorize a district to levy general taxes with a majority 
vote. 
5. Schopflin v Dole 
I In this case, the court addressed questions about the election 
• 
requirements imposed by Proposition 62. Although the case has 
been decertified and therefore applies only to taxes in Sonoma 
County, the logic of the case important. In Schopflin, the 
court held that the vote requirements in Proposition 62, 
amounting to a referendum on a tax levy, are a violation of 
Article 2, Section 9 of the California Constitution. The case 
raises questions about whether the statutory provisions of 
Proposition 62, by its own terms in requiring elections on 
levies, is unconstitutional. 
Within this context, the Legislature has attempted to 
authorize counties to establish new districts with general taxing 
authority. In particular: 
o SB 142 (Deddeh)--Chapter 786, Statutes of 1987, authorized 
counties to create transportation districts. The 
legislation also authorized the district to fund 
transportation improvements with an additional sales tax 
levy of up to 1%. The tax could be imposed with a majority 
vote of the electorate. 
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o AB 999 (Farr)--Chapter 1257, Statutes of 1987, authorized 
counties to impose half-cent sales tax increases in small 
counties, provided that the increase was placed on the 
ballot by the board of supervisors and approved by a 
majority of the electorate. 
o AB 2505 (Stirling)--Chapter 1258, Statutes of 1987, 
authorized San Diego to establish a jail financing agency 
and to levy a half-cent sales tax with an approval by a 
simple majority of the voters. 
o AB 1067 (Hauser)--Chapter 1335, Statutes of 1989, 
authorized the formation of a local j 1 authority, whose 
governing board had a majority made up of county 
supervisors. The legislation authorized the jail's 
governing board to levy a sales tax increase with a 
majority voter approval. 
The provisions of AB 2507 and AB 1067 were successfully 
challenged when the courts invalidated the bills' simple majority 
provisions. In these cases, judges found that legislation 
made an impermissible attempt to circumvent the 2/3rds vote 
requirements on special taxes. In addition, Attorney General 
issued an opinion (number 89-604) stating the vote 
requirement in AB 999 was tantamount to a referendum on a tax 
levy. As such, the referendum was in conflict with Section 9 of 
Article II of the State Constitution, and therefore 
unconstitutional. 
Twelve years after Proposition 13, counties face a great deal 
of confusion about the procedures and conditions for levying 
general taxes. Until a definitive, higher court opinion is 
rendered, local governments will operate with suspicions about the 
security and constitutionality of their newly imposed general tax 
levies. If the Legislature grants new or higher taxing authority, 
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it will have to craft legislation within the narrow constraints 
imposed throughout the last 12 years. 
Options 
1. Broaden the General Tax Base. 
There are several multi-million dollar exemptions in the sales 
and use tax law and the property tax law. Selectively closing 
the existing "loopholes" -- even temporarily -- will increase 
money allocated to local governments. The Assembly Revenue and 
Taxation Committee is preparing a list of revenue raising 
options. 
2. Impose or Authorize New Taxes 
Under current law, cities have taxing authority that counties 
lack, including the authority to levy: 
o Business License Taxes. 
taxes for regulatory and 
imposed on the number of 
quantity produced. Most 
gross income. 
Cities may impose business license 
revenue purposes. Taxes may be 
employees, receipts, sales or 
often, the tax is on a business' 
o Utility Users Taxes. Cities impose gross receipt taxes on 
utilities (including water, electricity, natural gas and 
cable television). 
The Legislature could extend to counties the same authority 
that cities have. The actual levy would be made by counties, 




3. Selectively Raise Rates on Existing Taxes. 
The Legislature may consider raising taxes through the 
following mechanisms: 
o Raise Rates on Statewide Taxes. The state imposes several 
general taxes including the Sales and Use, Personal Income, 
and Bank and Corporation taxes. It also imposes special 
taxes, including the Use Fuel Tax, and the Motor Vehicle Fuel 
Tax. The state may consider increasing county revenue by 
raising the tax rates on these taxes, and dedicating the 
additional revenue to counties. Any increases would have to 
be made consistent with Propositions 13 and 4. 
o Increase the Emergency Telephone Number (9-1-1) Account Tax. 
This is a state-imposed tax, but revenues are distributed to 
counties for their emergency dispatch costs. Revenue 
increases could be dedicated to county emergency services. 
The tax can be raised administratively by the director of 
general services, up from the current .69 percent rate to a 
.75 percent rate. The rate cap could be increased by the 
Legislature. 
o Reguire that Selected Local Fees Cover the Entire Cost of 
Providing Service. Current law prohibits counties from 
charging fees in excess of the costs of providing the 
service, but does not require counties to levy fees equal to 
the costs of service. In some cases, it is not appropriate 
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for fees to fully support a government service. Essential 
government services or social programs (such as parks and 
recreation programs) should be financed in part through 
general taxes. However, discretionary services, such as 
parking and some development regulation, should be 
self-supporting. 
To the extent that some discretionary services are not fully 
self-supporting, the Legislature could require that fees be 
raised to cover all administrative and programmatic costs, as 
a prerequisite for receiving further state assistance. 
o Authorize an Additional Local Documentary Transfer Tax. 
Under current law, a city and county may impose a tax 
whenever a property title transfers. A lower court decision 
found that this tax is exempt from the Proposition 13 limits. 
The current documentary transfer tax is 55 cents per $500 of 
assessed value. 
o Authorize a Parcel Tax on Real Property. Under current law, 
counties may impose parcel taxes in limited circumstances 
with the approval of 2/3rds of the electorate. This 
authority could be expanded. 
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4. Facilitate Adjustments to Fiscal Relationships Among Local 
Governments. 
Counties have complex and differing fiscal relationships with 
their cities and special districts. Constitutional and 
statutory law defines how flexible these relationships may be. 
With regard to cities, existing provisions of the California 
Constitution and statutory law require that any sales tax 
sharing agreement negotiated between a city and county must be 
approved by a majority of the voters in each jurisdiction. 
These provisions make tax sharing agreements subject to 
referendum. As a result, it may be difficult to ratify 
agreements which reflect agreements negotiated to account for 
modest or subtle changes in city-county fiscal changes or 
needs. 
The Legislature can make negotiated tax sharing agreements 
easier by: (1) helping to remove constitutional limits by 
placing a constitutional amendment before the voters, and (2) 
providing through statute incentives for cities and counties to 
negotiate tax-sharing agreements. 
For special districts, current law establishes a mechanism for 
counties to allocate property tax revenues among its special 
districts. This mechanism includes allocations from the 
Special District Augmentation Fund (SDAF). The county board of 
supervisors has discretion in allocating SDAF money, so that 
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districts that have "surplus" revenues can help subsidize those 
districts with insufficient revenues. 
A recent appellate court decision found that, for Sacramento 
County only, a district established after 1978-79 is not 
required to participate in the county's SDAF. This opinion 
could encourage wealthy districts to reform into "new" 
districts and withdraw from the SDAF. If this happens, 
counties would have more difficulty ensuring sufficient funding 
for its poorer special districts. 
The court's decision does not prevent the Legislature from 
compelling new special districts to participate in the SDAF 
mechanism. If the Legislature amended the SDAF law to compel 
districts' participation, it would be preserving county fiscal 
discretion. 
Potential New Limitation on Taxing Authority 
An initiative in circulation for signatures on the November 
1990 ballot, "The Taxpayers' Right-To-Vote Act of 1990," would 
appear to: (1) further limit a local agency's ability to impose 
special taxes, and (2) limit state and local tax increases imposed 
on tangible personal property (including sales and excise taxes). 
The Act has an effective date concurrent with the November 
election date, rather than the standard date of the day after the 
election. If the Right-to-Vote Act passes, authorizing and 
imposing new increased taxes will become more difficult. 
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The Legislature could -- under limited circumstances --
preserve state and local flexibility by authorizing new or 
increased taxes under the existing requirements, rather than the 
under the stiffer requirements of the Right-to-Vote Act, if it 
acts in the current session. 
Any increase in revenues (and corresponding increase in 
expenditures) would be subject to state and/or local 
appropriations limits. 
Adjustments to the Fees on Vehicles May Be Necessary. 
Under current law, the state taxes vehicles on two percent of 
"market value," depreciated at a statutory rate. Market value is 
the cost to the purchaser of a new vehicle. When a used vehicle 
is sold, the VLF is based on the original owner's market value, 
and continues to be depreciated at the statutory rate. The State 
Constitution dedicates VLF revenues to cities and counties. 
Statute allocates the revenues with a population-based formula. 
Revenues are distributed to cities and counties by a formula that 
is in part based on population. 
The state could potentially raise more vehicle license 
revenues in at least two ways: 
(1) Adjust the current depreciation schedule so that a 
vehicle depreciates at a slower rate (i.e., the taxable 
value stays higher longer). 
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(2) Adjust the taxable value on used cars so that it 
reflects the sales price at the time the vehicle is 
resold. Depreciation is restarted at the top of the 
depreciation schedule. 
Recently, an appellate court ruled that the state's laws imposing 
the Vehicle License Fees (VLF) denied due process to vehicle 
owners who made out-of-state purchases, and interfered with the 
Federal Commerce Clause which prevents restrictions on interstate 
commerce. The decision requires remediation. The State Supreme 
Court has agreed to take this case. If the state's appeal fails, 
then the Attorney General must develop a plan to remedy the past 
overcharges. One proposal is to increase taxes to market value 
(as outlined in (2) above), and to refund an $800 million in 
excess VLF charges, and about $1 billion in use taxes. A decision 
is expected before 1991. 
Realignment 
Realignment transfers a state-administered or -funded program 
to the county with a revenue source which generates revenue in 
excess of the program's costs. As an example, the state could 
shift both the funding responsibilities for the Medically Indigent 
Services Program (MISP), and an equivalent amount of state sales 
tax revenue. This shift would provide counties with a sufficient 
and stable revenue source they could use to fund their new fiscal 
responsibility. 
Realignment provides the state with the advantages of reduced 
appropriations under the State Appropriations Limit. However, 
these advantages have to be weighed against the state's loss of 
program control, design and administration. 
Options 
1. Shift MISP Responsibilities. 
As described above, counties could assume from the state the 
fiscal responsibilities for MISP. 
By dedicating additional sales tax revenues to the counties, 
counties will have a sufficient and growing revenue source to 
finance the program. 
2. Return "AB 8" Health Programs to Counties. 
After enactment of Proposition 13 and in response to the 
proposition's reduction in county revenues, the Legislature 
"bought out" a share of local health programs through AB 8 (L. 
Greene), Chapter 282, Statutes of 1979. This program was 
intended to provide a stable, permanent funding source for 
county health services. Current year General Fund expenditures 
for this program are estimated at $470 million. The Governor 
proposes reducing state appropriations for AB 8 funding in 




Prior to Proposition 13, "AB B" programs were funded with local 
revenues. If a sufficiently large (and growing) revenue source 
or sources can be extended to counties (such as combining an 
increase in VLF and authority for levying business license 
fees), the state could return the funding of local health 
programs to counties . 
3. Provide Local Revenues for Maintaining Libraries. 
Under current law, the state provides up to a 10 percent match 
against local appropriations for public libraries. However, at 
annual appropriations of $20.6 million, the state has been 
unable to meet its full match. Match funds may be used for 
acquisitions (books, audio-video materials) and other operating 
expenses (including staff). 
Many library services, though important municipal services, are 
discretionary for counties. Indeed, some commentators argue 
that cities should provide branch services, while the county 
should merely provide coordinating services. If a county 
wishes to provide countywide branch services, perhaps it should 
be empowered to establish an independent library governing 
board. The new board could be granted general tax authority. 
If this authority were granted, the need for a state match 
could be eliminated. 
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4. Increase Local Funding Sources for "Stabilization" Programs. 
This program helps protect counties from spending an increasing 
share of their discretionary funds to meet their match 
requirements on Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(excluding Foster Care), In-Home Supportive Services, Community 
Mental Health, and Food Stamps. Under the program, whenever a 
county spends a greater share of its general purpose revenues 
than it did in 1981-82, the county receives a subsidy through 
an appropriation of stabilization program funds. Although the 
subsidy can be up to the full amount of excess costs, the 
program has never been fully funded. As a result, counties 
receive subsidies on a pro rata basis. 
If a stable, local revenue source (such as cable television 
users taxes) were available to counties, they would not need to 
rely on state "stabilization" funds for meeting the local share 




Summary of Fiscal Options 
for Counties 
As Discussed in "State/Local Fiscal Crisis" 
prepared by the Assembly Local Government Committee 
June 11, 1990 
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------+ 
I Expenditure Options I Fiscal Impact I 
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------+ 
1. Waive Local Match or Cost-Share Reduce local costs by up 
Requirements. to $1.3 billion. (a) 
2. Suspend Unfunded Mandates. 
3. Require the State to Pay for 
More Local Programs. 
Unknown. (b) 
Unknown. {b) 
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------+ I Revenue Options I Increase in Local Income! 
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------+ 
1. Broaden the General Tax Base. Unknown. (b) 
2. Impose or Authorize New Taxes. 
a) Business License Taxes $450 million (c) 
b) Utility Users' Taxes $700 million (c) 
3. Raise Rates on Existing Taxes. 
a) Statewide Taxes Unknown. (b) 
b) 9-1-1 Tax $67 million (d) 
c) Local Fees to Cover Cost 
of Service Unknown. (b) 
d) Documentary Transfer Tax Unknown. (b) 
e) Parcel Tax Unknown. (b) 
4. Authorize Easier Tax-Share 
Agreements Unknown. {b) 
5. Adjust Vehicle License Fees 
a) Adjust depreciation schedule $200 - $400 million 
b) Adjust the taxable value 





Realignment Options Increase in Local Revenue 
and Consequent Reduction 
in State Transfers 
+-----------------------------------+-------------------------+ 
1. MISP $370 million 
2. AB 8 $470 million 
3. Library Funding $21 million 
4. Funding for Stabilization $15 million 
a Potential increase in state expenditures if the state 
backfills local costs to maintain specified service levels. 
b Revenue gain depends on the substance of the proposal. 
c Estimate assumes that the new tax is imposed on the same 
activities and in the same manner as the existing taxes. 





COUNTY SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION OF CALIFORNIA 
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD P. SIMPSON 
DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH 
BEFORE ASSEMBLY LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 
JUNE II, 1990 
COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA IS IN SEYER E FISCAL CRISIS. THAT IS 
NOT JUST A FACT OF LIFE AMONG A FEW SMALL RURAL COUNTIES; SOME OF 
THE LARGEST COUNTIES IN THE STATE ARE ALSO IN VOL YEO. WHILE A SMALL 
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA COUNTY - BUTTE - MAY ACTUALLY FILE FOR 
BANKRUPTCY IN FEDERAL COURT THIS AUGUST, IT IS INEVITABLE THAT A 
DOZEN OR MORE COUNTIES WILL CONFRONT THE SAME SITUATION WITHIN 
THE NEXT TWO TO THREE YEARS. IF NOTHING IS DONE TO ADDRESS THIS 
FISCAL CRISIS, ALL CALIFORNIA COUNTIES COULD BE IN THE BUTTE COUNTY 
SITUATION BY MID-DECADE. 
THE CAUSE OF THE CRISIS IS SIMPLE. IT IS THE FACT THAT CALIFORNIA 
COUNTIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERY OF A RANGE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, 
SOCIAL, AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES. THESE RESPONSIBILITIES ARE OPEN-
ENDED. HOWEVER, FINANCIAL ABILITY TO DELIVER THESE SERVICES IS 
LIMITED BY CONSTITUTION, STATUTE AND STATE REGULATION. 
THE CRISIS HAS BEEN WITH US FOR MANY YEARS. WHILE IT STARTED WITH 
PROPOSITION 13, IN 1978, IT HAS BEEN CONCEALED BY A NUMBER OF FISCAL 
EVENTS -- THE MASSIVE POST· PROPOSITION 13 BAILOUT OF LOCAL 
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GOVERNMENT, THE PARTIAL SHIFT OF SCHOOL FUNDING OFF THE PROPERTY 
TAX, THE SUPPLEMENTAL PROPERTY TAX R 0 L L, FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING, 
STABILIZATION FUNDING, TRIAL COURT FUNDING, AND THE STRONG 
CONTINUED GROWTH OF PROPERTY VALUES, PARTICULARLY IN CALIFORNIA 
URBAN AREAS. 
UNFORTUNATELY, THIS STRING OF POSITIVE FISCAL EVENTS HAS RUN ITS 
COURSE, AND WITH STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS IN FISCAL STRAIT-
JACKETS, COUNTIES FIND THEMSELVES IN THE WORST FISCAL CRISIS SINCE 
THE DEPRESSION OF THE l930S. IT IS NOW BECOMING REVEALED FOR WHAT IS 
ACTUALLY IS-- A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE 
AND FINANCE. IT CAN NO LONGER BE FlX ED WITH BANDA IDS. THE 
MAGNITUDE OF CHANGES REQUIRED COULD BE AS SIGNIFICANT 
HISTORICALLY AS THE EVENTS OF THE HIRAM JOHNSON ERA. THE 
LEADERSHIP REQUIRED MAY HAVE TO BE OF THE CALIBER THOSE 
PROGRESSIVES BROUGHT TO THE CALIFORNIA POLITICAL SCENE. UNLESS THE 
PROBLEM ATTRACTS THAT QUALITY OF EFFORT AND COMMITMENT, COUNTY 
FISCAL COLLAPSE IS AN INEVITABILITY OF THE 1 990s. 
MY TASK TODAY IS NOT TO MAKER £COMMENDATIONS ON RESOLVING THESE 
FISCAL ISSUES, BUT TO GIVE YOU AN INTERIM REPORT ON A MAJOR SURVEY 
THAT CSAC HAS UNDERWAY, WHICH IS PROBABLY THE MOST THOROUGH 
REVIEW OF COUNTY FISCAL ISSUES WE HAVE ATTEMPTED. 
WE ARE MAKING A COMPREHENSIVE INQUIRY OF ALL 58 COUNTIES, IN WHICH 
WE HAVE SOUGHT THE LATEST 5-YEAR TREND OAT A ON REVENUES, 
EXPENDITURES, WORKLOADS, STAFFING, SALARY SCALES, EFFICIENCY 
MEASURES, DEMOGRAPHICS, CITY-COUNTY FISCAL INTERACTION, UNIQUE 
2 
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FISCAL EVENTS, AND MAJOR FISCAL CHALLENGES TO BE CONFRONTED IN THE 
FUTURE. 
IN ADDITION, OVER THE PAST 10 WEEKS, WE HAVE MADE FIELD TRIPS TO 18 
COUNTIES, SELECTED ON THE BASIS OF MEASURES OF RELATIVE WEALTH, SIZE, 
LOCATION AND URBAN AND RURAL MIX. WE CONDUCTED IN-DEPTH 
INTERVIEWS WITH COUNTY ADMINISTRATIVE AND FISCAL STAFF AND KEY 
DEPARTMENT HEADS. 
OUR MAJOR CONCLUSION SO FAR IS THAT THE LOCAL COSTS OF STATE 
PROGRAMS CONDUCTED BY COUNTIES HAVE, IN SOME COUNTIES, SO SEVERELY 
ERODED COUNTY GENERAL PURPOSE REVENUES AS TO JEOPARDIZE THE 
CONTINUED EFFECTIVE CONDUCT OF THOSE STATE PROGRAMS. 
THE "STATE PROGRAMS" REFERRED TO HERE ARE NOT JUST MANDATES; THEY 
ARE PROGRAMS IN WHICH THE STATE HAS A STRONG INTEREST, AND THEY 
ARE PROGRAMS WHICH HAVE LONG BEEN A COUNTY RESPONSIBILITY -
HEALTH, WELFARE, JUSTICE, AND PUBLIC PROTECTION. SOME OF THESE 
PROGRAMS ARE STRICTLY MANDATED AND REGULATED; OTHERS ARE 
ASSIGNED TO COUNTIES BY CONSTITUTION OR STATUTE, AND ARE MANAGED 
BY EACH COUNTY WITHIN BROAD LEGAL GUIDELINES. 
"COUNTY GENERAL PURPOSE REVENUES" ARE THOSE REVENUES SUCH AS 
PROPERTY AND SALES TAXES, FINES, FORFEITURES, INTEREST, VEHICLE 
LICENSE FEES AND LESSER LOCAL R EVEJ\JUES WHICH MAY BE DEVOTED TO ANY 




THE FINDING THAT STATE INTEREST PROGRAM COSTS ARE SERIOUSLY 
ERODING COUNTY GENERAL PURPOSE REVENUES IS NOT NEW WITH US; IT WAS 
AN IMPLICIT CONCLUSION OF THE DEPARTI\1ENT OF FINANCE AUDIT OF BUTTE 
COUNTY LAST DECEMBER. IT WAS ACTUALLY ARTICULATED BY THE 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST IN R £PORTS PUBLISHED LAST FEBRUARY. THE 
PURPOSE OF OUR WORK HAS BEEN TO TEST THOSE FINDINGS ON A BROADER 
FRONT-- IN ALL COUNTIES-- TO SEE HOW \\lDESPREAD AND IMMEDIATE THE 
BUTTE COUNTY CONDITION IS, AND TO DISCOVER ANY ADDITIONAL FACTORS 
THAT MAY HAVE A BEARING ON MORE WIDESPREAD COUNTY FISCAL 
COLLAPSE. 
IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO THINK OF THIS PROBLEM AS A SET OF 58 TWO-PART 
EQUATIONS. THE FIRST PART OF EACH EQUATION REPRESENTS STATE-
INTEREST PROGRAMS WHICH GROW IN AN ABSOLUTE SENSE, BY CASELOADS 
AND COLAS, BY PATIENTS AND PRISONER DAYS, BY LAW AND REGULATION. 
THE SECOND PART OF EACH EQUATION IS UNIQUE FROM ALL THE OTHERS 
AND REPRESENTS A DIFFERENT COUNTY IN THE STATE. IT CONTAINS A 
COMPOSITE OF FACTORS WHICH, WHEN COMPUTED, COULD SOLVE EACH 
EQUATION FOR THE APPROXIMATE YEAR EACH COUNTY WILL ENCOUNTER A 
BUTTE COUNTY CONDITION. 
OUR FIELD WORK SO FAR HAS CONFIRMED WHAT THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST 
HAS SAID ABOUT THE COUNTY PART OF THE EQUATION, PARTICULARLY WITH 
RESPECT TO THE COUNTY REVENUE BASE AND ITS DECLINING ABILITY TO 
ABSORB GROWING COSTS OF STATE PROGRAMS. IN FACT, WE HAVE FOUND A 





I. ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY TAXES TO COUNTIES. THE ORIGINAL 
ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY TAXES TO LOCAL PUBLIC JURISDICTIONS IN 
AB8, AFTER PASSAGE OF PROPOSIIION 13, liAS A CRITICAL BEARING ON 
COUNTY ABILITY TO FINANCE COSTS OF STATE INTEREST PROGRAMS. 
COUNTIES RECEIVE, ON AVERAGE, 33°i<J OF PROPERTY TAX REVENUES, BUT 
SHARES RANGE FROM 18% IN ORANGE COUNTY TO 68% IN ALPINE COUNTY. 
THIS WAS CLEARLY A FACTOR IN BUTTE COUNTY, WHERE THE COUNTY'S 
PROPERTY TAX ALLOCATION UNDER AB8 IS 21%. IF THE FISCAL PROFILES 
OF TWO SIMILAR COUNTIES, BUTTE AND MERCED, ARE PLACED SIDE BY 
SIDE, ONE OF THE KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTIES IS THE 
DIFFERENCE IN THE AB8 ALLOCATION, WHICH IS 33% IN MERCED COUNTY, 
RESULTINGINSEVERALMILLION DOLLARS MORE ANNUALLY IN PROPERTY 
TAX REVENUES. THIS IS ONE KEY REASON MERCED IS PERHAPS TWO TO 
THREE YEARS AWAY FROM BUTTE'S CURRENT YEAR FISCAL CONDITION. 
2. GROWTH IN ASSESSED VALUATIONS. DESPITE PROPOSITION 13, PROPERTY 
TAX VALUES HAVE GROWN STATEWIDE AT OR NEAR 10% PER YEAR 
THROUGH THE 1980S. COUNTY BY COUNTY, GROWTH RATES HAVE BEEN 
QUITE DIFFERENT. OUR FINDINGS SO FAR SUGGEST THAT AN ASSESSED 
VALUATION GROWTH IN EXCESS OF THE STATEWIDE AVERAGE IS A 
DRAMATIC FACTOR IN A COUNTY'S A !31LITY TO SUSTAIN ONGOING GROWTH 
IN STATE PROGRAM COSTS. FOR EXAMPLE. THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST HAS 
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY ON A LIST OF COUNTIES CHARACTERIZED BY 
BELOW AVERAGE AND DECLINING LOC\L PURPOSE REVENUES. HOWEVER, 
ANY CONCLUSION THAT SAN BERNARDINO IS HEADED FOR SUDDEN FISCAL 
COLLAPSE WOULD APPEAR TO BE A GROSS EXAGGERATION. OUR 
TENTATIVE CONCLUSION IS THAT EVEN THOUGH SAN BERNARDINO HAS 
BELOW AVERAGE AND DECLINI:\G LOCAL GENERAL PURPOSE REVENUE, 
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THERE IS STILL ENOUGH SOLID ASSESSED VALUATION GROWTH TO KEEP 
PACE WITH STATE PROGRAM COSTS. SAf': BERNARDINO COUNTY MAY BE 
ABLE TO ABSORB STATE COSTS SO LONG AS THE BUILD-OUT FROM THE LOS 
ANGELES BASIN CONTINUES AND BUSINESS AND RESIDENTIAL DEMAND FOR 
SAN BERNARDINO PROPERTY REMAINS STRONG. 
3. GROWTH IN OVERALL LOCAL GENERAL PURPOSE REVENUES. COUNTY 
NON-PROPERTY REVENUES AVAILABLE FOR GENERAL USE ARE 
RELATIVELY MINOR COMPARED TO THE PROPERTY TAX. SALES TAXES, AT 
ABOUT 3% OF COUNTY REVENUES, HAVE BEEN FAIRLY STAGNANT 
THROUGH THE 1980S, AND IN MANY COUNTY SALES TAX REVENUES HAVE 
ACTUALLY DECLINED, PARTLY AS A RESULT OF CITY INCORPORATIONS 
AND ANNEXATIONS. LOSS OF SALES TAX CAN HAVE A GREATER IMPACT ON 
SMALLER COUNTY REVENUES, AS IN BUTTE COUNTY, AND AS IN YOLO --
WHERE 75% OF COUNTY SALES TAXES \VER E LOST AS A RESULT OF THE WEST 
SACRAMENTO INCORPORATION. 
4. DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF STATE-INTEREST PROGRAMS ON COUNTIES. 
ON THE EXPENDITURE SIDE OF THE COUNTY EQUATION, STATE PROGRAMS 
HAVE A WIDELY DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT, COUNTY BY COUNTY. THE 
DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT IS A RESULT OF DIFFERENCES IN LOCAL 
DEMOGRAPHICS, ECONOMICS, COURT ACTIONS REGARDING PROGRAMS, 
LOCAL BOARD PHILOSOPHIES AND MANAGEMENT PRACTICES. HERE ARE 
FOUR EXAMPLES FROM OUR FIELD WORK: 
A. A COUNTY HOSPITAL CAN ~1AKE A OIFFERENCE. 
WHETHER OR NOT A COUNTY II AS A ( 01 J N I Y IIOSI'ITA L, AND TB E KIND OF 
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HOSPITAL SYSTEM A COUNTY HAS CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE ON COUNTY 
COSTS FOR INDIGENT MEDICAL CARE. COUNTIES LIKE YUBA AND SHASTA 
THAT HAVE GONE OUT OJ· Till: INPA.III.NT ll!JSI NESS IrA V E DISCOVERED THEY 
CAN SHARPLY REDUCE AND CONTROL INDIGENT MEDICAL CARE COSTS. 
COUNTIES LIKE SACRAMENTO THAT HAVE CONVERTED THEIR HOSPITALS TO 
UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION, HAVE SHIFTED MOST OF THEIR MEDICAL COST 
LIABILITY TO THE STATE. COUNTIES LIKE MERCED, WHICH OPERATE THE 
MOST COMPETITIVE HOSPITAL IN THE COMMUNITY HAVE A SUFFICIENT MIX 
AND VOLUME OF INDIGENT AND PRIVATE PAY PATIENTS TO REMAIN FISCALLY 
VIABLE. 
HOWEVER, IF YOU ARE A COUNTY LIKE FRESNO, OR SANTA CLARA, OR 
ALAMEDA, YOU HAVE A MAJOR HOSPITAL SYSTEM WHICH CARES PRIMARILY 
FOR INDIGENT AND MEDI-CAL PATIENTS FOR WHICH YOU WILL BE 
REIMBURSED ANYWHERE FROM 38 TO 43 CENTS ON THE GOING RATE IN THE 
MEDICAL MARKET. THESE HOSPITALS WILL REQUIRE ANNUAL LARGE 
GENERAL FUND SUBSIDIES. YOU WILL ALSO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL MEDI-CAL 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE (IF YOU ARE SANTA CLARA COUNTY, YOUR 
OUTSTANDING BILLINGS TO MEDI-CAL WILL CURRENTLY AMOUNT TO $40 
MILLION, AND YOUR TIME LAG BETWEEN OPENING A MEDI-CAL CASE AND 
PAYMENT WILL BE 200 DAYS). THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF A STATE-COUNTY 
REGULATORY RELATIONSHIP THAT ADDS ENORMOUS HIDDEN LOCAL COST. 
IN THE CASE OF MEDI-CAL, IT STARTS WITH AN II-PAGE APPLICATION FOR 
BENEFITS WHICH QUESTIONS THE APPLICANT, FOR EXAMPLE, ON THE FUNDS 
HE OR SHE MAY POSSESS IN CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT. DESIGNED TO LIMIT 




B. BEING "TOUGH ON CRIME" HAS/~ PRICE. 
DURING THE 1980S, RESPONDING TO PUBLIC DEMANDS FOR GREATER 
SECURITY, CONCERNS ABOUT (1ANGS. AND TO ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE 
DRUG EPIDEMIC, THE LEGISLATURE HAS, SESSION AFTER SESSION, PASSED NEW 
LAWS MAKING NEW CRIMES AND MAKING SENTENCES FOR CERTAIN CRIMES 
LONGER AND MANDATORY. THE REPRESEJ\:TATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
FINANCE THAT HELPED DRAFT THE MANDATED COST REIMBURSEMENT 
PROVISIONS OF SB 90 IN 1972 COULD NOT HAVE SEEN THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
THE LANGUAGE TO EXCLUDE STATE REIMBURSEMENT FOR NEW CRIMES AND 
INFRACTIONS. IT, OF COURSE, FOUND ITS WAY INTO ARTICLE XIII B OF THE 
STATE CONSTITUTION AND HAS AN ENORMOUS IMPACT ON COUNTY COSTS FOR 
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM TODAY. 
COSTS FOR THE JUSTICE SYSTEM ARE THE LARGEST COUNTY GENERAL FUND 
EXPENDITURES. EACH OF THE \8 COUNTIES WE VISITED EITHER HAD JUST 
OPENED A NEW JAIL, WAS ABOUT TO OPEN A NEW ONE, OR HAD ONE IN THE 
PLANNING STAGES. JAIL OPERATIONAL COSTS HAVE MORE THAN DOUBLED IN 
SOME COUNTIES BETWEEN 1983-84 AND 1988-89. THEY WENT FROM $115 MILLION 
TO $290 MILLION IN LOS ANGELES; FROM $33 MILLION TO $59 MILLION IN SAN 
DIEGO; FROM $2.8 MILLION TO $8 MILLION IN SHASTA. THE COUNTY COST 
IMPACT IS SUCH THAT MORE THAN ONE COUNTY IS HAVING DIFFICULTY 
MEETING THE COSTS OF OPENING A NEW JAIL. AND ANOTHER MAJOR COUNTY 
HAS DISCUSSED CLOSING A NEW JAIL AS AN EMERGENCY FISCAL MEASURE. 
THE JAIL BUILDING TREND SEEMS PERPETUAL, DESPITE LOCAL USE OF EVERY 
INCARCERATION ALTERNATIVE CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC SAFETY. JAILS ARE 





WHILE NEW JAIL DESIGNS PERMIT MORE EFriCI ENT INMATE/STAFF RATIOS, 
JAILSTAFFINGHASGENERALLY DOUBLED, BECAUSE PRISONER POPULATIONS 
HAVE ALSO DOUBLED. NEW PROBLI:MS LOOM \VH ICII BECOME MAJOR JAIL 
COST CENTERS. JAIL HEALTH IS AN EXAMPLE. 90% TO 95% OF THE PRISONERS 
IN THE LOS ANGELES AND SAN DIEGO JAILS TEST POSITIVE FOR DRUGS. 
PRISONERS COME TO THE JAIL SICK AND MALNOURISHED AND SOMETIMES 
REMAIN ON DRUG-RELIEVING MEDICATIONS FOR A MONTH. AS THEY 
RECOVER, ADDITIONAL ILLNESSES THAT THE PRISONER WAS NOT EVEN A WARE 
OF MANIFEST THEMSEL YES . 
AIDS AND MENTAL DISORDERS ARE ON THE INCREASE. PRE-NATAL CARE IS 
A GROWING JAIL HEALTH PROBLEM. 15% OF THE FEMALES IN ALAMEDA'S 
SANTA RITA PRISON ARE PREGNANT. THERE IS A GROWING JUDICIAL 
SENTIMENT TO INCARCERATE PREGNANT OFFENDERS IN THE INTERESTS OF 
BETTER CARE INSIDE THE INSTITUTION. THE ANNUAL COST OF OPERATING 
THE NEW SANTA RITA JAIL INFIRMARY IS $11 MILLION-- THE COST OF 
OPERATING A SMALL TO MEDIUM-SIZED HOSPITAL A DECADE OR SO AGO. IN 
LITTLE LAKE COUNTY, JAIL HEALTH COSTS WERE BUDGETED AT $200,000 IN 
THE CURRENT YEAR, WILL ACTUALLY BE $400,000, AND WILL BE BUDGETED AT 
$1 MILLION 1990-91. 
LOCAL COSTS FOR OTHER PARTS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM HAVE TRAILED 
BEHIND JAIL OPERATIONS COSTS, AS COURTS, PROSECUTORS, PUBLIC 
DEFENDERS, AND PROBATION STAFF STRUGGLE WITH MONSTROUSCASELOADS 
IN MOST COUNTIES. MEANINGFUL SUPERVISION OF PROBATIONERS IS ALMOST 
NON-EXISTENT IN SOME JURISDICTIONS. EVEN WITH NEW COURTS AND 
JUSTICE SYSTEM STAFF, WE HAVE FALLEN BEHIND IN GETTING PRISONERS OUT 
OF COUNTY JAILS AND INTO STATE PRISONS. THE AVERAGE LENGTH OF PRE-
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PRISON CONFINEMENT CREDIT IN COUNTY JAILS HAS INCREASED FROM 4 
MONTHS IN 1978 TO 8 MONTHS IN 1988. PROSECUTORS, DEFENDERS, AND 
" PROBATION STAFF ARE STRETCHED SO THIN AS TO BE UNABLE TO MEET MORE 
SPEEDY COURT CALENDARS. 
PROVISION OF NEW COURT FACILITIES IS RUNNING PROPERTY MANAGERS 
RAGGED. IN SMALLER COUNTIES, THE COURT HOUSE IS LITERALLY BECOMING 
THAT,ASSUPERVISORS AND CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS FIND OTHER QUARTERS. 
IN SAN DIEGO, THE LANDMARK EL CORTEZ HOTEL AND THE HOTEL SAN DIEGO 
HAVE BECOME LEASED COURT FACILITIES. 
TRIAL COURT FUNDING HAS BEEN A TIMELY EMERGENCY TOURNIQUET ON 
THEJUSTICESYSTEMCOST HEMORRHAGE, BUT IT IS LITTLE MORE THAN THAT, 
IN ADDRESSING PENT-UP JUSTICE SYSTEM STAFFING, AND FACILITIES NEEDS. 
IN ADDITION, JUDICIAL SIGN-OFF ON TRIAL COURT FUNDING HAS MADE IT 
ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE THE .MOST COST-EFFECTIVE USE OF 
THIS NEW FUNDING. 
C. WELFARE'S CRAZY-QUILT COST IMPACT. 
AN AFDC ASSISTANCE STANDARD, UNIFORM ACROSS THE STATE, IS HAVING 
AN INTERESTING IMPACT COUNTY-BY-COUNTY. WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN 
THE CENTRAL VALLEY ARE NOW SEEING MOVEMENT OF AFDC CLIENTS FROM 
HIGHER COST URBAN AREAS TO THE VALLEY WITH ITS LOWER LIVING COSTS 
AND LOWER CRIME RATES. THIS IS APPARENTLY ONE OF THE FACTORS IN 
BUTTE COUNTY'S HIGHER AFDC CASELOAD. 
CULTURAL INFLUENCES ARE ALSO IMI'ACIINC; WI.LI ARE; IT IS WELL-KNOWN 
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THAT THE CENTRAL VALLEY HAS BECOME A DESTINATION FOR SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN REFUGEES. WE LEARNED IN FRESNO THAT TilE ELDERS OF THE HMONG 
PEOPLE HAVE REPORTED THAT FRESNO WILL BECOME THE NEW WORLD 
CENTER FOR TIIAT CULTURF. 
GENERAL RELIEF IS, OF COURSE, TOTALLY A COUNTY PROGRAM AND FULLY 
GENERAL FUND SUPPORTED. AND YET, THE DISCRETION OF COUNTIES IN 
SHAPING A GENERAL RELIEF PROGRAM AND CONTROLLING ITS COSTS HAS 
BEEN STRONGLY AFFECTED BY ADVERSE COURT DECISIONS, HOMELESSNESS, 
LARGE IMMIGRATIONS OF POOR PEOPLE, CASE-FINDING NETWORKS THAT 
APPEAR TO TARGET CERTAIN REGIONS AND COUNTIES, AND ANY NUMBER OF 
OTHER INFLUENCES. THUS THE FACT THAT BUTTE HAD A SEVEN-FOLD 
INCREASE IN GENERAL RELIEF COSTS IN 5 YEARS (FROM $240,000 TO $1.8 
MILLION) WAS A FACTOR IN ITS CURRENT CONDITION. HOWEVER, BUTTE IS 
NOT ALONE; GENERAL RELIEF IN SAN DIEGO GREW FOUR-FOLD, FROM $4.5 TO 
$17.5 MILLION, AND ALAMEDA GREW FIVE-FOLD, FROM $6 MILLION TO $30 
MILLION OVER THE SAME PERIOD. 
5. IT HELPS TO BE A "PERS" COUNTY. 
THIS IS SORT OF A "GOOD NEWS-BAD NEWS" FINDING WHICH UNDERSCORES THE 
INEVITABILITY OF THE COUNTY FISCAL SCENARIO. THE "GOOD NEWS" IS THAT 
ABOUT FOUR YEARS AGO THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
REVALUED ITS ASSETS FROM BOOK TO MARKET. THE RESULT WAS A LARGE 
WINDFALL TO 35 COUNTIES WHICH CONTRACT WITH PERS FOR EMPLOYEE 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS. IN EFFECT, THESE COUNTIES, WHICH CONTAIN 5.2 
MILLION OF THE STATE'S POPULATION, HAVE OVERPAID THEIR EMPLOYEE 
RETIREMENT PREMIUMS AND HAVE BEEN CREDITED, OVER THE PAST TWO 
II 
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YEARS AND NEXT YEAR, WITH PORllONS OF TH 
DETERMINED OVERPAYMENTS. 
CTUARIALLY-
THE SEMI-GOOD NEWS IS THAT THESE PERS CREDITS, WHICH AMOUNT TO 
ABOUT $100 MILLION A YEAR, HAVE BEC0:\1E INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IN 
KEEPING THESE COUNTIES AFLOAT. THE "BAD" NEWS IS THAT NO ONE KNOWS 
HOW LONG THIS CREDITING CAN LAST, SINCE IT IS A FUNCTION OF MARKET 
FORCES, AND ACTUARIAL FINDINGS. THERE IS A BILL, AUTHORED BY 
SENATOR RUSSELL, THAT WOULD STOP THE CREDITING IN 1993, ALTHOUGH IT 
MIGHT ACTUARIALLY BE POSSIBLE TO CREDIT BEYOND THAT DATE. TO 
UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PERS CREDIT, IF THE DOLLAR 
BENEFIT WERE TO BE EXTRAPOLATED, PER CAPITA, STATE WIDE, AND BE 
CREDITED TO ALL COUNTIES, IT WOULD AI\10UNT TO ALMOST $600 MILLION 
ANNUALLY. FEDERAL REVENUE SHARING, AT ITS ZENITH, DID NOT EXCEED 
$245,000. SOME PERS COUNTIES WET ALKED WITH WERE ABLE TO DIRECT THE 
CREDIT TO ONE-TIME EXPENDITURES AND FIXED ASSETS. UNFORTUNATELY, 
MANY HAVE BEEN FORCED TO BALANCE BUDGETS WITH THESE FUNDS. WHEN 
THE CREDITS END, WE MAY SEE SOME MORE BUTTE COUNTIES. 
6. CITIES HAVE HAD AN IMPACT ON BOTH COUNTY GENERAL FUND REVENUES 
AND COSTS 
A RECENT REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH HAS ESTIMATED 
THAT CITY REDEVELOPMENT DISTRICTS ARE TAKING UP TO $800 MILLION 
ANNUALLY OUT OF THE GENERAL FUND REVENUES OF OTHER LOCAL 
PROPERTY TAX AGENCIES. THERE SEEi\1S LITTLE DOUBT THAT CITIES HAVE 
SIZED UPON REDEVELOPMENT AS A "CASH COW" SINCE PASSAGE OF 
PROPOSITION 13, AND THAT SOME COUNTIES -- BUT NOT ALL-- HAVE BEEN 
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SLOW TO RECOGNIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS DEVELOPMENT AND REACT 
TO IT. REDEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATIONS AND ANNEXATIONS HAVE ALL 
PLAYED A ROLE IN SHIFTING Tll E I-I X ED AMOUNTS OF PROPERTY AND SALES 
TAXES AVAILABLE TO LOCAL GOYERNt\lENTS, AND COUNTIES HAVE 
GENERALLY BEEN THE LOSERS IN Til ESE PROCEEDINGS. 
THERE IS ANOTHER WAY IN WHICH CITIES IMPACT ADVERSELY ON COUNTY 
GENERAL FUNDS, AND THAT IS ON THE SPENDING SIDE, AND PRIMARILY IN 
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM. MOST OF THE OFFENDERS BROUGHT TO COUNTY JAIL 
BOOKING COUNTERS ARE BROUGHT THERE BY CITY POLICE. AFTER BOOKING, 
THE OFFENDER BECOMES A COUNTY CHARGE; THE OFFENDERS' HOUSING, 
FEEDING, CLOTHING, HEALTH CARE, TRANSPORTATION, PROSECUTION, 
DEFENSE (IF INDIGENT) AND TRIAL ARE A COUNTY COST. THE ONLY 
REMAINING COST TO THE CITY MAY BE SERVICE AS A WITNESS BY THE 
ARRESTING OFFICER. ANY FINES AND FORFEITURES RESULTING FROM THE 
CARE WILL PRINCIPALLY GO TO THE CITY. 
BANKRUPTCY: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
BANKRUPTCY IS A DIFFICULT CONCEPT TO UNDERSTAND IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR. HOW CAN CIVIL GOVERNMENT GO OUT OF BUSINESS? IT CANNOT, 
AND WHAT WILL PROBABLY HAPPEN IN BUTTE COUNTY, ACCORDING TO THEIR 
AUDITOR-CONTROLLER, JIM JOHANSEN, IS THAT THEY WILL FILE UNDER 
CHAPTER 9 OF THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY STATUTES AND AS OF 12:01 AM THE 
VERY NEXT DAY, THEY ARE BACK IN BUSINESS WITH PROTECTION AGAINST 
IMMEDIATE PAYMENT OF ABOUT $1 MILLION IN BILLS. SO, THERE WILL BE NO 
LOCKS ON THE COURTHOUSE DOOR, THE POWER WILL STAY ON IN THE JAIL, 
AND EVERYBODY WILL PROBABLY REPORT FOR WORK. 
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BANKRUPTCY IN GOVERNMENT, IN A STRICTLY LEGAL SE IS SOMETHING 
WE WILL NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND UNTIL WE HAVE ACTUALLY EXPERIENCED 
IT. UNTIL THAT HAPPENS, I HAVE A COUPLE OF OTHER DEFINITIONS I WOULD 
LIKE TO SUGGEST. 
IN A PRACTICAL WORKING SENSE, BANKRUPTCY OF A COUNTY GOVERNMENT 
IS WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE COST OF STATE PROGRAMS FINALLY OUTSTRIPS 
THE CAPACITY OF LOCAL GENERAL PURPOSE REVENUES TO PAY FOR THEM 
REMEMBERING OUR TWO-PART EQUATION, THAT HAPPENS WHEN STATE 
PROGRAM COSTS HAVE TO BE MET FROM A LOCAL REVENUE BASE THAT 
REFLECTS A LOW AB 8 SHARE OF PROPERTY TAX, A SLOW GROWING PROPERTY 
TAX BASE, LOW NON-PROPERTY TAX REVENUES, A HIGH AFDC SHARE, HIGH 
GENERAL RELIEF COSTS, UNDERPAID EMPLOYEES, INADEQUATE FACILITIES, 
AND, PERHAPS, A NEW JAIL. EXCEPT FOR THE NEW JAIL, THAT IS BUTTE 
COUNTY. 
THERE IS ANOTHER, MORE THEORETICAL DEl INIT!ON OF BANKRUPTCY MORE 
APPROPRIATE TO THE PRESENT SITUATION. THAT IS WHEN CONDITIONS IN 
COUNTIES GET BEYOND MANAGEMENT'S ABILITY TO EST A BLISH RATIONAL 
SPENDING PRIORITIES. AS ONE MANAGER IN A MAJOR COUNTY COMMENTED: 
"WE ARE EITHER GOOD MANAGERS OR CRI\11NALS, I DON'T KNOW WHICH." 
SIMILARLY, IT SHOULD BE NO SURPRISE THAT A PROGRAM FOR RATIONING 
HEALTH CARE ("BIOETHICS") CAME OUT OF A COUNTY SETTING --ALAMEDA. 
THE PROBLEM IS SQUARELY BEFORE THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. IT SHOULD 
NOT OFFER THE PROMISE OF PUBLIC SERVICES AND PUBLIC PROTECTION THAT 
ITISNOTWILLINGTO PAY FOR. Al"D 11111\IIORE, NOT REALLY WILLINGTO 




BANKRUPTCY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR REALLY IS. IF THAT IS THE CASE, WE DO 
NOT NEED TO WAIT FOR DEVELOPMENTS IN OROVILLE IN AUGUST. WE ARE 




RECAP OF 1990-91 BUDGET SCENARIOS 
18-COUNTV SAMPLE 




















SUMMARY OF MAJOR BUDGET PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN MOST COUNTIES: 
I. The opening of a new jail, with attendant operational costs, primarily for staff. Every 
county visited by survey team had either opened a new jail, was planning to open a new 
jail, or had one on the drawing board. 
2. Major costs for the justice system as a whole; need for new court rooms, new staffing, 
new prosecuting and defense attorneys, probation staff. Trial court funding has helped 
counties chase a moving fiscal target. 
3. Increased welfare costs, primarily AFDC grant shares and general relief. 
4. Inability to keep up with need for competitive salary plans. 
5. Major avoidance of infrastructure needs and preventive maintenance. 
6. Serious concerns regarding state budget cuts (as announced in January, particularly in 
AB 8, in-horne supportive services, and mental health). 
7. In counties with traditional county hospitals (Fresno, Alameda, Santa Clara), without 
university administration, major county costs as a result of general fund subsidies to 
hospitals and a high level of accounts receivable due from Medi-Cal. 
8. losses in property and sales taxes due to city incorporations, annexations, and 
redeveloprnen t. 
The following statements were true in the designated counties between March 15 and May 
30, and may have changed for better or worse since then: 
ALAMEDA: 
Budget: The gap was stated as $43 million, based on January 1 state budget. As we 
discussed the impact of cuts with individual department heads, the depth of the 
cuts seemed almost impossible to achieve. As alternatives, the County has 
considered some one-time moves, such as selling its share of the 
Oakland/ Alameda County Coliseum, the County fairgrounds, or closing the 
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North County jail. 
Problems: Justice system costs, sheriff in particular. Last year's sheriff budget was $87 
million. Cuts have been requested to reduce budget to $84 million. The sheriff 
contends that with the opening of new Santa Rita jail, $99.7 million is the 
minimum needed for the department. New Santa Rita rated at 2870 capacity; 
now have 3100 in jail. Also, Alameda has a substantial increase in general relief 
costs in recent years. 
BUTTE: 
Budget: Visit confirmed what has already been reported by Department of Finance and 
Legislative Analyst in their visits to county, i.e, low AB 8 share of property tax 
(21 %), slow-growing property tax base, low non-property tax revenues, loss of 
tax base to incorporation, annexation, redevelopment, high AFDC costs, high 
general relief costs, underpaid employees, and inadequate facilities. 
FRESNO: 
Budget: They plan a "rollover" budget for 1990-91, $7 million needed to balance 1990-
91, and based on January state budget. 
History: Fresno cut 600 positions in 1985-86 and actually laid off 300 people. Parks and 
Recreation cut from $2 million to $600,000 at the same time. Fresno has also 
sustained revenue losses due to city annexations and redevelopment. 
Fresno has been hit hard in all major programs-- health, welfare, justice. Valley Medical 
Center requires a large general fund annual subsidy of $12 million and has a backlog of 
Medi-Cal billings. Average age of Valley Medical Center medical equipment is 12 years; 
average for private sector is 6 years. The fire marshal has noted deficiencies at Valley 
Medical Center that would require $29 million to repair. The UCSF residency (teaching) 
program is in some jeopardy at the hospital. 
LAKE: 
Budget: No indication of budget gap at time of visit, but situation looks grim. Geo-
thermal property tax values, 41% of the assessment roll in mid-1980s, has 
dropped to 25% of the roll in 5 years. 
Problems: Lake is opening a new 242-bed jail. Jail health costs are skyrocketing. Were 
budgeted this year at $200,000, will be $400,000 by year-end, and are budgeting 
$1 million for jail health in 1990-91. 
MENDOCINO: 
Budget: Simply to repeat the 1989-90 budget would require $6 million in net county costs 
beyond currently available revenues. County has mortgaged the courthouse for 
$7 million to replenish Workers' Compensation reserve deficit of $3 million, and 
for other needs. 
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History: Board of Supervisors has maintained levels of County services by stretching 
maintenance, equipment replacement, and insurance premiums. The County has 
faced virtually ongoing jail construction; will soon open a new 128-bed jail. 
MERCED: 
Budget: There remains a $4 million gap; can make some tough cuts that will get them just 
below a $3 million gap, but after that, the cuts get into the marrow of county 
expenditures. The county provides and operates all of the local parks and 
libraries in Merced County. Parks budget is now $1.1 million and libraries 
budget is $1.3 million. A major fiscal threat for the future is the opening of a 
new jail. 
History: Merced has been noted for tough fiscal management, without which the county 
would be in perilous fiscal condition. For example, fee revenues have gone from 
$1.6 million in 1981 to $7.7 million today. 
SAN JOAQUIN: 
Budget: Can balance this year, but concerned about future years, especially in regard to 
the opening of a new jail next year. 
SAN BERNARDINO: 
Budget: Anticipate no major problems this year; county has experienced excellent growth 
in assessed valuation. 
SAN DIEGO: 
Budget: Gap of $43 million. They are preparing a status guo budget (same as last year), 
plus $30 million for anticipated salary MOU. Budget did not address about $10 
million in known costs that will be financed (such as AFDC caseloads and 
COLAs). 
History: Jail system is second most overcrowded in U.S. 
County has been forced of follow a policy of major avoidance of infrastructure 
upkeep and costs of preventive maintenance repairs on a "crisis management" 
basis. 
Facilities are inadequate throughout county; the old Hotel El Cortez and San 




Indigent health care 
Dependency hearings (5 - 6 attorneys at county cost) 
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Opening of a new Mesa jail 
SAN MATEO: 
Budget: No indication of budget gap at time of visit; may be able to make it this year 
(based on Governor's January budget), however, serious concerns regarding 
further cuts this (1990-91) year, and regarding future years. 
Future Threats: 
SANTA CLARA: 
Long-time deferral of major infrastructure needs -- new jail, new 
hospital, courtrooms, office space. 
San Mateo has a serious salary shortfall, compared to other bay area 
counties; they have failed to keep pace on salaries and cost of living on 
the Peninsula is very expensive. 
Budget: Worst situation since 1982 (when substantial layoffs occurred). No specific 
budget gap indicated; could be as much as $25 million. 
Future Threats: 
SANTA CRUZ: 
Financing of Valley Medical Center operations. Annual general fund 
subsidy of Valley Medical Center and $40 million in Medi-Cal accounts 
receivable pipeline. 
Communicable disease on the rise; measles and TB, particularly among 
refugee population. 
Budget: Essentially status quo ( 1989-90 rollover); no fixed assets, no new positions except 
courts and positions financed by other than county general fund. Anticipate 
will provide a 6.5% salary increase. 
Future Threats: 
The earthquake; will it help or hurt financially? Net effect on county 
general fund appears negative; state and federal emergency funds will 
not fully finance repairs. For example, county must destroy at least 100 
residences at county cost. 
Building activity is down 30%. 
Homes for sale are !!.Q 50%. 
Home sales ~ 30%. 




Budget: Essentially a rollover budget, with no new staff (except where no net county cost 
is involved), no fixed assets. Services and supplies are status auo. 
Future Threats: 
Higher welfare costs 
Criminal justice system costs 
Negative impacts of annexations and redevelopments 
Very low workers' compensation reserve (need $1.5 million for safety 
margin) 
Note: Shasta would be in worse fiscal shape had their hospital not been closed in 1987, 
followed by elimination of health services agency and closure of libraries. 
SOLANO: 
Budget: Can be balanced with some discipline and luck. Board of Supervisors 
confronted a negative general fund balance of $750,000 two years ago, and cut, 
laid off, or retired 50 positions. County has a 5-year pan to hold general fund 
expenditures to 4% per year, using a PERS credit as balancing mechanism. 
Future Threats: 
TULARE: 
Solano has very low salary scales; sheriff deputies are 35% low compared 
to other counties. 
District attorney deputies are members of Teamsters' Union. 
Just opened new jail; not yet fully operational and can't staff and operate 
new infirmary. 
Budget: Tulare has had "rollover" budgets the past two years and expect another for 
1990-91. Tulare sustained major employee cuts in the 1980s; fewer employees 
in 1987 that 1982. 
Future Threats: 
Major deferral of infrastructure expenditures. Just opened new jail and 
need courthouse expansion. 




Budget: Can balance for 1999-91, but concerned about following year. 
Future Threats: 
YOLO: 
Major new jail 
Five year financial forecast projects an $18 million deficit on general 
fund revenues of $518 million by 1994-95. 
Budget: No expression of budget gap at time of visit, but there are several major fiscal 
issues: 
The opening of two new jails that do not increase capacity 
Jail operations will require $400,000 to $800,000 in new money 
General assistance lawsuits are in the mill 
State AB 8 cuts 
Hospital subsidy about $500,000 
Problems: Yolo lost 75% of its sales tax base due to incorporation of West Sacramento. 
Yolo has experienced several of the factors that have impacted Butte County. 
YUBA: 
Budget: 1990-91 budget is status quo; no new positions or fiscal assets. 
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Variations In County Fiscal Capacity 
How anti Why Does Fiscal Capacity VaiJlAmongtheState•s 
Counties? Whatpptioas Does the t:.egisl~ture Have for 
Improving It? , ,, , 
Summary 
The fiscal capacity of California's 58 counties varies considera-
bly. While all of the counties are subject to many of the same 
sources of fiscal pressure, our analysis indicates that the fiscal 
capacity of a number of counties is low and declining. As a result, 
their ability to deal with ongoing fiscal pressures is worsening. 
Contrary to widespread belief, low fiscal capacity is not cone 
fined to the small rural counties; a number of larger counties also are 
characterized by low or declining fiscal capacity. While the specific 
contributing factors vaty from county to county, low capacity coun-
ties generally experience some combination of limited revenue. low 
growth in revenue, and/or high or increasing costs for state-required 
programs. In addition, the state may aggravate the differences in 
fiscal capacity to the extent that the assistance it provides does not 
reflect the current county populations in need of services. 
In 1987-88, state grants for fiscal relief had a positive impact on 
county fiscal capacities, particularly with regard to the smaller 
counties. However, given that the state has not provided a similar 
amount of targeted fiscal relief in subsequent years, it is likely that 
some counties have continued to experience a decline in fiscal 
capacity. 
If the Legislature wishes to avert future declines in county fiscal 
capacity, it can provide short-term fiscal relief to counties by in-
creasing the funding provided under the County Revenue Stabiliza-
tion program. In the longer term, the Legislature may wish to 
examine more permanent solutions to the county fiscal dilemma, 
such as the reallocation of state program funding or property tax 
revenues, the creation of additional county revenue sources. or the 
realignment of county program responsibilities. 
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In September 1989, Butte County offic1a announced that 
the county could not balance its 198CJ-90 and thereforr· 
planned to seek bankruptcy protection in court. While 
subsequent state relief and budgetary reductions by the 
allowed it to finance projected 1989-90 
tions did not provide a long-term solution to the 
dilemma. Butte County officials 
million deficit for 1990-91. see our recent 
County Fiscal Distress· A Lool? at Butte 
tion.) 
While it is tempting to isolate Butte 
of a California county in fiscal straits, our 
many other counties are experiencing serious 
Furthermore, our review indicates that this not 
county problem. 
The state has a clear interest in maintaining the fiscal 
viability of county governments. They are the entities which 
serve all Californians through programs of statewide interest 
(such as health, corrections, and welfare programs). In 
they provide to residents of unincorporated areas such local 
services as sheriffand library services. In this piece, we examine 
county fiscal capacity--the ability of counties to respond to these 
needs. 
First, we describe the county-state relationship and discuss 
our framework for identifying variations in county fiscal capac-
ity. Second, we provide our findings regarding the fiscal eapacity 
of counties, and discuss some of the counties which rate below 
average in this regard. Third, we identify the primary factors 
that contribute to low fiscal capacity. Finally, we offer several a 1-
ternatives that the Legislature may wish to use to improve the 
fiscal capacity of California's counties. 
BACKGROUND: AFRAMEWORKFOR 
COMPARING COUNTY FISCAL CAPACITY 
For the purposes of this analysis, we define county fiscal ca-
pacity broadly as the ability of a county to meet whatever public 
service needs may arise in its community with the resources it 
has available to it. Low fiscal capacity leads to fiscal distress when 
the 1mba1ance between resources and responsibilities leads the 
county to have severe difficulty addressing service needs. 
The Dual Role of Counties 
Counties in California play a dual role in providing services 
to their residents. First, counties are charged with the responsi-
bility to administer a variety of programs required by state law. 
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These state-required programs include welfare (such as Aid to 
Families with Dependent Childrcn--AFDC--and general assis-
tance), county health services, In-Home Supportive Services 
(IHSS), community mental health, corrections and the trial 
courts. Second, the counties administer a variety of local pro-
grams. These include some programs of state interest, such as 
public health and social services, and others of primarily local 
import, such as the municipal-type services provided to residents 
of unincorporated areas (for example, fire and sheriff services). 
The state provides substantial funding for many, but not a II, 
of its required programs. In many cases, specific county contri-
butions are also required. Such programs include AFDC, county 
health services, community mental health, IHSS and the trial 
courts. The counties bear the primary fiscal responsibility for 
other state-required programs, because the state in thesf' cases 
does not provide funding specifically for these purposes. Such 
programs include general relief, probation, indigent legal de-
fense, and corrections. 
County Revenue Sources 
Counties pay for their shm·e of state-required program cosh 
and for local programs out of the revenue they have available f(lr 
general county purposes. County general purpose revenuf:' i.GPHI 
comes from a variety of sources, including the property tax, state 
general purpose subventions (such as vehicle license fehl, and 
the sales tax. Due to the constraints imposed by Proposition 18, 
rountie:.; hw•e uery limited pOll'('r to increase GPR. For example. 
counties cannot increase their property tax rate, and must get 
voter approval to increase other taxes. 
As service demands or co;:;ts grow over time, slate-required 
programs and local program" compete for the gnmth in tlw 
existing GPR base. Because counties have relativPlv limited 
control over the costs of slate-required program,, tlw;:;e pro-
grams may absorb an increasing share ofGPR over time. Thus. 
the GPR available for local purposes ma.v decline over time, 
requiring counties to restrict spending on local prOi.,'Tams. 
Fiscal Capacity Indicators 
Based upon our review of county financial data, W<' have 
identified three useful indicators of the fi,.,cal capacity of coun-
ties: 
• Local Purpose Revenues (LPR). The first indicator i;; 
the total GPR available forlocal purposes, after expendi-
tures on state-required programs are accounted for. \Ve 
refer to this residual as local purpose rPvenue. or LPR. 
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This measure shows the residual fisca I of coun 
ties to meet local needs after state requirernu1ts. 
• Change in LPR. Another important indicator is the 
change in LPR over time. A decline in LPR shows that a 
county's revenues are not growing at the same pace as the 
costs of state-required programs, and that the 
county may be faced with difficult 
state programs and local service 
• Proportion of GPR 
Programs. A third indicator is 
GPR spent on state-required programs. The 
this measure is that it enables one to compare the relative 
load that various counties carry in the financing of state-
required programs. 
For purposes of this analysis, all of these measures are 
computed on a per capita basis, unless otherwise indicated. 
Our review of county fiscal capacity is based on county reve-
nue and expenditures from 1984-85 to 1987-88 latter is the 
most recent year for which complete data are available). We 
obtained data on county financial transactions from the State 
Controller's Office, the Department of Mental Health, the De-
partment of Health Services, and the Department of Social 
Services. Our analysis excludes San as a city/ 
county, it is not directly comparable to other counties. For 
example, San Francisco's charter powers it greater 
ability to raise local revenues. 
FINDINGS REGARDING COUNTY FISCAL CAPACITY 
Statewide, the capacity of county governments to meet local 
needs with local revenues did not keep pace with the growth in 
population and the cost ofliving over the period 1984-85 through 
1987-88. On a statewide basis, county LPR increased 12 percent 
during this period. After adjusting for population growth and 
inflation, however, LPR declined 6.5 percent over the period. 
Counties also bore an increasing share of costs for state-re-
quired programs. In 1984-85, counties used approximately 50 
percent of their general purpose revenues to support state-re-
quired programs. By 1987-88, share had to 55 
percent. This trend is to the the 
cost increases in state-required programs revenue 
growth. Between 1984-85 and 1987-88, the costs of state-required 
programs increased 40 percent, genera] purpose revenue 
increased by only 26 .. ,,..,..,.,..,r 
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Variations in County Fiscal Capacity 
The statewide trends mask considerable variation in fiscal 
capacity among counties. The counties vary in terms of their total 
LPR, as well as in the growth or decline of this funding base over 
time. 
As Fi~:,rure 1 shows, in 1987-88, the average county had LPR 
of $108 per capita. However, county LPR ranged from Solano 
County, with only $57, to Sierra County, with $599. Alpine 
County is an outlier in this comparison, with LPR of $1,837. 
Alpine County exhibits much higher per capita LPR because it 
receives a relatively large share of the local property tax ( 68 
percent), has an extremely small population, and spends rela-
tively lower amounts for state-required programs. 
The counties also show considerable variation as to changes 
in their LPR over time. For example, Solano County experienced 
a 33 percent decline in LPR between 1984-85 and 1987-88, while 
Alameda County experienced a 50 percent increase during the 
same period. In all, 23 counties experienced a decline in LPR 
during this period. while 14 of these counties experie:1n·d a 
douhle-digit decline in this revenw~. In contrast, 34 countie:-, 
experienced an increa . .;(~ in LPH, with 20 ofthe;.;e counti(':-, (•xpe 
riencing a double-digit increase in this re\·enue. 
Figure 2 identifies the counties which experienced a double-
digit decline in LPR between 1984-85 and 1987-88. These coun-
ties are of interest bc·rause they appear to ha\·e shifted a rel<=~­
tively large share of general purpose revenue from local purpO'-(~,., 
to support state-required programs. It is intere~ting to note that 
many of thf>se countil's an~ clustered in the northPrn central 
\alley. 
County Fiscal Capacity and Fiscal Distress 
It is difficult to determine whether a county is experiencing 
fiscal distress based purely on these measures of fiscal capacity. 
Clearly, a county with low fiscal capacity is more likely to expe-
rience fiscal distress; however, the level of distress d<·pends on 
the unique circum stanch of each county For example, a county 
which has a high level of LPR may be bettN equipped to sustain 
a decline in LPH without serious detrinwnt lo its residents. On 
the other hand, if the residents d<~rnand a high lew•l of local 
services, the county may face practical difficulty in limiting 
servic<~s, and r('sidenb may feel rlepri\<·d if traditionally local 
resources are shifted to support statP-r~>quired program". Con 
versf•ly, a county with high f.{r(l[dh in LPR may "till hav<· 
difficulty "making (•tl(Jc, rned" if tJH· u!Jsn//1[1' /i'l'e/ of' :-,uth re-
sources was low to lwgin with. 
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0 Small rural (populatron 
less than 100,000) 
[@! Medium {population between 
100,000 and 350,000) 
1111 Large (population greater 
than 350,000) 
300 400 500 
Noto Alprne County is excluded because LPR is off this chan at $1 ,837 per caprta 
San F rancrsco County is excluded due to lack o1 comparability. 
Source· Legrslai!Ve Analyst Office estimate. 
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.----------------------------------------------------------, 
• 
Source: Legislative Analyst's estimate. 
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Counties are particularly to face fiscal distress when 
they experience both a low level of LPR, and a decline in that 
leveL For example, Butte County experienced a double-digit 
decline in LPR between 1984-85 and 1987-88. At the same time, 
Butte County had the fifth-lowest per LPR in the state in 
1987-88. Butte County also less the state average 
(measured on a per-capita basis) for a ofloca1 programs, 
including general administration, social services, 
and recreation/cultural the county has less 
flexibility to implement service in response to the 
increasing expenditures required in programs. As 
Figure 3 shows, 10 counties are by both a below-





!I San Bernardino 
~~San Joaquin 
~~Santa Clara 




Low Fiscal Capacity--Not Just a Rural County Problem 
In the past, rural counties have appeared to be particularly 
plagued by the gap resource availability and service 
requirements, and state been established to ad-
dress the For example, the 
Homicide counties. 
The 1990-91 Governor's reflects the perception that 
low fiscal problem, and calls for a 
"Rural County the situation. Our analysis 
indicates, however, the oflow fiscal capacity is not 
merely a rural county problem. 
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Figure 4 provides information about changes in LPR for small 
rural, medium-sized, and larg<~ counties. Small rural counties are 
ddi1wd as those with populations under 100,000, medium-sized 
counties as having populations betwetm 100,000 and ~)!10,000, 
and large counties as those with populations in excl'ss of350,000. 
In each category of county size the fi~:,'Ures indicate that there are 
counties with improving as well as declining fiscal capacity. For 
example, among small rural counties (upper panelJ, change in 
LPR varies from a 31 percent decline (Lake CountyJ to a 38 
percent increase (lnyo County!. Among medium-sized counties 
(middle panel), it varies from a 33 percent decline (Solano 
County) to a 36 percent increase (Monterey CountyJ. Among 
large counties (lower panelJ, San Joaquin experiencC>d a 16 
percent. decline in LPH, while Alameda County experienced a !10 
p(~rcent. increase. 
Further, some of the larger counties which :-huw d('clines in 
LPH also have a relatively low basi! amount of LPH 1 please refer 
to Figure 1). These counties include Santa Clara, San Bernar-
dino, and Fresno. Thus, these data indicate that the problems of 
low and declining fiscal capacity are not confi71ed to the rur<tl 
counties. 
The Role of State Fiscal Relief in Preventing Fiscal Decline 
In 1987-88, the :.,tate l~:o.tabli,hed one-tinw block f:,'lanh for 
county fiscal relief under Chapter 1286, Statutes of 191i7 lAB 650, 
Co:.,ta). This program provided $110 million to California's coun-
ties. Of the total, $89 million was allocated to countiPs ba:--ed on 
their relative shares of certain county health service,.; grants, 
discretionary COLAs, and population. An r.rl.ditional $21 millicn 
was allocau~d based on a "revenue :o.tabiliz.Jtion .. formula (•:o.tah-
lished by Chapter 1286. Specifically, these grants were intended 
to stabilize the percentage of county GPH e;;p('nded for tlw count.\' 
share of costs in AFDC (exclusive of Foster Care), the HISS 
program, the Community Mental Health program. and tlw Food 
Stamp:-, program. In addition to the granb provided under Chap-
ter 1286, several rural counties receiw~d stall· grants in 1981-88 
for the reimbursement of certain homicid<' tnal cosb (S2 mill ion 1 
and for marijuana eradication 1$2.8 mill iot1l. 
Our analysis indicates that the fiscal reliefprovl(led in 1981-
88 reduced the magnitude of the fiscal decline e\perienced by 
counties between 1984-85 and 1987-88. ln the nbsence of this 
relief, counties would have experienced a 10 percent d<'cline in 
inflation-adjusted LPR, rather than the 6.!1 percPnt declirw they 
did experience. Thu~, slate fi~cal relief appeared to have a mar-
ginal positive effect on overall count.\ fiscal capacity in 1987 -~8. 
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The state fiscal relief providf'd in 1987-88 played a more 
important role in improving the fiscal capacity of the smaller 
counties. These counties were the primary recipients of the $21 
million in revenue stabilization grants, as well as the grants for 
homicide trials reimbursement and marijuana eradication. In 
1987-88, small rural counties received $16 per capita in this state 
fiscal relief, compared to $5 per capita received by medium-sized 
counties, and $3 per capita received by large counties. In the 
absence of this relief, small rural counties would have experienced 
a 5 percent decline in LPR, rather than the 3 percent increase that 
actually occurred. 
It is important to note that, following 1987-88, counties did 
not receive large block grants for fiscal relief. In 1988-89 and 
subsequent years, however, counties did begin to receive new 
stale assistance under the Trial Court Funding Program. Al-
though information is not yet available to measure the impact of 
this program on individual counties, it is unlikely to provide the 
same level of relief to counties with low fiscal capacity. This is 
because the Trial Court Funding program provides its assistance 
in proportion to the number of judges in each county, and this 
bears little relationship to relative fiscal capacity. 
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO LOW FISCAL CAPACITY 
The specific factors contributing to low fiscal capacity vary 
considerably from county to county. For example, Butte County 
has experienced a decline in LPR primarily because of slow 
growth in local revenue sources. In contrast, San Bernardino 
County's declining LPR appears to stem primarily from dramatic 
growth in expenditures for state-required programs. Between 
1984-85 and 1987-88, San Bernardino's expenditures for state-
required programs grew at almost double the statewide pace--77 
percent compared to 40 percent. Generally speaking, however, 
low fiscal capacity stems from some combination oflimited reve-
nue growth and increasing expenditures for state-required pro-
grams. As discussed below, counties have only limited control 
over these factors. 
limited or Low-Growth in Revenue 
Our analysis suggests that a number of counties were char-
acterized by low GPR, or by low growth in GPR, during the study 
period. Figure 5 shows the 10 counties with the lowest total GPR 
per capita in 1987-88 (upper panel), and the 10 with the lowest 
growth (or actual declines) in GPR between 1984-85 and 1987-88 
(lower panel). The counties with low-growth or declining GPR 
include primarily smaller counties. There are, however, several 
large counties with low absolute levels of GPR (San Diego, Or-
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Figure 5 
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ange, San Bernardino, and Riverside Counties). Only one county--
Yolo--was in the bottom 10 both in terms of absolute level and 
changes to GPR during the study period. As discussed below, a 
variety of factors are responsible for a county experiencing a low 
level ofGPR, or low growth in that base. 
Economic Characteristics. The county's characteristics, 
such as its economic base and the pace and pattern of develop-
ment within its boundaries, are critical factors in determining 
GPR. For example, counties with primarily agricultural econo-
mies tend to have lower property values and retail sales and, 
therefore, more limited revenue. Even if a county has a growing 
economy, it will receive only limited fiscal benefit from this 
growth if commercial or industrial growth occurs within city 
boundaries. 
Actions of Other Entities Within the County. The actions 
of overlying governmental entities can have an important effect 
on county resources. For example, Yolo County's decline in GPR 
during the study period is largely attributable to the incorpora-
tion of the City of West Sacramento in January 1987. While a 
county may experience some reduction in service responsibilities 
as a result of incorporation, these reductions are not always 
commensurate with its loss of revenues. In addition, city redevel-
opment policies can have an eff'ect on county revenue. This is 
because current law allows redevelopment agencies to retain 
most of the increased property tax revenues (tax increment) 
occurring within a redevelopment project area. 
State Policies. State policies also can affect county resource 
availability. One of the most important ofthese is the allocation 
of county property tax revenues established by state law. Under 
the AB 8 property tax allocation formula (enacted following the 
voters' approval of Proposition 13), the share ofthe property tax 
allocated to each local agency is based on its share of the total 
amount of property taxes co11ected in the countyduringthe three 
fiscal years prior to 1978-79. Many counties imposed low property 
tax rates during this period and, therefore, currently receive a 
relatively low share of countywide property tax revenues. While 
counties receive on average 33 percent of total property tax 
revenues, county shares range from 18 percent in Orange County 
to 68 percent in Alpine County. 
As discussed above, counties have extremely limited access to 
independent revenue sources. One potential revenue source for 
smaller counties is the sales tax. Chapter 1257, Statutes of 1988 
and Chapter 277, Statutes of 1989 (both AB 999, Farr), allow 
counties with populations under 350,000 to increase sales taxes 
by one-half cent, subject to voter approval. Counties have had 
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High or Rapidly for 
State-Required Programs 
Our analysis 
Only two of th,,_,, mE·:l"-'U n·,.; 
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panel), and the 
for :-,tate 
Figure 6 shows counties with the 
expenditures for 
10 with the h 
required programs 
with high or ncreasing costs for 
small rural 
(Alameda, Sacramento Counties). Threl: 
counties show both extremely rapidly mcreasing costs 
for state-required program and Mariposa Coun-
ties). Of these, only t'vvo are characterized by declimng LPR 
(Mariposa and Sierra Counties). Trinity County did not experi-
ence a decline in LPR because its increase in GPR 
outpaced cost increases period. 
A variety contribute to a county experiencing high 
or rapidly increasing for state-required pro£:,rrams. 
Population face high costs for 
state-required programs in because oflocal population 
characteristics. For example, in AFDC casEdoads ranged 
from six cases per thousand residents in Marin Countv, to 50 
cases per 1,000 in Del Norte and Yuba Counties. Counties abo 
have differing populations in need of specialized services, such<~" 
elderly individuals or recent immigrants. 
Local Program Choices. Counties can exert some influ-
ence over program costs through decisions regarding program 
administration, access to services and service levels. The ability 
of counties to determine eligibility and service levels varies, how-
ever, from program to program and from county to county. For 
example, counties have extremely limited control over expendi-
tures in AFDC because eligibility criteria and b'Tant levels are 
established by the state and federal government. Counties gen-
erally have more control over general assistance expenditures 
because the state does not specific standards in this 
law enforcement also have 
on their costs for administration of the 
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Court Actions. In many countie:-., lh(! un,rt \1av\ ~~::,1 
lished guidelitH~s for state-required programs which n~str:d ; hl' 
county's ability to control program costs. For example, a number 
of counties face court-imposed minimum eligibilily sta1,clanb 
and grant levels for general assistance. The courts also have 
imposed population caps on correctional facilities in 19 counties, 
requiring those counties to incur increased costs for staffing and 
operations of new or expanded correctional facilities. 
Actions of Other Governments. The actions of other gov-
ernmental entities also affect county expenditures for required 
programs. For example, the state is constitutionally required to 
reimburse counties for the costs of new programs or higher levels 
of service imposed after 1975. This requirement specifically does 
not apply, however, in the case of county program costs resulting 
from changes in crimes and infractions. Thus, county court and 
correctional costs are sensitive to state criminal justice policies. 
In addition, the law enforcement actions of cities, whose police 
departments operate independently of counties, can increase 
county costs by placing demands on the courts and jail facilities. 
Variations in State Funding Affect Fiscal Capacity 
As we discussed above, targeted state fiscal relief played a 
role in mitigating fiscal decline in 1987-88. Ironically, differences 
in state grants also may contribute to county fiscal disparities. 
Figure 7 illustrates the per capita state assistance provided to 
counties in 1987-88. This measure includes general purpose state 
subventions as well as state grants for programs such as mental 
health, county health services, and social service administration. 
It excludes payments for programs providing direct grant pay-
ments to individuals (such as the Supplemental Security I nco me/ 
State Supplementary Program and AFDC). It also excludes state 
payments for social service program costs that are primarily 
caseload driven. We exclude these caseload-driven payments 
because they are directly related to the service population and, 
therefore, would distort county-by-county comparisons. 
As Figure 7 demonstrates, state assistance payments vary 
considerably, from $100 per capita in Ventura County, to $300 
per capita in Colusa County. To the extent that these variations 
do not accurately reflect variations in county service require-
ments or fiscal need, they may contribute to county fiscal strain. 
Our analysis indicates that this may in fact be the case, for 
two reasons. First, funding for many programs is allocated in pro-
portion to each county's relative level of expenditure during a 
"base year." For example, the subvention for county public 
health services is based partially on the level of" net county costs" 
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Figure 7 
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Note: Alpine and Sierra Counties excluded because they are off the chart at $1,094 and $831. 
respectively. San Francisco County excluded due to lack of comparability. 
Source· Legislative Analyst Office estimates. 
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for health pro~;rH!li:-, dunn~; thv 1~Yi7 7H f!-;c;d ' ·.r· ( '•'CI· 
which chose lo provide hif~her l<~vcls of st·rvict~ tl1:•• y. ,\, ;tl 
county expense, arP now f(:ward(:d by hight:r allocatio;" (Jfstal(· 
funds th,H\ COUnties that Were providing lower kvt·l 'uf' :'>\'fVil:('S 
at that time. As these allocations are fixed, they do not respond 
to changes in service demands overtime. Second, some programs, 
such as the state's alcohol and drug programs, provide a mini-
mum amount of assistance regardless of population. This results 
in a higher per capita allocation of program funds for the less-
populous rural counties. 
These differences in state funding levels can have the effect 
of requiring counties to bear differing burdens for state pro-
grams. For example, state payments for community mental 
health under the ShorUDoyle Act vary considerably from county 
to county. Unti I recently, these grant levels had not been adjusted 
to better reflect current county populations in need of these 
services. Counties which receive relatively low grant levels may 
find it necessary to increase expenditures to respond to their 
increasing service needs. As a result, they may bear a higher 
share of program costs than counties receiving higher levels of 
state assistance. This differential in county costs for state-
required programs is responsible for some of the difference in 
LPR between counties shown in our data. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, while county fiscal capacity varies considerably 
throughout the state, our analysis indicates that a number of 
counties are characterized by low fiscal capacity. Low fiscal 
capacity is not confined to small rural counties, as anum her of the 
larger counties also are characterized by low or declining LPR. 
While the specific contributing f~ctors vary from county to 
county, low-capacity counties generally experience some combi-
nation oflimited revenue, low growth in revenue, and/or high or 
increasing costs for state-required programs. In addition, the 
state may contribute to fiscal disparities to the extent that the 
state aid it provides does not reflect current county fiscal condi-
tions. 
Low fiscal capacity can have many negative ramifications. As 
we describe in The 1.989-90 Budget: Perspectives and Is.'wes 
(please see p. 348), low fiscal capacity may require counties to 
restrict local services, or result in counties having difficulty 
meeting statewide objectives in programs of state interest. Jt also 
results in pressure to increase local revenue, and this may have 
an undue influence on local land use decisions. Moreover, coun-
ties' revenue constraints may hamper their ability to respond to 
future infrastructure needs and to facilitate local economic deve 1-
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opment. Fiscally distressed counties also may have difficulty 
providing adequait! funding lf~v(~ls for state programs with mntch 
ing requirements, which can n:sult in them not ~~~~~eting state ob 
jectives. For example, some counties may not have the fiscal re-
sources to aggressively pursue child support collections, which 
may result in higher net state costs for AFDC. At the extreme, a 
county may consider bankruptcy action in federal court. Given 
the lack of precedence and the complex issues involved, the state 
would face considerable uncertainty as to the outcome of such an 
action. 
How Can the Legislature Improve County Fiscal Conditions? 
The fiscal difficulties faced by counties are long-term and 
structural in nature. They result from the prot,rrammatic rela-
tionship between the state and counties, as well as the revenue 
constraints imposed by Proposition 13. Given the complexity of 
factors involved, and the diversity of California's counties, it will 
not be an easy task to find long-term solutions to county fiscal 
distress. In the short term, however, the Legislature should take 
into account the fiscal difficulties faced by counties when consid-
ering the Governor's budget proposals, many of which may have 
a negative impact on counties (see Figure 8 for the major propos-
als). 
In addition, the Legislature will need to examine its options 
for providing short-term fiscal relief, as well as investigate 
longer-term solutions to the county fiscal dilemma. Figure 9 
summarizes some of the alternatives for providing fiscal relief to 
counties. Three of these options are shorter-term in nature, and 
could be implemented in the budget year. These include the 
provision of targeted relief, reduction in county match require-
ments for state-required programs (or increased funding levels), 
and the reallocation of program funding (or allocation of future 
funding) based on measures of current program service require-
ments. 
Our analysis indicates that i funding and expanded 
program coverage for the existing County Revenue Stabilization 
program is an effective means of providing targeted fiscal relief 
to counties. This is because the statutorily determined grants 
provided by this program are designed to reflect the impact of 
state-program requirements on the revenue available for local 
purposes. The Governor's Budget proposes to provide $15 mill ion 
for this program. Our analysis indicates, that to fully 
"stabilize" revenues in the manner contemplated by th(~ statutory 
formulas would require considerably more than this amount 
(please see our discussion of program in the Analysis of the 
1990-91 Budget Bill, Item 9210) 
342! Part IV: Major Issues Facing the Legislature 
[f] Augmentat1on for open-space 
subventions ~ counties under the 
I 
$5 million Item 9100 
Williamson Act 
ffi Increased funding for the Community $10 million Item 4440 Mental Health Program 
[±] Increased funding for the California 
I 
$35 million Item 4260 
Healthcare for the Indigent Program 
(CHIP) 
EEJ Shift the responsibility for mental Unknown Item 6110 health and residential services for positive 
children. as required by Ch 1747/84 impact 
(AB 3632, Brown) and Ch 127 4/85 
(AB 882. Brown), from the Departrnent 
of Mental Health and Department of 
Social Services to the Department of 
Educat1on 
EJ Reduction in payments to counties Item 4260 under tt1e AB 8 County Health Services 
Program 
EJ One-year suspens1on of the statutory cost-of-living adjustments for AB 8 
health services grants 
EJ Reduction 1n payments to counties under the Medically Indigent Serv1ces 
Program 
$25 million Item 4260 
B Program growth "adjustment" under $24 million Item 5180 the Child Welfare Services program 
B Deferral of payment for the prior- $40 million Item 8885 year costs for certain mandates until 
the Budget Acts of 1991, 1992, and 
___ j 1993 
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Figure 9 
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Provide additional targeted relief (for example, 
increase funding provided under the revenue 
stabilization program). 
Reduce county match requirements or increase 
overall funding levels in state programs. 
Reallocate state program funding, or allocate future 
increases in funding, based on measures of current 
program requirements. (Note: Current law requires 
increases in funding for community mental health 
to be allocated based on an "equity" formula.) 
~-::----'-~_LO~N_G~--TE_R_M_O_PT~IO~N~S~--~-j 
Provide additional independent revenue sources 
(for example, extend AB 999 to large counties). 
Realign state/local program responsibilities. 
While these may close the gap between revenue and 
responsibilities in the term, they are unlikely to solve the 
long-term structural budget problem experienced by counties. In 
the longer term, the Legislature should examine more perma-
nent solutions to the county fiscal As Figure 9 indicates, 
potential longer-term options include modification of the current 
county property tax allocations, provision of additional indepen-
dent revenue sources, or the realignment of relative state and 
local program These options should he consid-
ered, however, in the context ofthe overall county-state relation-
srHp and the programmatic goals of the state social service 




Associatio11 of California 
ASSEMBLY LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE 
STATE/LOCAL FISCAL CRISIS 
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Mr. Chairman and Members -
APPENDIX F 
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and outline the consequences this 
current budget crisis presents in the county health and welfare area. Given the magnitude of 
a $3.6 billion shortiall in revenues, it appears inev1table that critical programs will be reduced 
and that the most frail and needy populat1on in California will suffer greatly. 
The Governor's budget, as proposed in January, outlined a number of program reductions 
that would significantly reduce the ability of counties to provide essential health and welfare 
services at the local level. I would like to briefly outline the most significant proposals 
contained in the budget as introduced: to highlight other key areas of vulnerability that we 
foresee; provide the comm1ttee with the impact of funding reductions in this area: and, finally, 
to provide some suggestions that will assist m local implementation of your budget decisions. 
1. AB 8/County Health Services Program 
The 1990-91 State budget proposes to reduce the County Health Services/AS 8 Program 
by $150 million General Fund and eliminate the statutory annual cost-of-living adjustment 
of $23 million General Fund. The stated reason for the $150 million reduction in AB 8 
funding is the "availability of Medi-Cal OBRA services for persons who were previously 
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provided services under the County Health Servtces Program." This basic assumption that 
revenues from Medi-Cai/OBRA services is a windfall to the counties is not valid. There are 
several points to consider in analyzing the Administration's proposal: 
o AB 8 Program/Background and County Match Experience: 
In 1978, after Proposition 13 was adopted, the Legislature appropriated $4.4 
billion in one-time fiscal relief to schools, counties, cities and special districts. In 
the following year, AB 8 (Chapter 282, Statutes of 1979), continued, with some 
modification, the assistance to schools and the "buy-outs" of specified health and 
welfare programs. The provisions of AB 8 were established to be a permanent 
system of fiscal relief for local governments. 
The County Health Services Program was established in AB 8 as a part of 
this larger fiscal relief measure to provide block grants to counties for funding for 
a broad spectrum of public health services This program provides a block grant 
"partnership" between the State and the counties in the financing of health services 
delivered at the local level. Counties have substantial flexibility in determining the 
priority and use of State and local funds. Each county's allocation is based on a 
formula consisting of (1) a per capita grant, and (2) state sharing funds that must 
of matched by county funds. 
The best perspective to weigh the Administration's proposal can be obtained 
from each county's health services plan and budget -- the county match for State 
AB 8 funds should be the deciding factor as to whether there Is any kind of a 
"windfall" from select revenue category changes. Counties across the State have 
"over-matched" ttw AB 8 program Ttw::,(; over-matct1 funds are provtded out of 






needs to spend county funds on other high priority programs, such as law 
enforcement, park services, road improvements, etc. Counties have not provided 
so generously to the AB 8 Program because we are flush with resources. Instead, 
we find that counties have provided over-match funds in attempts to keep up with 
dramatic cost increases in providing basic public health services. 
To represent that OBRA revenue as a windfall is only accurate if counties 
have actually decreased the local over-match funds used to provide services. As 
illustrated in Table A, counties have NOT seen a local offset in the cost of providing 
health services. In fact counties have nearly doubled our over-match expenditures 
in the last fiscal year!! In the 26 counties ,which administer their own indigent 
healthcare programs (commonly referred to as the "MISP counties), the over-match 
figures have grown from $203.5 million in FY 1988-89 to $391 .4 million in FY 1989-
90. This information portrays quite accurately that we have not received any kind 
of offset for local expenditures as a result of OBRA. Any reduction in AB 8 funding 
will only result in decreasing or eliminating public health services -- OBRA revenues 
simply will not compensate for this cut tn funding. 
Reductions in State AB 8 Funds will jeopardize Proposition 99 funds: 
Under the provisions of AB 75 (Chapter 1331, Statutes of 1989), counties are 
strictly required to "maintain a level of financial support of county funds for health 
services at least equal to its county match and any overmatch of county funds in 
the 1988-89 fiscal year." Counties supported this provision of AB 75 in recognition 
of the provisions of Proposition 99 which require tobacco tax funds to be used to 
supplement and not to supplant existing services. 




of AB 8 funds received, a reduction in state funds would inevitably result in a 
statutory reduction in county funds. Unless, the maintenance of effort provisions 
of AB 75 are significantly modified by the Legislature, counties will not be able 
to sustain the financial or service level maintenance of effort requirements of 
AB 75. We simply cannot fill the gap with county funds if the AB 8 dollars are 
reduced. Thus, the Prop. 99 appropriations to counties for health services slated 
for FY 1990-91 will be jeopardized. The Administration and the Legislature must be 
aware that the issue to Proposit1on 99's non-supplantation issue will be tested in 
court. 
o Many AB 8 services are not related in any way to Medi-Cai/OBRA: 
State and local AB 8 funds are used to support the entire scope of health 
services. Many of these services are not eligible and are not related in any way to 
the Medi-Cal program funded in part by the Federal OBRA Act of 1986. Counties 
have the latitude to use these funds for a broad array of services, including in-
patient and out-patient indigent care, environmental health services, jail health, 
animal control, immunizations. juvenile court health services, public health for 
sexually transmitted diseases, dental care. public health nursing, and California 
Children's Services. 
CSAC collected expenditure data from the counties in order to demonstrate 
the range of services that are funded by AB 8. 44 of the 58 counties completed the 
survey, as illustrated in Table C. 
o Reductions in State Health Subvent1ons v1olate the agreements acl1ieve·d in SB 175: 




emergency services and pregnancy-related services. including labor and delivery 
costs, to undocumented persons and persons w1th v1sas. provided they meet income 
and resource requirements. The state legislation implementing these OBRA 
changes, SB 175 (Chapter 1441, Statutes of 1988) added prenatal and postnatal 
care as an additional Medi-Cal benefit for this population. The SB 175 agreement 
that was reached after lengthy negotiations between the Administration, the 
Legislature and the counties, specifically did not include an offsetting reduction in 
any state-funded local assistance, AB 8 included. 
The Administration is treating the OBRA program as if these are all newly 
provided Medi-Cal services to this population and that counties were paying for 
these services. Some counties. primarily Los Angeles, were reimbursed by Medi-
Cal for these services by using the CA 6 eligibility process. The State of California 
has been incurring costs for this serv1ce population for years under the Medi-Cal 
program through the CA 6 process -- a process by which an alien certified that they 
are not under order of deportation and Medi-Cal services are rendered pending 
review of INS. The Administration's position that these pregnancy-related 
services were completely provided by counties under the AB 8 program Is a 
complete fallacy. The Medi-Cal estimate for FY 1989-90 contained a conservative 
$40 million savings due to the elimination of the CA 6 process. 
Counties are concerned that a decision to reduce AB 8 funding represents 
the State Administration turning its back on its partnership with the counties in the 
area of public health services. It was through this partnership that counties 
supported the Administration in efforts to achieve passage of SB 175. 
Achieving full restoration of funds for the AB 8 Program is the highest budget priority for 
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CSAC and the counties for fiscal year 1990-91. Any methodology used to apply these cuts to 
counties -- whether the reduction affects all 58 counties or a selected number -- will be 
vigorously opposed by CSAC. Individual counties and county health associations will also 
maintain opposition to this reduction. 
The impact of reductions in AB 8 will differ by county. due to the discretionary nature of this 
block grant-type health program. However. all counties which suffer reductions in AB 8 
funding, will inevitably reduce basic public health services for immunizations, venereal disease 
treatment, well child clinics, family planning, tuberculin skin testing, HIV screening, public health 
nursing for child abuse and neglect, services to high risk infants, discontinuation of services 
to senior citizens and frail elderly, as well as the Women Infants and Children (WIC Food 
Supplement and Education Program. Enforcement of Non-Smoking Ordinances would be 
eliminated completely in some counties. Children with catastrophic medical needs, such as 
cancer and congenital heart disease, would experience delays in medical treatment, and in 
some cases go without care altogether. And environmental health programs would suffer, with 
reductions in inspections for food handling establishments and investigations of sites 
contaminated with toxic waste and sewage spills. 
Reductions will not just mean that less services will be available. Many counties will be 
forced to close public health clinics, thus eliminating the only point of access to health care 
for many county residents. Table D demonstrates the list of public health referrals in Yolo 
County that are not assigned to a public health nurse due to lack of staff. 
2. Medically Indigent Services Program 
The Governor's 1990-91 budget proposes to reduce the Medically Indigent Services Program 
(MISP) by $25 million from its current funding level by deterring payment until the next fiscal 




honor to the statutory commitment to hold counties harmless from reductions made in the MISP 
program last year. In 1989-90, the MISP program was reduced by $100 million. This cut was 
predicated upon assumptions that federal funds (!RCA) for newly legalized persons would 
"backfill" the MISP cut. In taking this cut, the Legislature acknowledged that certain counties 
would never claim sufficient funds to fill the gap in MISP funding. Thus, a "hold-harmless" 
provision was adopted by the Legislature and signed by the Governor, to make up the 
difference between MISP and IRCA funds. Many counties have assumed that the State would 
hold true to this commitment, and have included these funds in their local budget. 
Unfortunately, the State has not provided any assurances of honoring the hold-harmless 
provisions in any state budget hearing. In the absence of corrective action, counties will 
already experience a shortfall in MISP funding. 
The "deferral" in MISP expenditures cannot be interpreted as anything other than a budget 
cut -- there is absolutely no guarantee that next year's budget will include this $25 million 
beyond what would otherwise be appropriated. The fact remains that even without this 
additional cut, MISP has been and continues to be severely underfunded. At the inception of 
the MISP program in 1982, counties were given 70 percent of the State's expected expenditures 
to provide services to this group. Since that time. the program has been subjected to repeated 
cuts in the face of mounting costs due to inflation and case load increases (see Table E). 
The MISP program was been rumored to be vulnerable to additional funding reductions as 
a means to balance the 1990-91 State budget. Further reductions in MISP could result in 
county hospital closures -- and patient deaths -- due to the very fragile condition of the county 
health safety net. In some counties, patients already wait over nine weeks for outpatient care. 
Delayed medical treatment often results in more expensive care as health conditions get worse. 
3. Mental Health Funding 
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The Governor's January budget proposal does not contain specific program reductions for 
Short-Doyle Mental Health programs. However. the budget proposes to transfer fiscal 
responsibility for mental health services provided to special education pupils to the State 
Department of Education under the umbrella oi Proposition 98. This proposal was initiated 
under the assumption that "Test 1" of Proposition 98 would allow for the $40 million in State 
General Funds to be ''freed up" for other budget purposes. Circumstances have changed since 
the introduction of the budget and it now appears that the growth in Average Daily Attendance 
(ADA) of school children will necessitate the use of "Test 2". The outcome of Proposition 98's 
"Test 2" provisions is that the non-Prop. 98 side of the state ledger will become smaller and 
additional reductions may result 1n health and welfare programs. 
It now appears that the Governor's original proposal to transfer the program for Seriously 
Emotionally Disturbed (SED) children to the State Department of Education may not result in 
making the $40 million available for other health and welfare programs. However, CSAC 
continues to support the proposed transfer because special education programs under the 
auspices of the State Department of Education have enjoyed more stable funding, with annual 
increases, which could protect and enhance future mental health services to the SED program. 
The educational community is uniformly opposed to this transfer. 
The fiscal subcommittees in both houses have acted to reject the proposed transfer to 
Proposition 98 and restored funding to county mental health and welfare departments. Our 
greatest fear Is that the proposal to transfer the funding to Proposition 98 will be rejected 
-· and that the funding for county mental health and welfare departments will not be 
replaced. Without statutory repeal of the legislation which mandated services to SED children 
(Chapter 17 4 7 - Statutes of 1984/ AB 3632 and Chapter 127 4 - Statutes of 1985/ AB 882), mental 
health services for children and adults will be Jeopardized. 
The funding for community mental health serv1ces, as well as SED services, is very 
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uncertain given the magnitude of the $3.6 billion gap 1n state funding for FY 1990-91. Local 
mental health programs have been placed at fiscal and legal risk along with seriously 
emotionally disturbed children, as part of this enormous budget crisis. 
County mental health programs serve the sickest and poorest Californians. Statewide, 
90% of mental health funds are used for persons with very low income. The balance of mental 
health funds are used for people who pay some share of cost and for vitally needed community 
mental health services: earthquake recovery services, other disaster response, outreach to 
minority communities and similar programs. 
65% of our funds go to persons who are severe and persistently mentally ill. The balance 
goes to children with serious mental health needs but without an adult diagnosis, people with 
urgent short-term problems such as suicide prevention or disaster response, and adults who 
are evaluated in a crisis clinic or emergency room and referred to non-public services. 
Mental health services in California's counties have suffered a $132·$250 million 
reduction In per capita funding since the early 1980's. 
The Legislature and Governor have mvested substantial funds in increasing staffing and 
facility adequacy at California's state hospitals in the last five years. State hospital beds have 
been increased an average of 1 oo beds per year each of the last four years to serve the needs 
of clients sent by the criminal justice system. The State has replaced substantial amounts of 
federal funds withdrawn from the inpatient system when federal participation in Institutes for 
Mental Disease was eliminated. Several new categorical programs were created, including 
services to severely emotionally disturbed children in public schools, services to the homeless 
mentally ill and supplemental rate payments for board and care homes. Each of these 
categorical programs brought expanded service mandates or new caseloads into the county-
operated programs. During this same penod, the community mental health system received 
a 1% cost of living four years ago and a 2-2 1 /2% increase for new caseload and services from 
F-9 
10 
tobacco tax funds this year. Community access to state hospital beds has not been increased, 
and locally operated programs for the vast majority of mentally ill Californians have been 
reduced or eliminated. 
The impact of this steady erosion of local programs is serious and intensely personal for 
many Californians. San Diego has recently investigated two suicides by persons who were 
seriously and persistently mentally ill. They have concluded that the reduction in outreach 
services, case management and support for people released from in-patient units, inadequate 
day treatment and other rehabilitation services. and lack of services for people with both a 
substance abuse and mental illness problem contributed directly to the suicides. 
Some counties have additional problems because they have experienced explosive 
population growth. 
Riverside County's population has increased 65% in 1 o years, while the state's population 
grew 25%. As a result, their per capita mental health funding has declined 25% since the late 
1970's. They now serve 10% of the severely and persistently ill population. This scenario has 
been repeated in foothill counties throughout northern California. 
Funds appropriated in the State Budget have failed to keep pace with Inflation. 
Los Angeles closed 2 clinics and reduced services in 7 other facilities last year atone. Even 
•over-equity" counties are affected by this funding crisis. San Francisco County, for example, 
also closed two clinics last year. Outpatient and day treatment services were reduced in over 
half the counties in the state this year. Typically, count1es have already reduced or eliminated 
outreach, prevention, early intervention and community education. Rural counties cannot 
recruit medical supervision needed to maintain licensing, because their salaries are 
embarrassingly low. 




As clinics and inpatient units have closed or their waiting lists have grown, the county jail 
has become the largest psychiatric facility in Califomia. The state's budget practices have 
created a disastrous spectacle of communities whose only open door is the jail. 
County mental health departments are not able to meet the needs of AIDS demented 
patients In adult acute Inpatient service areas. 
In the first half of 1989, San Francisco saw the caseload of AIDS demented patients 
increase to 20% of their total inpatient population. These clients, often non-rehabilitatable, 
require extensive physical care. Most are not combative, but require a locked inpatient setting 
for their personal safety and are gravely disabled in their ability to care for themselves. The 
needs of this population will grow in many communities, and the mental health system must 
have the resources to provide appropnate. spec1alizerl settings for their care. 
County Supervisors unanimously passed a resolut1on at our 1988 Annual Meeting which 
declares that there is a severe crisis in the California public mental health system and, that in 
the absence of appropriate state action to mitigate the crisis, counties will explore legislative 
and legal means to disengage counties from the mandates of the Short-Doyle Act. 
4. Child Welfare Services 
The Governor's budget proposes a reduction of $38 million in Federal and State General 
Fund expenditures for the Child Welfare Services Program. This proposal represents the first 
time since the early 1980's that the administration has proposed to fund CWS at less than its 
full estimated costs. This funding shorttall translates into a underfunding of approximately 500 
full-time social workers which are identified as needed by the SDSS budget. Specifically, this 
means either of the following -- some children go unserved or all children receive less service 
because caseloads per worker are approximately 10-15% higher. Overall, this shortfall will likely 
translate into increased cases per social workers, which m turn means child visitation standards, 
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court-ordered service requirements and overall supervision of child and family situations will be 
compromised. 
This budget proposal is made, in part, based upon assumptions that counties may absorb 
the reduction through increased efficiency in local administration of the Child Welfare Services 
Program. To the extent that counties cannot achieve $38 million in efficiencies, however, the 
reduction would result in social workers being able to perform fewer tasks required under 
current state law. If this is the case, it would be better public policy to statutorily eliminate 
some of the currently required tasks, than to force counties into the position of having to 
choose which statutory requirements to ignore. 
The past commitment of the Administration has been to fund the caseloads in Child Welfare 
Services. The failure to do so in FY 1990-991 will means many children and families will not 
be served in keeping with the intentions of state law and regulations. (See Table F.) 
5. In-Home Supportive Services 
The budget proposes to cut the In-Home Support1ve Services Program by $71 million by 
eliminating access to services for over 40,000 elderly and disabled Californians. The 
percentage of IHSS clients who would lose access to services as a result of the proposed : 
reduction varies by county. In the counties of Plumas, Kings and Merced, two-thirds of clients 
would lose access to care. In other counties, approximately 30% of the clients would lose their 
IHSS. (See Table G.) 
Without services, the functional level of many of these IHSS clients will quickly deteriorate 
to a disability level which would again make them eligible for IHSS. In addition, the health 
status of some of these clients may actually deteriorate to such a level that medical care, 
hospitalization or long-term care may be required Because IHSS eligible clients are eligible 




removed from the IHSS program. In addition, the 1mpact of eliminat1ng IHSS services as a 
source of income to poor families with a disabled family member will likely force these families 
more deeply into poverty. 
6. Medi-Cal Optional Benefits 
The budget proposes elimination of optional benefits pro•Jided under the Medi-Cal program, 
including medical transportation, psychology, chiropractic, podiatry, acupuncture, heroin 
detoxification for a savings of $74.5 million ($36.4 million General Fund). Elimination of these 
benefits under the Medi-Cal program may result in increased demands upon county indigent 
health care programs as medical necessity demands the provision of services that would be 
eliminated under Medi-Cal. 
As you can see, reductions in any of these programs will be extremely dramatic if 
implemented at the local level. However. we appreciate the dilemma that the State has this 
year in constructing a balanced budget. Therefore, we would propose two very important 
actions for your consideration that would be essential for the counties in mitigating funding 
cuts: 
1. Suspend or Repeal hearings as required by the Bellenson Act: 
The Beilenson Act (Health and Safety Code Section 1442 and 1442.5} requires county 
boards of supervisors to hold noticed public hearings and make specified findings prior to 
closing a county facility, eliminating or reducing the level of services, and selling/transferring 
management. Notice must be posted not less than 30 days prior to the public hearings and 
reductions cannot occur until the filing of documents with the State Department of Health 
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Services which describe the actual serv1ces to be reduced or eliminated. These documents 
must be very specific, with detail about every employee position that would be reduced to 
eliminated. 
The Beilenson hearing process is cumbersome and expensive. It often leads of litigation 
because one of the standards that applies to counties by the law is the requirement that "the 
availability of services and the quality of treatment received by people who cannot afford to pay 
for their health care shall be the same as that available to nonindigent people receiving health 
care services in private facilities in that county." Because Beilenson hearing delay local 
implementation of funding reductions, these cuts are more painful since they are concentrated 
over a shorter period of time. 
Counties should be exempted from Beilenson hearing when county-level reductions are 
a result of state-level cuts. Action was last taken to suspend Beilenson hearings during FY 
1982-83 as a means of mitigating the local implementation of state-level reductions that 
accompanied the FY 1982-83 State budget. 
2. Maintenance of Effort Provisions of AB 75 should be modified or repealed. 
As a condition of receiving Cigarette and Tobacco Tax, counties agreed to a strict 
maintenance of effort for health funding and service levels. These provisions, contained in AB 
75 (Chapter 1331, Statutes of 1988) should be repealed or suspended in recognition of the 
certainty that counties will be unable to comply with both maintenance of effort tests. In 
addition, counties should be granted additional flexibility in utilizing Proposition 99 funds in 
accordance with high priority local programs. 
CSAC has actively participated in every budget process and has tried to assist the State 




the Legislature to develop mechanisms which can more adequately address the entirety of the 
b~dget crisis in this State. Explorations of various solutions and proposals will obviously be 
a major ongoing priority for CSAC in the coming weeks. 
### 
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TABLE 8 - COUNTY OVERMATCH EXPENDITURES 
26 Medically Indigent Services Program Counties Only 
COUNTY "88/89 OVER-MATCH '89/900VER-MATCH DIFFERENCE 
ALAMEDA 18,795,665 87,676,692 18,884,027 
CONTRA COSTA 8,854,119 9,397,005 1,0.(2,886 
FRESNO .(76,243 5,807,080 5,880,787 
KERN 8,186,907 10,838,845 2,651,.(38 
LAKE 712,512 659,124 (58,888) 
LOS ANGELES 23,432,925 110,972,571 87,589,646 
MENDOCINO 876,363 2,068,210 1,191,847 
MERCED 3,859,890 4,326,310 .(66,420 
MONTEREY 3,566,036 8,668,017 5,101,981 
ORANGE 4,573,9.(5 7,628,397 3,05.(,452 
PLACER 621,154 394,205 (266,9.(9) 
RIVERSIDE 4,5.(2,563 3,685,698 (856,865) 
SACRAMENTO 4.068,883 4,179,484 967,966 
SAN BERNARDINO 11,232,984 12,6-t7,4-t0 1,.(1.(,.(56 
SAN DIEGO 17,013,691 33,301,628 16,187,937 
SAN FRANCISCO 45,517,621 72,359,99-t 26,842,373 
SAN JOAQUIN 1,698,009 5,275,110 8,577,101 
SAN LUIS OBISPO 3,51.(,585 4,664,502 1,149,916 
SAN MATEO 8,910,005 13,113,810 4,208,805 
SANTA BARBARA 2,·418,096 2,746,011 827,916 
SANTA CLARA 20,232,145 20,039,751 (192,394) 
SANTA CRUZ 1,355,095 1,688,160 333,065 
STANISLAUS H7,660 2,954,233 2,806,573 
TULARE 3,036,978 3,8.(6,586 809,608 
VENTURA 5,299,124 11,351,782 6,052,658 
YOLO 1,123,572 1,231,602 108,030 
TOTALS $203,563,271 $391,421,697 $188,715,291 
NOTE: This data does not indicate correctiom made by counties to reflect "estimated actual" expenditures. 
Information from the countie5 reflecting final numbers in brackets will demonstrate higher overmatch 
expenditures in 1989-90, thu5 indicating an increase in overmatch for all MISP counties. 
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TABLE C - COUNTY UTILIZATION OF AB 8 FUNDS 
COUNnES HOSP- JAIL E~\ JRr, PUBLIC PRMRY OTHER 
ITALS HJ JH HLTH CARE 
% <;; <;t '* % 
Al.AMl!DA 53.4 0 H 44.~ 0 0 
ALPINE 0 0 (I 1()(1 0 0 
AMADOR 5 10 H' 70.C\ 0 0 
BtnTE 7.9 16 6.~ 69.~ 0 0 
CALAVERAS 
COWSA 14.8 4.7 15.• 421 22& 228 
CONTRA COSTA 624 7 0.4 18.4 3.15 3.15 
DEL NORTE 0 ~ Jc 57 0 0 
ELDORADO 0 12.~ 1\t> ~~4 0 11.4 
FR.ESNO S2.9 10.7 61• (I 3.04 .9 
GLENN 95 0 (J 5 0 0 
HUMBOLDT 0 8.~7 J(l." 51 B.f 0 
IMPERIAL 11.5 35 H.' 10 0 0 
IN YO 0 18.1 5.~ 25.~ 3.1 0 
KERN 56.8 13 o.J 321 0 2.6 . 
KINOS 0 0 '~ 71 0 0 
LAKE 0 MC\ lt>.'- 8.'.4 (I 0 
LASSEN 0 (I ?--1- 4tl.~ (J 18.9 
LOS ANGELES ss 0 1.; (I 
MADERA 0 ;\) 71 u 0 
MARIN 




MONO 50.2 498 0 0 
MONIEREY 87.7 ~0.5 ;:r. .'-1 . .: () 0 
NAPA 
NEVADA 0 " i~ 0 0 
ORANGE 364 14.< 4;; 7 0 291 
PLACER 0 "' 'I ~ 685 (J 0 
PWMAS 0 lo.< ,,, 11' .. < 0 0 
RIVERSIDE 34 0 h: 0 0 
SACRAMENTO 16.0 26 7 ~~-lt• 1.09 5.43 
SAN BENITO 
SAN BERNARDINO 54.2 <ij ,(,_'i 0 0 
SAN DIEGO 1H .'til ·"'1• ~fl.t,i 11 14.7 
SAN FRANCISCO 
SAN JOAQUIN 
SAN WIS OBISPO 16.2 1~ 1 "~- 7 0 5.8 
:iAN MATEO 35 11> ::!-1 14 2 
SANTA BARBARA 0 " .'R~ ol.f 0 SANTA CLARA 57.4 4.1- :.o.<.~ 0 
SANTA CRUZ 9.5 12 i,<..-:. 41.; 229 6.77 
SHASTA 0 0 4" 78.< 1o.S 0 
SIERRA 
SISKIYOU 
SOl..ANO 0 (I (I 100 0 0 
SONOMA (J ::.4 95., 0 2.4 
STANISLAUS 0 
SUTI'ER 0 (\ 0 0 100 
TEHAMA 
TRINITY 
TULARE 0 79 17 0 
TUOLOMNE 23.1 8.9 4".~ 1!.~ 0 226 
VEN'IURA 56.2 0 4' 39 0 0 
YOLO 32.7 0 " 67.3 0 0 YUBA 0 llo 77 0 
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TABLE D - YOLO COUNTY 
PUBLIC HEALTH NURSES INFORMATION 
Ust of referrals received by public health nursing in the West Sacramento office that were noc assigned for follow-
up due to lack of staff. 


























REASON FOR REFERRAL 
Russian refugees 
Premature baby with postnatal asphyxia and metabolic 
acidosis 
Newborn infant with low birthweight, burses concerned re: 
home safety 
Southeast Asian refugees 
Premature baby with ADS (respiratory distress syndrome) 
Southeast Asian refugees 
Low birthweight baby born to drug abusing 16 year old 
No prenatal care. Mother and baby had positive tox. screen 
for methaphetamines/amphethamines 
Pregnant, abusing alcohol 
Southeast Asian, suicidal (seen by Mental Health), needs 
info re: physical health 
Southeast Asian delivered, no prenatal care, baby premature 
Premature baby with RDS 
Russian refugee child, retardation suspected 
Russian refugee child with developmental delays 
Premature baby born to mother with 6th grade education 
Southeast Asisan born to mentally deficient mother 
Possible pregnancy in a 12 year old 
Child with no speech, developmental delays 
Child with abnormal emotional pattern, gross motor delays, 
speech delays, Alcoholic father. 
Russian refugees 
Pregnant. Mentally retarded. 2 chlldrem removed from home 
previously. 
Pregnant Southeast Asian. Unplanned pregnancy. Abused 
by spouse. 
Pregnant Southeast refugees. 
Child with speech delay, possible mental retardation. 

















(Source: Yolo County Public Health Department) 
Single mom with no prenatal care., first baby. Spanish 
speaking only. 
Premature baby born to Southea10t A10lan mom. 
Premature baby with ADS 
3 1/2 year old with unclear 10peech 
Southeast Asian refugees -- new arrivals 
Russian refugees -- new arrivals 
Russian refugees - new arrivals 
Southeast Asian refugee mother with depression, demential, 
organic brain syndrome. Concern re: children's safety. 
Russian refugees - new arrivals 
Russian refugees -- new arrivals 
Southeast Asian with premature baby. Abused by spouse. 
Russian refugees •• new arrivals 
Russian refugees -- new arrivals 
6 month old who was born with positive tox. screen. Mother 
needs help with parenting. 
Obese 2 year old. 
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TABLE E - Medically Indigent Services Program 
Level of State Appropriations 


















CURRENT FUNDING COMPARED TO VARIOUS FUNDING SCHEMES 
1989 Budget Act 
Method 1: Compare the level of MISP to CMSP 
Full funding 
Method 2: Re-estimate 70% of the health services costs and 1 00% of the 
administrative costs for MIAs in the Medi-Cal Program In 1982-
83; Increased by (a) population growth and (b) Inflation. 
Full Funding 
Method 3: Re-estimate 100% of health services and administrative costs for 
MIAs In the Medi-Cal Program in 1982-83; Increased by (a) 
population growth and (b) Inflation. 
Full funding 
Method 4: Re-estimate 70% of the health services costs and 1 00% of the 
admmlnlstratlve coats for MIA's In the Medi-Cal Program In 1982· 
83; Increase by Medi-Cal cost increases. 
Full funding 
Method 5: Re-estimate 100% of health services and administrative coats for 
MIAs In the Medi-Cal program; increase by Medi-Cal cost increases. 
Full funding 
(Sourc.: Analysis of the 1990·91 Budget Bill, Office of the Legislative Analyat) 















TABLE F • CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 
IMPACTS OF CUTS ON CERTAIN COUNTIES 
The county's Permanent Placement (PP) caseload increased 27% In 1989. The county projec1s 
this trend will continue and ten additional social workers will be nMded In 1990. Wlthom 
additional funding, existing flocial workers will have lest~ time to t~eek permanent homes for 
children and children In foster care are likely to experience longer leng1hs of stay. 
In 1989, the county's Fiiimily Maintenance (FM) caseload lncreaMd 25%. Because this program 
attempts to keep children and families together through lntenaive supervision and support, the 
lack of lll1ate funde~ for this program will means the county experiences higher caseloads per 
worker and lees time per family wm be possible. As a result, more children are likely 10 enter 
foster care to a~~osure their protection. 
In the last six months of 1989, the Family Reunification and Permanent Placement Clll!ileloads 
lncrealiled 10% and 31% respectively over the same ~&il(·month period In 198f3. Unfunded 
caseload growth will mean Increased Cllli>E!Ioads per worker resulting In children and families 
being underserved. Higher foster care caseloads are anticipated. 
Due to its proportion of the statewide caseload, the county would experience an underfundlng 
of roughly $5 to $8 million, translating into a potential understaffing of over 100 social workers. 
As a result, children and families would receive less service. 
Based upon local ca&e!oad growth trends, 1he county wm need an additional 8 Family 
Maintenance social worker~>, 5 Family Reunification social workers and 5 Permanent Placement 
social workers to serve an additional 8,300 children. Wi1hol.l1 additional funding, existing staff 
will be required to serve more children and families, leading to less service overall. 
RIVERSIDE COUNTY- The county projects an $800,000 lilhare of the "funding gap," which means 10 fewer social 
workers than needed, higher caseloads for all staff, and less timely provlelon of services, 
Including child visitation and court reports. 
SAN DIEGO COUNTY -The county projects an underfunding of 46 social workers, leading to fewer social worker 
contacts with children, parent!> and foster parents, delays in preparing court reports and less 





The County estimated that 3,600 cases will be affected through the less of 8 full time social 
work positions. County social workers currently carry caseloads in excess of state budget 
targets. Projected under-funding will escalate existing caseload burdens and mean less ability 
to meet program standards. 
The county estimated the budget will result in 16 fewer social workers than needed, leading 
to uncovered caseloads and an inability to meet state program standards. The likely impacts 
are reduced child visitation, delayed court-ordered hearings, fewer family reunifications and 
fewer caaes In family maintenance. 
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TABLE G • IHSS 
CLIENTS LOSING ACCESS TO SERVICE BY COUNTY 
COUNTY CLIENTS LOSING PERCENT OF IHSS CASELOAO 
SERVICE 
Alameda 900 * 
Amador 68 54% 
Del Norte 115 61% 
ElDorado 200 45% 
Lake 310 44% 
Colusa * 90% 
Contra Costa 1,658 
Kern * 50% 
Kings 412 72°ib 
Loa Angeles 8,490 * 
Merced 725 66% 
Orange 1,430 27% 
Plumas 120 73% 
Riverside 2,837 49% 
San Benito 68 52% 
San Bernardino 2,714 36% 
San Diego 3,400 ... 
San Joaquin 1,080 47% 
San Mateo 378 * 
Santa Barbara 592 44% 
S.nta Clara 1,428 41% 
Santa Cruz 750 65% 
Shasta * 54% 
Sialdyou * 50% 
Solano 375 28% 
Sonoma 520 28% 
Tehama 300 * 
Ventura 548 .. 
Yuba 319 * 
NOTE: (") denoted not reported. 
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Assembly Local Government committee 
June 11, 1990 
n:snfOtY OF CON PERA TA 
I. Hhat 1s the impact of the Governor's Budgot en Alameda County? 
A. The Govarnor'$ 90.91 Budgat wi11 result in net losses to 
Alameda County throu;n funding cuts and not granting OOLA•s of 
up to S13.9 mit1;on. 
a. up to 253 County staff pos1t1ons would be e11m1nated. 
Comlunity Based Provider Contracts would also be cut. 
II. How will th1s aao to thl county•s f1sca1 cris1s1 
A. Alameda County anticipates a funding gap of up to S49.8 
mi111on 1f the Govarnor•s 90-91 Budget 1s approved. Of this 
amount. $13.9 is due to the 90-91 Govarnor•s Budget. The 
rt~Nimhn·. S!!.9 mllltuu h UUII lu .... uJe:\.lcu ~pwlldi"~ ro .. 
chronically underfunded State required programs. 
s. up to 641 county staff positions who provide State raau1rtd 
services would b1 alim1natad. This includes u~ to 253 
eliminated due to the Governor's budgat and 388 positions 
t11m1natld due to chronic underfunding. Again. major euts in 
Co~unity Basad Provider Contracts would also be n1eded. 
III. Hhat programs are affected by the Governor's BUdget~ 
A. In Health Clre net d1reet progr~m cuts cf up to $10.6 mi11~on 
are estimated. In addition $3.2 m1111on in n11ded 
cost-of-ifving &djustmtnts &re not fundtd. 
s. rn rub1it Protection 11v1n9 ad~ustmont~ which 
tot' a 1 $ .l 11 1 on arc not 'l"nn,l'uut 
~. 1n ~ener& ~vernmsnt tntrt 1s a s1i 1ncraase 1n funding of 




on, General Government impacts 
n a progru wt 1 i 1 ose 
n revenues • An $11.5 m1111on 
adjustment would not be funded. 
IV. Hnat ac ons or nat1on of actions tan tne State tlke to heip 
tha county ease 1ts f1nancia1 cr1s1s? 
A. Allow a half sales tax tn proceeds to bt used 
for i • Social Services c Protact1on at the 
dis on of Local Boards. Fjn&nc1a1 Impact: $37.1 million 























Ob11gat1on bonds for 
one • F1nanc1a1 
revenue stream for 
o for AFDC to the General 
relieve counties of Health and Helfare 
Financial Impact: $28.4 m1111on 
include all residents, 
actual costs and 
He1 Section 17000 
Relieve counties of 11abi11ty 
property allocation formula. The 
ved by schools could be 
revenues replaced by the State. The 
on could be allocat;d to counties. 
Increasad revenue stream for counties. 
F. Change the sp11t of fines. fees. and forfeitures between 
counties and es to reflect the fact that most of the cost 
of the justice system falls on counties. F1nanc1aJ Impact: 
Increased revenue stream counties. 
G. laws give count1es more protection 
r revenue base Fjnancial Impact: $11 
in property tax revenues lost to 
acts. 
H. Provide realistic and t1me1y reimbursement for the cost of 
state mandated programs. F1oaoc1a1 Impact: Increased revenue 
stream for counties. 
Any combination of these ons e1d1ng $50-75 m1111on or more in annual 
savings to Alameda County would help ease 
plan ahead in an eff1c1ent manner. 
d1scret1onary revenue or eQui 




ALAHEQA COUNTY FISCAL CRISIS 
I. Proggs1t1on 13- 1978 
A. Reduced County property tax revenue by more than 501. 
B. Eliminated the County's ability to raise property taxes to pay 
for needed services. 
II. rocreased Reliance on StAte And Federal Revenue 
FY 1989-90: State and federal revenue accounted for 601 of the 
County•s total revenue in the General Fund <not including fund 
balance available). Local property taxes represented 231 of the 
total General Fund revenue. 
III. Gradual W1thdrawal of Federal Government from Human Serv1ces 
E11minatian of federal revenue sharing 1n 1986 resulted 1n a $6.5 
million reduction. (Revenue sharing was as high as $10 mil11on 
during early program years.) 
IV. Failure of State to uphold 1ts financing obl1gat1ons with respect to 
~tntP-f.nunty n~rtnPr~hip prngr~m~. prim~r11y hP~lth r~rp and public 
protect1on. 
In 1983, the State shifted the $32 million medically indigent 
adult program to the County with only $22 mi111on or 70t of the 
funding the State needed when it ran the program. 
In health care. throughout the last several years the State has 
noglectod to grant bacic coct of living adjuctmontc for alcohol 
programs since 1983, drug programs since 1981 and mental health 
programs since 1987. 
Although trial court funding has provided some relief to the 
judicial system, the State has made no effort to assist with 
financing court ancillary services such as District Attorney, 
Public Defender and Probation which cost $67.9 million and 
mandated ja11 costs which now total $52.4 million. 
The State has also made no effort to fund mandated Genera1 
Assistance cash aid costs which total $30 m1111on. 
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v. 01scret1ooary Revenue Shift 
A. Property Tax: 
VI. 
amada county has lost a signif1cant share of 1ts property tax 
revenues 1 opment projects. These revenues could 
lace 1 State and federal revenues and 
B. Sales Ta~: 
• the County's percentage of taxable 
reas 7l from $412.8 million in 1985 to 
contrast. the Alameda County cities' 
share of taxable 1 sales has increased 151 for the same 
period from $5.812.7 million in 1985 to $6.796.4 m1111on in 
1990 As ons occur. the County's share of sales tax 
revenues has 1 the ci es' share has increased. 
programs over 
popu1 on increase 
PUBLIC PROTECTION 
Superior 
na1 j ce, welfare and health 
s 1s 1n contrast to a 13~ 
11on in 1980 to 1.3 million today. 
• i27l increase in number of Super1or Court criminal filings from 
3.303 1n i to 7,505 today. 
• 39~ increase in numbor of superior court jud1c1a1 positions 
from it1ons 1 1978 to 39 judicial pos1t1ons today. 
ion in court locations from 5 in 1978 to a today. 
in number of specialty courts due to 
on on Drugs and Trial Delay Reduction 
1ncreasa 1n 
2,640 
of felony drug d1spos1t1ons from 464 1n 




• 397.973 or 34.1~ increase 1n annua1 number of total f11fngs 
fro- 1.165.582 1n 1978 to 1,563,555 today. 
• 32.11 increase in number of jud1c1a1 pos1t1ons from 28 1n 1978 
to 37 today. 
Probation 
• 681 increase in demand for felony 1nvest1gat1ons over 1ast 
decade. 
• 421 increase in number of adults under probation supervision to 
over 16,000. 591 of these are felons. 
• 32~ increase 1n number of law enforcement referrals for 
Juven1les over last decade. 
• 251 1ncrease 1n number of juveniles under probation to 3,789 
today. 
Sher1ff 
• 2,492 or 1721 increase in total annual inmate population from 
1 ,450 in 1978 to 3,942 today. 
• 187,486 or 364~ 1ncrease in requests for crime prevention 
services. largely due to drug epidemic. from 51,466 in 1979 to 
238,952 today. 
• 641 1ncrease in number of crime lab drug and narcotics cases 
over last ten years. 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
• 35.91 increase in a11 cash aid publ1c assistance cases. 
• 211.31 increase 1n General Ass1stance cash aid cases. 
• 76.81 1ncrease in child abuse/neglect casest 1n-homa support1ve 
services, and adult protective services. 
• Up to 4.000 homeless. Over $2 m1111on 1n fund1ng <General 
Fund) for non-mandated homeless programs. 
HEALTH CARE 
• 26.81 increase in total patient days at Highland General 
Hospital from 1980/81 to 1988/89. 
• 28.81 1ncrease in the acuta average da11y census at Highland 
General Hospital from 1980/81 to 1988/89. 
• 24.21 increase 1n Emergency Room visits at Highland General 
Hospital from 1980/81 to 1988/89. 
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in urgent care v1s1ts at Fairmont Hosp1ta1 from 
~000 in 1990. 
increase tn sexually transm1tted d1sease cases over lasts 
1n community health c11 c v1s1ts from 77.523 1n 
to 4 t specialty clinic 
• S1gn1 
cases 
increase 1n Mental Health and Alcohol and Drug 
d a conti withdrawal by the State. 
VII. The full Use of ameda county's general purpose revenue to maKe up 
for no State cos 1v1 adjustments and no State revenue · 
on huge case1oad growth. In essence the County 1s 
the State of iforn1a. 
A. Alameda County is spending $733 per capita largely to fund State 
red programs. This 1s the fourth largest sum in the state 
compared to other counties. The County ranks number one in 
spending for Health Care and f1fth in spending for Public 
Protection. Public Assistance and County Hospital programs 
(Attachment A). 
B. FY 89-90: General purpose ravenue 1n Alameda County equal 
$336 million. Of the amount, 86~ was used to match and 
overmatch State mandated programs. Of the remaining 14~ 
($49 million): 6~ C$19.8 million> is for capital improvements. 
primarily for fac111t1es to sarv1ca health care, social services 
and criminal justice programs. In addition. another 6~ 
($22 million) is for the Contingency Fund, which was distributed 
to a11 County departments during the fiscal year for salary and 
benefit increases. 
c. Non-Mandated Overmatches 
Alameda County has used 1ts local discretionary revenues to 
provide additional funding in excess of mandated matching fund 
requirements for health and social services programs. These 
overmatches include: 
Mental 
conol & Drug 
AB 8 
Department on Aging 
Child Welfare Services 
Hed1 
lt Protect1on Services 










Total Health and Social Services $54.976.962 
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o. The County has also used one-t1me rgseryes during the past t~o 
years to help meet service level demands 1n health care and 
soc1a1 services: 89-90- $6.2 million. 88-89- $7.2 m111,on. 
VIII. The Coynty bas also 1mgJemented progr~ cuts from status-quo 
operations during the last two years 1n order to achieve a balanced 
budget: 89-90- 31 net County cost or $9.5 million reduction. 88-89 
- 2.51 net County cost or $8.2 million reduction. Potential program 
reductions necessary to balance next year•s budget are outlined in 
the CSAC survey, Attachment B to this report. 
IX. Assessments: To help relieve pressure on scarce general purpose the 
county has established the following benef1t assessments: 





x. Other Erforts 
• The County has 1n1t1ated a very active 1eg1slat1ve program to 
obtain more State funding. Through our efforts we have 
routinely obtained near maximum State funding for jail 
construction. He helped initiate the legislation to use Mental 
Health savings to fund County Mental Health hospital 
construction. We helped initiate the Har on Drugs 1eg1slat1on 
and secured targeted funding for that effort. 
• The County has used debt financing for equipment and fac111t1es 
where it's cost effective. purchased rather than leased 
buildings where it will generate savings. and contracted for 
services when it's feasible and when it will generate savings. 
• The County also established an act1ve program to increase 
the value of the County's land assets to generate more stable 
revenues. 
• Aggressively pursued grant revenues and other additional sources 
of revenue to provide otherwise unfunded or inadequately funded 
programs. 
XI. 'Qn,1ys1on 




The concept reducing services seems unth1n~ab1a in the face 
of the many needs and the increased demand for services. 
Unfortunately, there are virtually no other alternatives 
available thout exposing the County to unacceptable risk. A 
fundamental reform 1n the Statewide financing structure for 
counties is clearly needed. 
1'\ L LA'-11111\fU L 1'\ 
Al..AMEM COJNTY 
Cl:JIPARISCII Of 12 lARGEST Ctl.JNTIES 
1 988-89 BUDGET 
Per 'a.glt~ 
12 largest Alameda 
Statewide Counti~~ County 
REQUIREMENTS $712 $734 $733 
Financing 
Property Taxes $137 $140 $144 
Inter Governmental Revenue 386 387 375 
1 le Fund ance 31 31 20* 
Program Expendityr~~ 
General Government 101 99 55 
Public Protection 192 197 191** 
Public Assistance 260 260 265 
1 th & Sanitation 88 94 142 
- Hospital Enterprise Funds 108 120 110 
Public Hay & Facilities 36 31 24 
Educat1on 8 7 12 
Recreation & Cultural 10 11 0.26 
Cont1ngenc1es & Reserves 
Contingencies 8 7 8 
s1on for Reserves 6 6 0.21*"'* 
• Excluding Santa R1ta and Mental Health Capital Projects 
•• Excluding Santa Rita Capital Projects 























COUNTY: A 1 ameda CONTACT: Kan Gross PHONE: 272-6984 
I. 1990-91 Estimated General Fund Budget Requirement: S273.4M 
II. 1990-91 Projected Shortfall: <money needed to maintain current service levels) 
A. Assuming no state cuts: S25.9-35.9M <Assuming $10-20M AFB> 
B. Assuming Governor's Budget: t39,8-49.8M <Assuming $10-?0M AFB> 
III. Potential Service/Program Reductions to Balance Budget: 
A. Assuming no state cuts: 
Identified One-Time Additional 
Program/Servjce Uu1 Revenue Cut 
General Government• $ 0.5M $0.0M 
Public Protection 3.0 Q.Q 
Public Assistance 3.1 0.4 
Health Care ...J...j_ ~ 
Total $lO.SM $9.SM $15.9H 
• Includes General Government, Capital. Public Hays. Cultural/Recreation. 





















IV. Potent1al Personnel Reduct1ans to Balance Budget: 



































B. Assum1ng Governor's Budget: 
No. of 
Personnel No. of Add1t1onal 
Years Layoffs No. of Total 
Ident1f1ed Identified Personnel #Personnel 
General Government 11 8 
Public Protection 48 38 
Public Assistance 28 11 
Health care 11 _l 
Total 98 58 543 641 
V. COunty's 1989·90 Gann limit: (If readily available) 
1989-90 Spending L1m1t: $362M 
1989-90 Appropriations Subject to the l1m1t: $294M 
(If not readily available, tell county staff CSAC w111 be sending them a quest1onnaire.) 





• HEALTH CARE 
- Deferral of June 1991 Medically Indigent Services 
Progra. payments to counties. 
- Reduction ;n AB 8 Grant based upon offset from 
ant1c1pated faderal funds. 
- Reduction in Kedi-cal funding for a.bul.nce costs 
(Impacts EMS District only) 
- Delay of the final Medi-cal cheek tor both 1989-90 
and 1990-91 until start of new fiscal year. 
- Elimination of optional benefits under Medi-cal: 
medical transportation. psychology, ch;ropractic. 
poaiatry, acupuncture, and heroin detoxification. 
- Reduction of Medi-Cal rates by restructuring the 
Relative Value Scale for Medi-Cal. 
- Transfer of residential .nd mental health services for 
children based upon AB 3632 of 1986 from Dept. of Mental 
Heaith to State idueat;on. 
- Increase for the I~nization Program 
~ Increase 1n local assistance for Mental Health 
progr&~~s. 
- Increase in funding for Institute for Mental 
01uue. 
Incre~se 1n funding for ment~l health services to 
~~rd~ 1nd de~endents per Stnata Bill 370. 
- Nat decrease in C&1ifornia Healthcara for the 
I ntH gent PrograM (CHIPS) funding. 
- Increase in funding for pilot systems of care for 
mental health per Assembly 8111s 3777 ana 377. 
TOTAL.: 
• Exelud1n9 EMS District impact. 































$3 • 661 • 505 -
$10,547,500" 
r 1 1 
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- Reduction in caseload growth 1n F~ily Maintenance, 
F&~~1 lh11un1f,cat1on, Pennanent Placement programs. 
- Reduction 1n GAIN Program. 
TOTAL: 
• MUC PMU ECTICI 
- Maintenance of 1989-90 funding level for 
County Justice System Subvention Programs (A8 90). 
- ~a1ntenanee of 1989-90 funding level for Assistance 
to Count11s for the Defense of Indigents. 
- Maintenance of full funding for the Brown-Presley 
Tri~l Court Funding Act. 
- Partial reimbursement for juvenile institution's food 
program to be determined. 
Repeal or make optional the following 
10 m&l'id&US; 
- Ch~ter 1203 of 1985 
Motorist Ass1stanee 
- Chapter 1225 of 1984 
Investment Reports 
- Chapter 615 of 1979 
Short-Doyle Case Mgt. 
- Chaptar 1399 of 1976 
of M1nors 
- Ti t11!1 22, CCR 
Fretreatment Fac11itia 
- Chapter 1088 of 1982 
Juvenile Felonv Arrest 
- Ch~~ter 1281 of 1980 




































- Chapter 1262 of 1971 
V1cttes Stat.-.nts 
- Chapter 641 of 1986 
Open Hltt;nvs Act 
- Ch~ttr 875 of 1981 
Interv;ew of Potentially 
Dependent Minors 
TOTAL: 
TOTAl DIRECT PROGRAM IMPACT: 





AB 8 - 0% COLA 
Hedt-tal - OS COLA 
Aleohol & Drug - 0% COLA 
Mental Health -OS COLA 
TOTAL: 
Soci ill Services: 
AFOC & SSI/SSP Aid - OS COLA 
Public Protection: 
AB 90 - 0% COLA 
Indigent Defense - 0% COLA 
Trial Court Funding Act - 51 COLA 
TOTAL: 
TOTAL All COLAS: 
GRANO TOTAL DIRECT PROGRAM 
IMPACTS + ALL COLAS: 
KG:MJ:jc/1229c 
Rev. 6/5/90 
AQ.QJ:ga au !U1 
0 (82 ,000) (82,000) 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
$(185,550) ${185,550) 
$4,602,455 - $3,475,955 -
$(26,000) $11,488,450 $10,351,950 
$0 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 
0 900,000 900,000 
0 100,000 100,000 
0 1,200,000 1,200,000 
$0 $3,200,000 $3.200,000 
0 0 0 
0 200,000 200,000 
0 100.000 100,000 
1,000,000 1,000,000 0 
$1,000.000 $1,300,000 $300,000 
$1.000,000 $4,500,000 $3,500,000 
$9,102,455-$6,975,955-








PRESIDENT OF THE COUNTY'S ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 
BEFORE 
THE ASSEMBLY'S LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE 
I RECOGNIZE THAT I AM HERE AT A VERY CRITICAL TIME, OUR 
1990-91 STATE BUDGET CURRENTLY FACES A DEFICIT OF APPROXIMATELY 
3.6 BILLION DOLLARS. AT THE SAME TIME, A MULTITUDE OF COUNTIES 
FACE CRISIS SITUATIONS IN VARYING AMOUNTS. AS YOU ALREADY KNOW, 
SOME ARE AT SUCH A SEVERE CRISIS STAGE THAT ABSENT ASSISTANCE 
THEY WILL HAVE TO TAKE ACTION WHICH WILL LITERALLY CLOSE DOWN 
COUNTY OPERATIONS AND REQUIRE STATE TAKE-OVER UP TO AND INCLUDING 
THE UTILIZATION OF FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY COURTS. 
WE ARE AT A JUNCTURE WHERE IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT 
YOU BE CLEARLY INFORMED OF THE DUAL CRISIS SITUATION OCCURRING. 
I WOULD OFFER IT IS A CRISIS IN THE MAGNITUDE OF THAT WHICH WAS 
FACED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 17 EARTHQUAKE. FOLLOWING 
THAT DISASTER YOU TOOK IMMEDIATE ACTION TO FIND SOLUTIONS AND 
MEET THE CRISIS. I AND MY COLLEAGUES WOULD OFFER THAT YOU MUST 
TAKE SIMILAR ACTION NOW. 
I SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE 3.6 BILLION COULD RESULT IN 
CHANGES AND/OR CUTBACKS IN PROGRAMS OPERATED BY COUNTY 
GOVERNMENT. THE SERVICE LEVELS AFFECTED WOULD BE IN PROGRAMS 
THAT WE MANAGE UNDER STATE DIRECTION. THESE PROGRAMS HAVE 
SIGNIFICANT CASELOAD INCREASES AND FIXED ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS 
AND SIMPLY DO NOT HAVE A "TURN OFF" SWITCH. 
IN TERMS OF EVALUATING THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE, IT IS 
ESSENTIAL THAT I BE VERY CLEAR IN INDICATING TO YOU THAT THERE 
ARE PROGRAMS THAT ARE LOCALLY MANAGED PROGRAMS AND THOSE THAT ARE 
STATE MANAGED PROGRAMS. 
THE STATE MANAGED PROGRAMS ARE THOSE THAT WE OPERATE FOR YOU 
AND THEY RANGE FROM AFDC, TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW LAWS, TO 
THE JAILING OF PRISONERS FOR THE BREAKING OF STATE LAWS, ETC ... 
LOCALLY MANAGED PROGRAMS ARE THOSE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
RANGING FROM LIBRARY SERVICES, TO SHERIFFS PATROL, TO FIRE 
PROTECTION, ETC .... WE HAVE BECOME QUITE EXPERT IN OUR CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT MODE AFTER PROPOSITION 13 TO VERY EFFECTIVELY MANAGE 
THOSE LOCAL PROGRAMS AS THE RESOURCES SHRINK TO INTOLERABLE 
LEVELS. THE DEMAND FOR LIMITED RESOURCES HAS GEOMETRICALLY 
INCREASED FOR STATE MANAGED PROGRAMS. 
THE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO YOU ARE DELINEATED IN A VERY 
COMPREHENSIVE LIST IN YOUR ANALYSIS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO 
RECOGNIZE THAT THESE OPTIONS ARE IN THREE PARTICULAR DIRECTIONS. 
ONE IS THAT OF PROGRAM REALIGNMENT WHERE THERE IS A REPEAL OF THE 
FUNDING FOR A PROGRAM AND EQUAL DISCRETIONARY FUNDS ARE PROVIDED 
-2-
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TO COUNTIES. THIS OPTION OF COURSE IS UTILIZED TO PROVIDE THE 
NEEDED GANN LIMIT FOR THE STATE. THE OTHER IS A POTENTIAL OF 
ABSORPTION OF CERTAIN COSTS BY THE STATE. AND FINALLY, A LAST 
OPTION IS REVENUE SOURCES PROVIDED TO COUNTIES TO MEET THE LOCAL 
MANAGED PROGRAMS I HAVE DESCRIBED AND TO OFFSET SOME OF THE COSTS 
PROVIDED OR REQUIRED FOR STATE MANAGED PROGRAMS. 
THE PROBLEM IS NOT A SIMPLE ONE, YET IN SOME WAYS IT IS. 
FIRST THERE HAS TO BE A CAREFUL EVALUATION OF THE SERVICES THAT 
HAVE TO BE PROVIDED. WE HAVE TO PRIORITIZE TOGETHER STATE 
PROGRAMS THAT WE OPERATE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA AND LOCAL PROGRAMS AT A DEFINED ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF 
SERVICE. ONCE THAT DECISION IS MADE, I BELIEVE IT WILL BE CLEAR 
THAT SUFFICIENT REVENUE OPTIONS MUST BE MADE AVAILABLE TO 
COUNTIES; SOME VERY IMMEDIATELY TO PREVENT LITERAL ANARCHY IN 
SOME COUNTIES. 
ABSENT THE EVALUATION/PRIORIZATION AND THE UTILIZATION OF 
THESE OPTIONS IN YOUR ANALYSIS VERY SIGNIFICANT EXPENDITURES MADE 
AT BOTH THE LOCAL AND STATE LEVEL WILL NOT BE BASED UPON SOUND 
PUBLIC POLICY YOU AND BOARDS OF SUPERVISORS HAVE ADOPTED BUT 
RATHER PRAGMATIC DECISIONS. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT SOME LEVEL OF 
REVENUE MUST BE PROVIDED IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE SERVICES TO 
CONTINUE. 
I PLEDGE ON BEHALF OF MYSELF AND MY COLLEAGUES WHO MANAGE A 
-3-
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LONG LIST OF STATE AND LOCAL PROGRAMS TO WORK VERY CLOSELY WITH 
YOU AND YOUR STAFFS DURING THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION TO ESTABLISH 
THE PRIORITIES UNDER EXISTENT PROGRAMS AND TO EVALUATE WHAT 
REVENUE OPTION'S BEST, ONCE THE PRIORITIZATION IS DETERMINED. I 
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Governor George Deukmejian 
Members, Calilorn1a S12te Legislature 
Larry E. Naake, Executive Director 
SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR STATE BUDGET DISCUSSIONS 
lt'-JTRODUCTIOhJ 
APPENDIX 
The upcoming 1990-91 s12.te budgel. as both the Governor and Legislative Leadership have pointe:::J 
out, will most likely present one of the b1ggest challenges that has faced the State of California 1n 
many decades. 
Because county-operated programs are extremely vulnerable, California counties must be an 
integral pan ol the upcoming budget discussions and in the development of solutions to this 
challenge. 
The program funds in the state budget that flow to or through California counties comprises a 
significant pan of the state's SC.2 billio:> budget. 
County and state programs are tightly woven together as pan of the state budget. Therefore, 
counties should be deeply involved in crafting the solution to what has been estimated as a S3 6 
billion aao between the revenues available and the expenditures necessary to fund all statutory. 
constitutional, and coun-required programs and services. 
The future of county-operated programs rest upon viable solutions. Indeed, unless a solution is 
carefully crafted, we predict that some counties will be unable to continue functioning. The present 
program delivery system thereby woui:J collapse. 
CSAC and counties want to be constructive and helpful in crafting a 1990-91 state budget that is 
balanced, rational, and fair. 
SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES 
Therefore, we are suggest1ng a number of principles that should be followed in crafting an equitable 
solution. These suggested principles include: 
1. Everythina must be on the table We agree with the Governor and the Legislative Leadership 
that everyone s ideas, everyone's programs, everyone's potential revenue should be on the 
table for d:scuss1on It is imperative, at the beginning of the discussion, that all ideas and 
suggestions be cons1dered. 
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2 There should be equal pain. If part of the solution is going to involve program and service 
cuts, everyone should share equally in this painful process. All segments of and programs 
in thr: state budget and C:~ll lf.:vels of government (state. counties. cities, schools, special 
districts) should parttcipate tn the "pain" of any potential expenditure or program cuts 
Existing revenue sharing ratios that fail to adequately reflect county operational costs need 
to be examined and changed. 
3. Structural Change is Needed. As stressed in the Administration's white paper entitled 
"Budgetary Gridlock in California," we do need to address the question of structural change 
in both budgetary process and program relationships. The white paper indicates that the 
state has no control over more than 90% of the state budget because of COLAs, court 
orders, initiatives, and federal mandates. 
The state and the counties are now in the same situation. CSAC documented over five years 
ago that we have no control over more than 94% of our county budgets. We have been in 
this situation for more than a decade. We have called for both structural and programmatic 
change since 1982. This would include the programmatic relationships between the state 
and the counties. 
4. Just shifting costs to counties can't work. Counties have structural problems as well. We 
have been stating for years that we cannot continue to pick up the costs of state-county 
programs with local revenue sources As the attached report indicates, there just isn't any 
more local money available. We have been reducing local programs for many years now to 
pay for state-county programs in the health, welfare, and justice areas. The money just isn't 
there any longer. With only four or five percent of our county budgets available for local 
discretionary programs, it is no longer possible to take funds from these programs without 
totally closing them down. As the attached report points out, counties, just like the state, are 
facing a massive shortfall in maintaining the same level of services in the next fiscal year as 
we are providing in this fiscal year. CSAC has done a preliminary survey and has results 
from 21 counties. The shortfall from these 21 counties totals $ 380 million. 
Thus, the state can no longer rely on the county to merely pick up the cost of any programs 
that the state cannot afford to fund. If state-county program cuts are going to occur. we must 
wcrk together to change those statutes that reguire counties to provide certain programs or 
maintain certain levels of service. There needs to be a clear understanding that cuts in state 
allocations for county-operated programs will mean less programs. Counties no longer have 
the fiscal capacity to fill state funding shortfalls. 
5. Revenue adjustments should be part of the solution. CSAC has been on record supporting 
revenue adjustments for a number of years now. We supported the Governor's proposal in 
1988 to adjust certain revenue sources, close certain loopholes, and accelerate the collection 
of certain taxes. We also developed other suggestions in 1988 for certain revenue 
enhancements. The problem in 1990-91 is so large that revenue adjustments must be a part 
of the solution. 
These are a number of suggestions that California counties have with respect to the upcoming 
discussions over the 1990-91 state budget. We stand ready to work with and assist both the 
Executive and Legislative branches in meeting this immense cha!lenge 
Cr' CSAC Board of Directors 
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AB 8 FROZE THEM AT 23% OF PROPERTY TAX VS. 33% WHICH IS THE STATE 
AVERAGE. 
AFTER PROPOSITION 13 THEY HAD A LARGE RESERVE, BUT AS DEMANDS 
INCREASED IT WAS USED UP. 
DEMANDS WERE FROM MIGRATION TO COUNTY OF PEOPLE SEEKING/NEEDING 
CHEAP HOUSING. 
COUNTY COSTS WENT UP 250% FOR AFDC AND 2000% FOR GENERAL ASSISTANCE 
AND SIMILAR INCREASES FOR RELATED PROGRAMS. 
REVENUE, AT THE SAME TIME, WENT UP ONLY 26%, DUE TO LOW TAX SHARE/ 
REDEVELOPMENT/SELECTIVE ANNEXATIONS. 
THE COUNTY COULD ONLY RESPOND IN ONE WAY, WHICH WAS TO CUT EACH 
YEAR AND NEVER REPLACE THE SERVICES/PEOPLE/EQUIPMENT CUT. 
WHEN CRITICIZED FOR NOT HELPING THEMSEL YES, THIS WAS THE ONLY 
OPTION. 
THE RESULT IS WHERE THE COUNTY IS TODAY: 
-39 COPS VS. 56 TEN YEARS AGO 
-FIRE TRUCKS ALL OLD ENOUGH TO VOTE 
-AVERAGE CAR A 1974, INCLUDING THOSE USED TO TRANSPORT ABUSED KIDS 
-PAY BELOW ALL MARKETS 
-MASS DEPARTURE OF ALL PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY KEY STAFF 
THIS YEAR THE LINES CROSSED IN THAT THE ONLY WAY TO BALANCE THE 
BUDGET IS TO WIPE OUT THE SHERIFF, D.A., AND A MULTITUDE OF OTHER 
DEPARTMENTS. 
THE DEFICIT IS ESTIMATED TO BE $16.8 MILLION, WHICH STOPS THE DECLINE 
BUT STILL HAS THE COUNTY BELOW ANY ACCEPTABLE LEVEL (i.e. STILL LOWEST 
PER CAPITA OF COPS OF ANY COUNTY). 
TO AVOID ANARCHY AND TO ALLOW A TRANSITION TO STATE TAKEOVER OF 
JAIL, SHERIFF, D.A., WELFARE ADMINISTRATlON, ETC., CHAPTER 9 IS PLANNED 
AS A LAST RESORT. 
PLANNING HAS ALREADY BEGUN FOR STATE DEPARTMENTS TO TAKE OVER. 
ABSENT LONG-TERM SOLUTION, A LOAN PROGRAM IS THE PROBABLE ANSWER. 
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By Richard Simpson 
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Fiscal futures, from page 21 
fees for permits and licenses for vanous 
activities within the county." 
summarizing the revenue trends, 
noted that the Board of Supem-
sors, in implementing "statutorily required 
programs," had to increase expendnure<; 
for these programs over a nine-year period 
100 percent while " ... revenue raised by 
county tax collection efforts increased by 
58.9 percent." Several attempts to 
raise added local taxes were reJected by 
voters. 
Regarding expenditures, Cutting found 
that outlays for roads, welfare and public 
defender showed the most sigmhcant in 
creases. Wh!le road operations are primar-
ily covered by state subventions, welfare 
programs are a mix of federal, state and 
county funds. In Butte County, A1d to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
and General Assistance (GA) sustarned the 
greatest mcreases. AFDC, whiCh requtrc\ 
county matchmg lunds, showed an m-
crease m caseload of nearly 160 percent, 
compared with a statewide increase of 22 
percent during the 1980s. While the 
county's required ··AFDC match" was about 
'5. '5 percent throughout the decade, county 
AFDC expenditures grew from $712,000 
m 1980-81 to $3 million in 1989-90 a 
growth of 322 percent 
GA, totally county funded, covers 
welfare recipients ineligible for federal or 
state welfare. While the GA grant level is a 
county option, Butte has lost a series of 
court cases judicially establishing a $295 
per month grant level (plus COLAs). The 
number of people receiving GA in Butte 
increased from 116 in 1980-·81 to 825 in 
1989-90 ~ a 611 percent increase --
compared with a statewide increase of224 
percent. Annual Butte GA costs rose from 
$104,000 to $24 million over the period 
- a 2,000 percent increase. 
Accordmg to Cutting, the most signifi-
cant result of the welfare fiscal data was" 
County General Purpose Revenue and 
Expenditures for State-Required 
Programs {Dollars in Millions) 
1984-85 1987-88 
y~.~Revenue $5,250 $6,582 
Expenditures: 
Judicial $1,097 $1,495 
Corrections 790 1,140 
Health Services 186 284 
Mental Health 59 91 
AfDC 265 321 
IHSS 6 18 
food Stamps 93 111 
General Assistance 124 200 
$2,621 $3,660 
$2,629 $2,922 
lr/ll't frum lr:<t·!.li:.• _.\",i/v.l i!,.,i/,/i, 1, 11•!1 I•• 
.\f,>)Oill!lt'l, junwny 10, 1 1J'i:· 1 ''>'' .' 





























the percentage of the county's d!screnon-
my tax revenue needed to support the 
AFDC and GA programs." AFDC and GA 
programs grew from $816,000 in 1980-81 
to $5.5 million in 1989-90. However, the 
share of counry general purpose revenue 
(GPR) consumed by these programs grew 
from about 4 percent of GPR in 1980-81 to 
more than 17 percent in 1989-90. 
Cutting noted that Butte County has 
slashed expenditures wherever it had dis-
cretion to do so. County libraries have been 
closed, animal control activities curtailed, 
sheriffs patrols cut, hiring freezes imposed 
and employee caseloads increased. The 
average annual Butte Counry salary in-
crease from 1979-89 through 1989-90 was 
3.8 percent, compared wnh a California 
cost of living increase of 6.3 percent and a 
state employee salary increase of 6.18 per-
cent. Certain employee costs have occurred 
as a result: there has been a doubling of em-
ployee grievances and appeals; there has 
been an mcrcase in employee turnover; 
and recruitrncllt of replacements has been 
extremely difficult. 
New insights mto the state-county 
tiscal relationship emerged as a result of the 
Butte County audn Since the early 1970s, 
a major focus of county concerns has been 
the spotty record of the state in paying the 
full cost of leg1slative mandates as 
by SB 90 (1972) and Arucle Xll!B of the 
state Constitution (1979) It is significam 
that while the state-county ftscal relation-
ship has played a key role m the Butte 
lmancial fa !lure, It has not been due pnmar-
ily to unreimbursed mandated costs that 
would properly fall under SB 90/Article 
Xll!B. The present Butte County problems 
are due in pan, accordmg to the oversight 
adviser, to the impact of "statutorily re-
quired programs" upon the county's GPR 
After all, the county's AFDC match has 
remained at a stable '5. 5 percent for more 
than two decades. There has been no new 
state-mandated AFDC mcrease, but the 
county must participate~ as it always has 
- in paying a share of the AFDC bill, and 
the caseload has increased 160 percent. 
Similarly, the provision of GA has been a 
program solely financed by county general 
purpose revenues since long before SB 90 
:Jilcl, as ~ttch, i<> 11ot a rcirnhursahlc rnan-
d:ttc. II()Wt:WI, tlw t{)llltly ha:.lwt·t, ·,11IJ 
JCUcd lu cour1 maw.Lu···, on (,A, wlirt i1 an· 
nut reimbursable u :vir:r :, B 90/Aruclc >JI! B, 
K-7 
and tlre~e co~r~ have Ill< w,t·,, d lll<lll" til,\11 
2,000 pcrccnr. AJ•,o, rhc r rHIIIIY h,t, h:~d 1" 
finant ,. all - or rno .1 ol the '<hi ',j 
tndigcnt legal dcft·n·,c, a ·.;.nur"ry llitd 
constttunon;d rcqLmenwnr lnng prn .-rill I)', 
mand,ned < o•.f Jt·rrrdHrr·,crrwril l'''''.'l'"''fl'·. 
;urd l()r tlw tl• r .rdc ilw·.t ' ... r·. 111 
Butte County ltavc Ir;crC:N:d I rum 'J,liJU,lH lrl 
to $15 million 
Is Butte County an Isolated Event? 
The answer is no. Other counties are 
undergoing the same fiscal stresses. For 
example, the Legislative Analyst, m a dts-
cussion within "Perspectives and Issues on 
the 1990-91 Budget," commented 
"Whtle it is tempting to isolate Rune 
County as a lone example of a ( altfor111a 
county in fiscal stratts, our analy~ts melt-
cates that many other counucs are expen 
encing serious fiscal difficulties Further-
more, our review indicates that thts ts not 
merely a rural county problem" 
CSAC's review of CUITetH county fNal 
stresses, based on these and other state 
reports and mtual !tndtngs from spccdtc 
counties, strongly mdtGllcs that 1 here .w 
fundamental, structural problems mvolvcd 
in the financing and provtsion of stare-
required and state-interest programs hy 
countirs. Based on the evidence. there 
seems very little question that there wdl he 
more "Rutre counurs" clunng the 19lJO·, 
It ts hard to prrusely prcdtcr, hut tfk 
next county fiscal failures could happen 111 
1991. As to when: these events wtll occur 
the I egislattw Analyst ha:, ad van( cd ~orne 
tenranve mdicators which C:SAC: plans ru 
rest in the field in coming wceks. 
The balance of this report wtll he 
devoted tor rw of these events The 
deals wuh the what of current 
~·umy fiscal stress; what ·,.vdl the 
ture and what will rhe vorcrs do ;md 
when. 
It seems to us there ts a four-pan 
to the current county fiscal situanon Agamst 
a backdrop of a constitutionally limited 
revenue base and a constitutionally !imued 
to raise additional local revenues, 
counties face these revenue-base erosion 
factors: 
II Dramatic growth in county expendi-
tures and use of local revenues for state-re-
quired and state-interest programs. 
II Governmental interacnon involvrr 
Aerial view of the Butte 
v,ovnnmcn 1 -; 
CO~ IS 
spending and policy decisrons by or hn pr< 
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legal defense and corrections. 
The next element m the analyst's 
conceptual framework is the observation 
that counties must pay for their share ol 
staterequired programs and for local pro-
grams out of revenues available for GPR 
This comes from property and sales taxes 
and state general subventions. Since coun-
ties have very limited power to increase 
GPR, service demands and inflation force 
state-required programs and local programs 
to compete for growth in the very limited 
GPR base. 
The analyst identified "three useful 
indicators" of county fiscal capacity 
1111 local Purpose Revenues (LPR). This 
simply reflects that fraction of GPR left over 
for local purposes after state- required 
expendnures are met. 
1111 Change in LPR. A declining LPR means 
that the growth in county revenues b not 
keepmg pace wnh the costs of state- rc · 
LjUired programs and suggests that difficult 
trade-offs he tween state and local programs 
may have to be faced. 
1111 Percentage of GPRdedicated to state-
required programs This makes possible 
a comparison of the relauve load various 
counties carry in financmg statc-reLjuired 
prugrams. 
The analyst then applied these con-
cepts to an analysis of county fiscal capacity 
from 1984-85 to 1987-88. The analyst first 
notes that statewide, the capacity of coun-
nes to meet local needs with local revenues 
did not keep pace with population and 
cost-of-hvmg growth for the period While 
LPR mcreascd 12 percent during this pe-
nod, alrcr adjustments for populauon and 
LPRactually dcclitH'd 6. 5 pern:nt 
over the period 
ln addition, counties also bore an 
mcreasmg share of cosLs for state-required 
programs.ln l984-85,counnesusedabout 
50 percent of rhm GPR for state-required 
programs 1987-88, the share had in-
creased to 55 percent. Cost increases in 
state-required programs dearly outpaced 
local revenue growth; costs of state-required 
programs increased 40 percent, general 
pmpoo.;c revnltlc innr:1',q] hy only 26 
percent. See Table l. 
The appearance ol ::,ant a Clara anJ San 
Bernardino counties on Table 3 lead to the 
conclusion that county f1scal stress due to 
the cost o! fmancmg state-reqUired pro-
grams is not JUSt a rural county problem 
For that matter, the fact that Alameda 
County has declined from a 73 percent to 
a 70 percent share of local revenues de-
voted to state programs should be small 
solace - the county was still 15 points 
above the statewide average in 1987-88. lt 
should also be noted that Lake County, 
while snll below the state average GPR 
spent on state programs, has moved 17 
"B y this fiscal year; the 
total criminal justice costs 
(in Yolo County) will be al-
most $16 million; the 
property tax generated i.n 
the county government will 
be only $13 million, The 
system is out of whach , . , " 
-Yolo County Supervisor 
Betsy Marchand 
pcrcenragc pomt~ [rom 2.2 pcrccm to)() 
percent ol GPR 
Growth in County Costs Through 
Governmental Interaction 
Counnes, as partners with all othn 
levels of government and given their as-
signed roles and responstbthties, arc inevi-
tably impacted by the independent acuons 
ol other governments. 
The dlccts of some ol these mtcrgov 
emmcntal actions can be antiupatcd and 
measured; others are not so rcad!ly appar-
ent. Thus, when the state limits rclmbursc-
menrs to prO\ndcrs of services under the 
Medi-Cal program as it has in the past, and 
private providers of these services elect to 
provide them no longer, counucs become 
providers uf last resort. l[ t!Hs means that 
county costs for provision of thc~c state-
required services are not met any better 
than they were for private pnwtdn''· rhcy 
Jo il<ll lt:tVt" t\w U{Jll(Jill<t 1\J-11y lit< ·,<"!VI<,. 
This simply means that dw c:uu!lly f~''ilt'!al 
revenue base lS further degradc~d 
The Cahfomia Legislature, m response 
-·-·~- ·-··---· --· -~--·~---·----·-----
to public demands for increased 
safety and security, has been very anive 
the criminal justice area since the late 
Stiffer sentences, longer sentences, 
tory sentences and new crimes have con-
tnbuted mightily to an explosive in 
state and county incarceration costs 
throughout the JUStice system 
recent studies by the Blue Ribbon Commis-
sion on Inmate Population found 1 hat si nee 
1973 " ... overall crime rates have remained 
relatively stable despite a period of signifi-
cant increases in prison and 
non. 
As a result of the legislative acnvity,jail 
operating costs have grown by more than 
300 percent since 1977-78, while general 
purpose revenue has grown by 64 
percent. In 1977-78, jail operating costs 
were approximately 'b 160 million, and the 
Board of Corrections estimates that 
Jail operating cosLs w!ll soon exceed $1 
billion. )atb are only one very expensive 
pan ol the JUStice system. Whtle there has 
been a strung emphasis on incarceratiOn, 
mher pans of the system have g()ne beg-
ging County probanon staff, for ,,,.,"w"''' 
has been forced to absorb higher 
and supervision of probationers has be-
come virtually non-existent in some coun-
ues. In one of the supreme iromes ol the 
current JUStice system cnsis, ch1c! 
tion officers report that the fastest 
workload area for staff 1s the 
and reports on adult prc-sentcncmg Be-
cause shon-sta[fing of probation officers 
requires more time to produce reports, 
prisoners sit in jails three to four weeks 
longer pendingsenrencing, contributing to 
Jail overcrowding and jail costs. The ulti-
mate irony is that the state lcgtslanve activ-
ny in the criminal justice area is not reim-
bursable as a mandated cost; SB 90/ Article 
XlllH specihcally exempted reimbursement 
for new crimes and infractions. 
Just as the actions of the state tmpact 
adversely on county system costs, 
so too do the actions of counties' other 
crime-fighting partner- the cities. Thanks 
ro the development of a justice system cost 
model, it is now possible to predict the cost 
tmpact of various actions in the 
system upon other pans of it. was 
d1'vclopnl 111 ',;mta Clara ( 'otmty and has 
he en suld to :,cvnal uti wr couttt W'., til< lud 
ing San Otego County and Flonda , [Jade 
' County. 
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For example, the ury of San Drego 
recentlyadded I 16offrcerstoitsPoliceDc-
partmentat autycostof$576 million. The 
action's rrnpact on the county JUStice sys-
tem to pro~.~Tilte, defend, incarcerate 
;111d :idpHlH :11c I, /00 fclorry :urrw., 1>:11'> 
misdemeanors and l ,020 JUVenile actrorb 
-is 140 added staff years and $7. ·4 million 
in added county costs. 
Yolo County Supervisor Betsy 
Marchand commented on the criminal jus-
nee system: .. in 1990 the system cannot 
handle the demands being put on it from 
exploding caseloads ... jail overcrowding, 
gang activity and more and more expensive 
trials. Only ll percent of the caseload 
comes from outside the cities ... By this 
fiscal year, the toral county criminal justice 
costs will be almost $16 million; the prop-
erty tax generated in the county govern-
ment will be only $1 '3 million The 
system is out of whack with the means to 
pay for ir." 
The Cllllrts have al~,o been act rvc 
Nineteen colllltics with 7B percent of the 
jail population are under court-ordered 
population caps pursuant to Article 8 of the 
U.S. Constitution relative to cruel and 
unusual punishment. And, in a non-crimi-
nal jusnce area, we have already seen how 
the courts have impacted GAgrant levels in 
Butte County 
Actions by other governments with 
the mtent to promote safe streets, cut costs 
or attack a social problem ·--· however 
important or desireable -- can result in 
enormous county costs simply because 
counties are there with the responsibility to 
deal with the rest of the problem 
on the impact of state 
and ac:nons upon county general pur-
pose revenues, Merced County Adminis-
trative Officer Clark Channing quipped, 
"There are three hands in the county cash 
drawer the state's, the cities' and the 
counties'." 
Impact of Incorporation and Annexations 
on County General Purpose Revenue 
A December 1989 report by the As-
sembly Office of Research (AOR)- Cali-
fornia Getting Ahead of the Curve -
reviews the impact of incorporations on 
counties. According to the report, the most 
important consequence of new incorpora-
tions on other jurisdictions --- particularly 
countie~ is redistribution of revenues. 
Srmply pw, m the zero sum game of local 
rc·vcnucs, when a new city takes its share of 
p1 operty taxes, the taxes of all other juris-
drctions arc affected. According to AOR, 
captrrrrng for local use revenues that 
wn1· l''''l'l<>rt~,Jy clr·.rllhiHcd r ounrywrdt~, 
tncorlH>J<tliOllS take money from counties 
and shtft it to cines. Unfortunately, the 
county retains responsibility for county-
wide serv1ces that also cover the newly 
incorporated city, including courts, correc-
tions, elections, property tax assessment 
and collection, as well as health and welfare 
services. 
AOR further noted: "Of all California 
counties, San Diego, Sacramento, San Ber-
nardino and Riverside counties face the 
greatest risk from future incorporations 
both in the number of incorporations likely 
to occur, and the magn][udc of resultmg 
fiscal impacts." AO R also reported that as a 
consequence of muluple incorporations in 
San Diego County, the San Dtego Associa-
tion of ( ;ovcrnrncnrs (SAN Di\G) conducted 
a study nf :r hyprrrlH'tJcal I!Hnrpor.llron nf 
the entltt· ur harrl.ll'd ur ur rcor puratt'll area 
of the county. They found that although 
county service costs would decline, county 
resources would decline even further, with 
a net loss to the county of $20 million 
annually. In an analysis of a proposed in-
corporation of the Citrus Heights area in 
eastern Sacramento County, County Ex-
ecutive Brian Richter noted, "Due to rhe 
presence of regional shopping centers within 
the proposed city and inequitable state law 
governing the transfer of property taxes 
Continued on page 26 
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Fiscal Futures, from page 25 
from a county to a newly incorporating city, 
Sacramento Cnumy stands to transfer some 
$4,746,000 more in revenue than is the 
cost of serv1ce responsibility ro Citrus 
Heights." 
Proposition 13 did not bring an end to 
city incorporation activity. Indeed, it may 
have provided some mcemives for incorpo-
ration in offering the prospect of carving 
out choice pieces of a zero-sum pie. Califor-
nia has seen 32 new cities incorporated 
since 1978. Twenty-one of them have been 
in southern California, with Los Angeles 
and San Bernardino getting five each, San 
Diego, four, Riverside, three, and one each 
in Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, Ventura 
and Orange In the north, Contra Costa has 
had three incorporanons since !978, and 
there has been one each in Kings, Alameda, 
San Mateo, Mono, Lake, Yolo, Butte and 
Placer 
The names of some of the new com 
mumnes discloses many are associated wHh 
the more upscale locales of California life 
Paradise, Big Bear Lake, Westlake Village, 
Danville, San Ramon, Mammoth Lakes, 
percent wlme 
The impact of and 
annexations on counry revenues under-
scores that one of rhe factors th<:.n 
negatively on Butte fmances h 
prevalent statewide /\s Butte was vulner-
able to revenue take-outs Oro,·-
ille and Paradise, so too are San 
"11 T vv hile it is tempting 
isolate Butte 
lone example of a 
nia county in fiscal 
our analysis 
many other counties are 
experiencing serious j1scal 
difficulties." 
-Le~rislative Analyst 
San Bcmardmo and Rivers1de 
from their current or cmcs 
1 Orinda, Santa Clarita, Mission As the These findmgs and comments 
reinforce the conclusion of the 
I 
AOR report noted, the 1987 incorporation 
ofSanra Clarita brought together a commu-
nity of 110,000 with an average income of 
$10,000 higher than the Los Angeles 
C:oumy average and a populauon rhat IS 92 
Analyst that serious fiscal di!Ticultic'' arc 
not merely a rural county problem. 
The sales tax ha.s nor been a strong 
revenue source for counucs m recent yc:ars, 
Counties with Greatest Percentage 




























Cowny Land U,,,. f'r,!J< w·,," htllld that 
a]rn,,·,t 18 000 ar res w1·re a!tltt·xed tiJ rhe 
City o! hesnrJ berwcui 1980 and 198'). 
The\r' annexation~ occurred 111 accordance 
wuh < tl!lf'lll l;tnd ll';c pnl11 H", which Ill 
dudnl a!lt()llg lh i';d·, rlw '""' t'lllia!l<lll 
, of urban development withm the ciues. 
While this objective had long been sup-
ported by the county as good land use 
policy, county staff concluded that "the tax 
structure and fiscal arrangements that are 
affected by the land use policies have re-
sulted in the decline of the !!seal health of 
the coumy." 
The report concluded in part: 
• Changes in sales tax agreements (inci-
demal to each new annexation) have re-
sulted in annual losses of almost $82 4,000 
since 1977. 
• Redevelopment projects have resulted 
in an average yearly property tax loss of 
more than $800,000 since 1980, and are 
expected to cost $20 million to $25 millton 
over the :muupated life of the current 
projects 
a Extenstve ctty annexation activity has 
shifted to cities an average of S 3 million per 
year in sales taxes plus $530.000 per year 
in property taxes since 1984. 
• The mZl)onry of services provided by 
the counry arc for residents livmg withm 
the Cities. yn most of the revenues arc 
derived from sources outside the cities. 
The report noted that hetween 1980 
and 1985, the total property tax loss due to 
annexations by ctties within the county was 
$3 million While the county retained $25.2 
milllon of property taxes collected from 
w1thm cnies, services provided to residents 
in those utics cost $57 million, leaving 
$31.8 milhon shortfall to be made up from 
other general purpose county revenue 
generated from umncorporated areas. 
Impact of Redevelopment Projects on 
the County Revenue Base 
Originally in tended as a governmental 
mechanism to restore economically de-
pressed urban areas, redevelopment agen-
cies have --- in the eyes of some critics 
been used for other purposes. The Fresno 
County report bluntly stated, "Many cities 
are using the state redevelopment law as a 
creative financing mechanism to replenish 
func.ls lost from Proposition 13." 
Cnder Cahfomia rec.lcvelopmcnt law, I 
debt financing roo! known as tax incrc-
mcnr fltLlflcmg ha·, hccnthnlro ·,('IVICC 1 he 
dchr 1111 tnrcd hy rcdevclopnwnt project~ 
Whn1 a redevelopment agency mLur~ debt, 
the property tax hasc wirh111 agency h(>unda-
rws J'; frn7en and the agency is nJtrtled to 
1<., ,·lvt· 'l/1 p('t< n11 of tlw Ltx Ill< n·nwiJI', 
generated from the n:devclopm<'llt area !ut 
the life of the project Tax shanng agree-
ments between the redevelopment agency 
and all property taxing emities in the rede-
velopment area may be negotiated for 20-
40 year terms. The tax increments pro-
duced within project areas arc used to 
repay any debt incurred in the redevelop-
ment area. 
The Fresno report noted that it was 
originally thought that Proposition 13 would 
eliminate redevelopment activities in Cali-
fornia because a reduction in property tax 
revenues would limit the amount of tax 
Increments available ro reduce debt gener-
ated hy rcdevcluprncnt agencies. The rv-
port ohservnl that only two Fresno uucs 
had redevelopment agencies bc!orc pa~­
sagc of Proposition 13· Fresno ( jl)')()) and 
P;ulwr ( I <J7B) S(T l;thk "1 
I lie report !ound that thrH· WCH' 21 
redevelopment area:, m 11 ot hesno 
County's 15 cities, and that in some cases 
the entire city has been included in a 
redevelopmentarea. In Coalinga, Huron, 
Mendota, Orange Cove and Parlier, " ... any 
increase in the tax increment \vithin the 
city goes ro that agency, including that 
which is unrelated to activi tics of the agency, 
such as reassessment of property which is 
sold \vi thin the redevelopment area.~, hut rs 
not part of the program." 
The report concluded that " .. .since 
Continued on page 28 


































City-Formed Redevelopment Agencies 











I ______ J 
May/June 1990 • California County • 27 
fiscal futures, from page 2 7 
1980, the coumy . has lost more thdn 
$6.5 million in propLTty tax revenue to 
redevelopment agenoes "The pace of the 
loss is increasing: from $) l 5,000 m l'JHli-
81 to $1.4 millic>n m 1986-87. 
A somewhat softer as~,·ssm.·m o[ rccle-
velopment trends lS lou lid in the /1.( )R'-. 
December 1989 rcptlrt, Califorma 2tl00 
Getting Ahead u[ the Growth Curw I he 
Future of local Covcmrncm in Calitom1a." 
"The prompt creanon of city redevel-
opment agencies after a commumty incor-
porates is another expresswn of Cltit:s' 
compelling imerest in and need for redevel-
opment," it said "Of the 2 7 new cities 
fom1ed between November l973andjanu-
aty 198 7, 16 formed redevelopment agen-
cies, 11 of which were formed withm two 
years after the cLue of Even 
two of the four ;mu-gruwth communttics 
formed redevelopment t! the 
activtty of redn-clopmcnr 111 the 
state is indicatJ\'t' ol the future d!on:; ol 
such agencies. the tmpact will be stgnth-
cant. 
The AOR, which also tabulated the 
growth of redewlopment agencies smcc 
Proposition 13, noted thatwh!le the number 
of agencies grew by 81 percent, projeCt 
areas grew by more than l 00 percent " 
and tax incremem revenue mcreac.ed over 
650 percent'" The growth noted by AOR 
represents an actual dollar growth in tax 
increment revenue from $100 million in 
1978-79 to nearly $700 million in redevel-
opment agency revenue m 1986-87. 
AOR's suggestion that the future 
impact of redevebpmcm agencies will be 
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NORMAN W HICKEY 
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER 
(619) 531 6226 
(Location Code 730) 
June 21, 1990 
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 
1600 PACIFIC HIGHWAY. SAN DIEGO. CALIFORNIA 92101-2472 
Sam Farr, Chairman 
Assembly Committee on Local Government 
State Capitol 
P.O. Box 942849 
Sacramento, CA 94249-0001 
Dear Assemblyman Farr: 
APPENDIX L 
Thank you for your letter concerning the June 11th Informational 
Hearing. I am sorry I had to leave to catch the plane but the 
flights to San Diego are few and inconvenient. I think the work 
of your committee is very important and can lead to resolving the 
growing problem of our state-county partnership. 
I have attached, for your information, my unedited comments I had 
planned to make at the Committee Hearing. Please use them as you 
see fit. I think my past experience as a state executive and 
current position as a county executive can provide your committee 
with a unique perspective. I am looking forward to working with 
you to solve our mutual concerns. 
,9~--
Sincer~ly/ ~ 
D~ E. JA EN 




MOST DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING STATE MANDATES FOCUS ON THE 
MANDATED CLAIMS PROCESS (UNFUNDED MANDATES) NOW ADMINISTERED BY THE 
STATE COMMISSION ON MANDATES. HOWEVER, THIS PROCESS IS NOT THE 
SIGNIFICANT ISSUE TODAY. 
PARTNERSHIP IS THE REAL ISSUE - AND THAT PERTAINS TO COUNTIES 
BEING AN ARM OF THE STATE CARRYING OUT ALL STATE REQUIRED PROGRAMS, 
AND COUNTIES NO LONGER HAVING REVENUE GENERATING CAPABILITIES. 
COUNTIES GENERALLY DO NOT COMPLAIN ABOUT FUNDED PROGRAMS; AND 
COUNTIES ARE NOT CONCERNED JUST ABOUT NEW PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED 
AFTER 1975, BUT ARE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE COSTLY BASIC PROGRAMS 
THAT ARE PROVIDED ON BEHALF OF THE STATE AND FALL OUTSIDE OF THE 
REIMBURSEMENT PROCESS. 
IT WAS NOT PROPOSITION 13 THAT FIRST CHANGED THE PARTNERSHIP 
BETWEEN COUNTIES AND THE STATE, BUT RATHER THE PASSAGE OF SB 90 IN 
1972. AND THE ISSUE FORCING THE CHANGE WAS NOT PROGRAM COST GROWTH 
BUT RATHER PROPERTY TAX RELIEF. THE LEGISLATURE SUBSTANTIALLY 
INCREASED THE HOMEOWNERS EXEMPTION TO PROVIDE THE RELIEF, PLACED 
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A CAP ON LOCAL AGENCIES THROUGH A MAXIMUM TAX RATE (CHANGED ONLY 
BY A VOTE OF THE PUBLIC) , AND FOR THE FIRST TIME REQUIRED THE STATE 
TO PAY FOR NEW MANDATES ENACTED AFTER 19./2. WE HAVE NEVER LOOKED 
BACK. 
PROPOSITION 13 ESSENTIALLY PUT THE CONCEPT OF MAXIMUM TAX RATE 
IN THE CONSTITUTION AND PROPOSITION 4 ADDED THE REIMBURSEMENT 
REQUIREMENT AS WELL. AS IN 1972, THE ACTIONS WERE NOT RELATED TO 
PROGRAM NEED, EXISTING LEVELS OF SERVICE OR WELL THOUGHT OUT POLICY 
OPTIONS BUT, RATHER FOCUSED ON PROPERTY TAX RELIEF. 
THE APPROXIMATELY 57% LOCAL PROPERTY TAX REVENUE REDUCTION WAS 
AVERTED, IN PART, BY THE STATE BAILOUT. THIS BAILOUT, ALONG WITH 
THE CONSTITUTIONALLY CAPED REVENUE BASE, DRAMATICALLY CHANGED THE 
DYNAMICS OF THE STATE-COUNTY PARTNERSHIP: 
1. IT CAUSED A HEIGHTENED MISTRUST BETWEEN STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT (THE STATE DOES IN FACT PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL 
FUNDS TO COUNTIES THROUGH SUBVENTIONS, TRIAL COURT 
FUNDING AND THE CLAIMS PROCESS, AND AS A RESULT HAS 
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ESTABLISHED STRICT CONTROLS ON ITS USE. COUNTIES AT THE 
SAME TIME CHAFF UNDER THE LOSS OF LOCAL DISCRETION AND 
BLAME THE STATE FOR THEIR CURRENT FISCAL PROBLEMS.) 
2. IT CREATED COMPETITION BETWEEN CITIES AND COUNTIES FOR 
A SHARE OF THE FIXED PROPERTY TAX BASE 
(INCORP./ANNEX/REDEV.) 
3. IT HAS FOCUSED THE DIALOGUE ON UNFUNDED MANDATES (IN A 
SYSTEM WHERE COUNTIES ARE INSTRUMENTS OF THE STATE BY 
CONSTITUTION) RATHER THAN ON DEFINING THE PARTNERSHIP. 
(OUR BOARD OF SUPERVISORS HAS GONE TO THE POINT OF "JUS'T 
SAYING NO" TO UNFUNDED STATE MANDATES AND REFUSING TO 
PROVIDE SERVICES BEYOND THOSE PAID FOR BY THE STATE.) 
4. IT CREATED STATUTORY INEQUITIES BETWEEN COUNTIES 
PROVIDING THE SAME STATE SERVICES. 
THE HISTORIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THESE TWO LEVELS OF 
GOVERNMENT, WHERE BOTH SHARE IN THE BURDEN OF PROVIDING STATE 
REQUIRED SERVICES HAS FAILED. THE STATE HAS NOT YET COME TO GRIPS 
3 
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WITH WHAT IT BEGAN IN 1972--PROVIDING TAX RELIEF AND CONTROLLING 
THE COST OF STATE PROGRAMS. 
IT IS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND TOMORROW'S 
SOLUTIONS USING THE THINKING WE USED TO SOLVE YESTERDAY'S PROBLEMS. 
THE PARTNERSHIP ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED IN TWO SIMPLE FASHIONS; HAVE 
THE STATE TAKE OVER ALL STATE PROGRAMS AND ADMINISTER THEM DIRECTLY 
OR ALLOW COUNTIES TO REFUSE TO DO STATE PROGRAMS THEY CANNOT 
AFFORD. 
A WORKABLE STRATEGY WILL REQUIRE A COMBINATION OF CONTROLLING 
THE GROWTH AND COST OF ALL STATE PROGRAMS, PROVIDING COUNTIES WITH 
A STABLE AND PROTECTED REVENUE SOURCE AND, PERHAPS REDISTRIBUTING 
RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES. 
OVER THE LONGER TERM, FURTHER WORK IS NEEDED: 
1. A SERIOUS ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATE SHARING OF THE LOAD 
BETWEEN COUNTIES AND THE STATE SHOULD BE DONE; 
2. STANDARDS OF SERVICE AND SERVICE LEVELS IN EXISTING 
PROGRAMS SHOULD BE REVISITED; 
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3. CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE RED TAPE SHOULD BE REDUCED; 
4. IMPROVED WORKING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COUNTIES, SCHOOLS 
AND CITIES SHOULD OCCUR; AND 
5. THERE SHOULD BE MORE OF A SYSTEMS' APPROACH AND LESS 
INCREMENTALISM IN THE MODIFICATION OF AND CREATION OF 
STATE PROGRAMS AND MORE ATTENTION MUST BE PAID TO 
PREVENTION. 
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